Could a South Carolina town ordinance require a municipal judge to impose a fixed fine?

Plain-English summary

In 2003, South Carolina's Attorney General concluded that a municipal ordinance could not require a judge to impose a fixed fine for an ordinance violation if doing so restricted the judge's sentencing discretion under state law. A town could set fines and penalties within statutory limits, but could not use an ordinance to override authority granted to municipal judges by the state.

The opinion relied on City of North Charleston v. Harper, which invalidated an ordinance's mandatory jail sentence because it displaced judicial discretion. The AG applied the same reasoning to the mayor's question about a stipulated fine.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2003. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Municipal judges

The AG described state law as giving judges discretion to impose punishment within authorized limits and to suspend sentences. A mandatory fine set by local ordinance could not eliminate that discretion.

Town councils

Section 5-7-30 allowed a municipal governing body to fix fines and penalties for ordinance violations, subject to statutory ceilings. The opinion said that power did not permit an ordinance to prescribe one unavoidable sentence for the judge to impose.

Common questions

Could a town require the same fine in every case under an ordinance?
The AG said no if the fixed amount deprived the municipal judge of discretion that state law granted.

Could a municipal judge impose a different sentence from the ordinance's mandatory amount?
The opinion treated the judge's state-law discretion as controlling within the statutory sentencing limits.

What case did the AG rely on?
In City of North Charleston v. Harper, the state supreme court held that a mandatory local jail sentence conflicted with state law protecting municipal judicial discretion. The AG applied that principle to mandatory fines.

Background and statutory framework

The mayor asked whether a judge could change a fine specified in a municipal ordinance. Section 5-7-30 addressed a governing body's power to set ordinance penalties. Sections 14-25-65 and 14-25-75 addressed a municipal judge's sentencing and suspension powers. The office concluded that a local fixed-fine command could not restrict the judge's discretion under those provisions.

Citations and references

The opinion discussed Section 5-7-30, Section 14-25-65, Section 14-25-75, and City of North Charleston v. Harper.

Official title

Questioning whether a municipal ordinance specifies a particular amount of a fine for a certain violation. Specifically, if a municipal judge has the authority to change the stipulated fine.

Requester

The Honorable N. R. Salley, Sr., Mayor, Town of Salley

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/october-15-2003-3/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/03oct-15-Salley.pdf

Original opinion text

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The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
liENRY McMAsrER
ATI'ORNEY GENERAL

October 15, 2003

The Honorable N. R. Salley, Sr.
Mayor, Town of Salley
Post Office Box 484
Salley, South Carolina 29137-0484
Dear Mayor Salley:
In a letter to this office you questioned whether if a municipal ordinance specifies a particular amount of a fine for a certain violation, does a municipal judge have the authority to change the stipulated fine.

S.C. Code Ann. Section 5-7-30 (Supp. 2002) provides that "(t)he municipal governing body may fix fines and penalties for the violation of municipal ordinances and regulations not exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisonment not exceeding thirty days, or both." S.C. Code Ann. Section 14-25-65 (Supp. 2002) states in part that "(i)f a municipal judge finds a party guilty of violating a municipal ordinance or a state law within the jurisdiction of the court, he may impose a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or imprisonment for thirty days, or both." Furthermore, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. Section 14-25-75 (Supp. 2002), "(a)ny municipal judge may suspend sentences imposed by him upon such terms and conditions as he deems proper including, without limitation, restitution or public service employment."

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As indicated in City of North Charleston v. Harper, 306 S.C. 153, 410 S.E.2d 569 (1991), the provisions in Title 14 " ... allow municipal judges a great degree of discretion to impose appropriate punishment and to suspend sentences." In that decision, the supreme court dealt with a situation where a municipal drug ordinance prohibiting the possession of marijuana provided a specific sentence in mandating that a violator of the particular ordinance " ... shall be sentenced to thirty (30) days in jail." Referencing Sections 14-25-75 and 14-25-65, the Court commented: Municipal judges' discretionary authority has been given pursuant to state law. The City has attempted to circumvent this grant of authority by enacting an ordinance which by its terms deprives municipal judges of discretionary authority. Power granted pursuant to state law can be restricted only by state law. A local government may not forbid what the legislature expressly has licensed, authorized or required.

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REMBERT C. DENNIS Bun.DING • Posr OFFICE Box 11549 • COLUMBIA, S.C. 29211-1549 • TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970 • fACSIMIIE: 803-253-6283

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The Honorable N. R. Salley, Sr.
Page2
October 15, 2003

306 S.C. at 157. As a result, the Court ruled that a municipal ordinance which expressly stated that a violator of that ordinance" ... shall be sentenced to thirty (30) days in jail" conflicted with state law and was, therefore, void.

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As referenced in a prior opinion of this office dated December 29, 1982, "(i)t is generally held that a sentencing judge is vested with broad discretion to mete out the sentence he thinks appropriate after all the facts are before him." See also: State v. Sidell, 262 S.C. 397, 205 S.E.2d 2 (1974) (broad discretion is given to trial judge in imposing sentence within legal limits). Therefore, as to your situation, a municipal ordinance cannot specify a particular fine so as to limit the discretionary authority of a judge in sentencing within his statutorily authorized limits. Sincerely,

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Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General