Did South Carolina’s School Safety Act let a Fort Mill police officer work at schools outside the town limits?

Short answer No. The 1998 opinion found no grant of general law-enforcement jurisdiction outside Fort Mill in the School Safety Act. It pointed instead to specific pursuit authority or an authorized agreement with the county.
State
South Carolina
Opinion
1998-october-19-1998
Issued
October 19, 1998
Issued by
Office of the South Carolina Attorney General
Requested by
Sergeant G.D. Parker, Town of Fort Mill, Police Department

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 1998. Ask about yours and see what current South Carolina law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official South Carolina Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed South Carolina attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

A Fort Mill police officer assigned to district school safety asked whether the South Carolina School Safety Act gave him authority at two new schools within York County but outside town limits. The Attorney General said it did not. The Act addressed assaults on school personnel, notices of student convictions and other school-safety subjects; the opinion found that none of those provisions expanded a municipal officer's territorial jurisdiction.

The opinion identified two possible sources of authority outside town: a specific statutory pursuit provision and an authorized reciprocal agreement between law-enforcement jurisdictions. It agreed that Fort Mill and the Sheriff's Office needed an agreement for the school assignment and suggested that their attorneys address its terms. An opinion about reciprocal-agreement statutes was described as enclosed, but the enclosure is absent from the linked PDF.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did a school event outside Fort Mill give a town officer statewide authority?
A: No. The opinion said the School Safety Act referred to school-related events but did not alter officers' territorial jurisdiction.

Q: How did the opinion address the officer's assignment to schools in York County?
A: It supported a joint agreement between the town police and sheriff's office. The AG suggested consultation with the town and county attorneys on the specific agreement.

Q: Did the opinion recognize any authority to arrest beyond town limits?
A: It quoted § 17-13-40 as amended in 1998, which allowed certain arrests during pursuit of an offender for an offense committed within the town. The opinion did not treat that limited pursuit provision as general school-officer jurisdiction.

Background and statutory framework

The School Safety Act of 1997 created an assault-and-battery offense involving school personnel and included school notification provisions. The opinion contrasted those provisions with the separately enacted pursuit rule in § 17-13-40. It stated that outside-city authority depended on pursuit or an agreement made under an applicable statute, rather than on a school officer's assignment alone. Its cited 1986 enclosure is not reproduced in the official PDF.

Citations and references

  • Sec. 16-3-612, a school-personnel assault provision quoted by the opinion.
  • Section 59-63-370, the school-notification provision discussed by the opinion.
  • § 17-13-40, the limited pursuit authority quoted by the opinion.

Official title

Regarding: the School Safety Act in its wording of statewide jurisdiction at school functions and events can be interpreted to cover the day to day operations of a school, therefore giving an officer jurisdiction out of jurisdiction.

Requester

Sergeant G.D. Parker, Town of Fort Mill, Police Department

Source

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES M. CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

October 19, 1998

Sergeant G.D. Parker
Town of Fort Mill
Police Department
Post Office Box 274
Fort Mill, South Carolina 29716-027 4

Re: Informal Opinion
Dear Sergeant Parker:
You have sought an opinion regarding the following situation: I am a Fort Mill Police officer newly assigned to be the District Safety Officer for the Fort Mill school system. Two new schools were built that physically reside in the jurisdiction of the York County Sheriffs Office. A reciprocal agreement between the two agencies has been formed to provide co-jurisdiction to combat the problem until we hear from you. What I am asking is if the School Safety Act in its wording of statewide jurisdiction at school functions and events can be interpreted to cover the day to day operations of a school, therefore giving an officer jurisdiction out of jurisdiction. Please consider the problem and issue a ruling for future procedure. Law I Analysis Act No. 80 of 1997 is entitled the "South Carolina School Safety Act of 1997." The Act, among other things creates new S. C. Code Ann. Sec. 16-3-612 which provides as follows:

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Sergeant Parker
Page2
October 19, 1998

(A) For purposes of this section:
( 1) 'Student' means a person currently enrolled in any school. (2) 'School' includes, but is not limited to, a public or private school that contains any grades of kindergarten through twelfth grade, public or private colleges, universities, and any vocational, technical, or occupational school.

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(B) A student who commits an assault and battery, other than one that is aggravated, on school grounds or at a school-sponsored event against any person affiliated with the school in an official capacity including, but not limited to, administrators, teachers, faculty, substitute teachers, teachers' assistants, student teachers, custodial staff, food service staff, volunteers, law enforcement officers, school bus drivers, school crossing guards, or other regularly assigned school-contracted persons is guilt of assault and battery against school personnel which is a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. Other portions of the Act also relate to and encompass school safety. Section 3 of the Act enumerates those instances in which a juvenile can be detained in a secure juvenile detention facility, for example. Section 5 adds to the Code Section 59-63-370 which relates to notification to the school district of convictions or adjudications of delinquency for certain assault or other violent offenses and provides as follows: (I) When a student who is convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for assault and battery against school personnel, as defined in Section 16-3-612, assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature committed on school grounds or at a school-sponsored event against any person affiliated with the school in an official capacity, or a violent offense defined in Section 16- 1-60 is assigned to the Department of Juvenile Justice, the Department of Corrections, or to the Department of

Sergeant Parker
Page 3
October 19, 1998
Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services that agency is required to provide immediate notice of the student's conviction or adjudication to the senior administrator of the school in which the student is enrolled or intends to be enrolled. These agencies are authorized to request information concerning school enrollment from the students convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for assault and battery against school personnel or a violent offense. (2) When a student convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for assault and battery against school personnel or assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature against school personnel is not sentenced to incarceration or probation, the presiding judge shall as part of his sentence order the clerk of the municipal, magistrate, or general sessions court to provide, within ten days, notification of the student's sentence to the appropriate school district for inclusion in the student's permanent record. If the student is under the jurisdiction of the family court and is not referred to the Department of Juvenile Justice, the prosecuting agency must provide notification within ten days to the appropriate school district. (3) An administrator notified pursuant to this section is required to notify each teacher or instructor in whose class the student is enrolled of a student's conviction of or adjudication for assault and battery against school personnel, assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature against school personnel, or a violent crime as defined in Section 16-1-60. This notification must be made to the appropriate teachers or instructors every year the student is enrolled in school. (4) If a student is convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for assault and battery against school personnel, assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature against school personnel, or a violent crime as defined in Section l 6- l-60, information concerning the conviction or adjudication and sentencing must be placed in the student's permanent school record and must be

Sergeant Parker
Page 4
October 19, 1998
foIWarded with the student's permanent school records if the student transfers to another school or school district. Section 6 grants immunity from criminal prosecution and civil liability when making a report of school-related crime in good faith to the extent that the exposure to criminal prosecution or civil liability arises from the same report of school-related crime. Nothing in the School Safety Act speaks either directly or indirectly to the jurisdiction of a law enforcement officer to enforce the Act or the criminal laws of the State. Of course, "it is well-recognized that a law enforcement officer possesses no authority beyond his jurisdiction unless such is expressly authorized by statute." Op. Atty. Gen., June 21, 1995 (Informal Opinion). While it is true that the School Safety Act speaks generally of"schoolrelated events," thereby encompassing school activities away from the school grounds itself, it does not appear that the Legislature contemplated any alteration of a law enforcement officer's territorial jurisdiction thereby. Nothing in the Act evinces an intent to equate the jurisdiction of a school safety officer with activities by the school away from the school grounds, in other words. Likewise, I do not see anything in the Act which would give a school safety officer employed by a municipality jurisdiction outside the town and thus encompass schools beyond the territorial boundaries of the municipality. While such may be a desirable goal, it does not appear that the Legislature contemplated or dealt with the issue of the jurisdiction of a law enforcement officer in the School Safety Act. Only certain officers, such as state constables, SLED agents or state troopers presently possess statewide arrest powers. Indeed, legislation enacted this past session by the General Assembly extended the jurisdiction oflocal law enforcement officers in certain specific situations. Act No. 265 of 1998 amended§ 17-13-40 so as to authorize that in the event the police authorities of a town or city are in pursuit of an offender for a violation of a municipal ordinance or statute of this State committed within the corporate limits, the "authorities may arrest the offender, with or without warrant, at a place within the corporate limits, at a place within the county in which the town or city is located, or at a place within a radius of three miles of the corporate limits." (emphasis added). No mention was made in this Act of other exceptions (such as the School Safety Act) with respect to a municipal police officer possessing authority outside the territorial jurisdiction of a municipality. It is well-recognized tenet of statutory construction that the express enumeration of particular things excludes the idea of something else not mentioned. Pa. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Parker, 282 S.C. 546, 320 S. W.2d 458 (Ct. App. 1984).

Sergeant Parker
Page 5
October l 9, l 998
Thus, I agree with you that there is the need for a joint agreement between your agency and the Sheriff's Office concerning this matter. I am enclosing a copy of an Opinion, Op. Atty. Gen., No. 86-79 (July 11, 1986) which discusses in considerable detail the various statutes which authorize these reciprocal agreements. We have consistently advised that "
... whether or not a ... city police officer could exercise law enforcement authority outside the city limits . . . would depend upon whether the officer was in pursuit of an offender or whether an agreement between jurisdictions pursuant to one of the referenced statutory provisions existed by which an officer was specifically authorized to act outside his jurisdiction." Thus, because I am unaware of any provision in the School Safety Act which would give Fort Mill police officers general law enforcement jurisdiction outside the Town, I suggest your Department consult with the Town Attorney and the County Attorney with respect to the specific details of a reciprocal agreement to provide jurisdiction for your officers outside the town limits. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I am Very truly yours,
/J

/Jilr

If~bert D. Cook

Assistant Deputy Attorney General
RDC/ph
Enclosure

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