Could a fight between two brothers in the same South Carolina home qualify as criminal domestic violence?

Short answer The 2002 informal AG opinion said a brother was a household member under the then-existing statute’s second-degree blood-relationship definition. Physical harm or an attempt meeting the statute’s elements against a sibling therefore could qualify as criminal domestic violence.
State
South Carolina
Opinion
2002-october-15-2002-1
Issued
October 15, 2002
Issued by
Office of the South Carolina Attorney General
Requested by
Ms. Michelle S. Peahuff, Victim Advocate, Union County

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 2002. Ask about yours and see what current South Carolina law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official South Carolina Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed South Carolina attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

A Union County victim advocate asked whether a fight between two brothers in the home was criminal domestic violence or assault. In an October 2002 informal opinion, an Assistant Attorney General said siblings came within the then-existing statutory definition of “household member” because they were related by blood within the second degree. Physical harm, or an attempt or offer meeting the law's other elements, against a sibling could therefore fall under the domestic-violence statute.

The letter did not determine what happened in a specific fight. Its answer addressed whether the brothers' relationship satisfied the statutory household-member requirement. It cited a South Carolina Supreme Court observation that a victim's brother fell within the second degree of consanguinity.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2002. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did brothers count as household members under the statute discussed? A: Yes. The AG said siblings were related by blood within the second degree under the law then in force.

Q: Did every disagreement between brothers become criminal domestic violence? A: No. The opinion tied its conclusion to the physical-harm, attempt or offer elements of the statute; it did not decide a particular incident's facts.

Q: Was this a formal Attorney General opinion?
A: No. The letter identified itself as an informal opinion by the signing Assistant Attorney General.

Background and statutory framework

The letter read §16-25-10's household-member definition with the prohibited conduct in § 16-25-20. It also cited Arthurs ex rel. Estate of Munn v. Aiken County for the sibling relationship under the then-existing definition.

Citations and references

  • §16-25-10: then-existing household-member definition.
  • § 16-25-20: prohibited physical harm and attempted harm.
  • Arthurs ex rel. Estate of Munn v. Aiken County: court observation about a brother's relationship.

Source

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLIE CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

October 15, 2002

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Ms. Michelle S. Peahuff
Victim Advocate, Union County
414 South Pinckney Street
Union, South Carolina 293 79

Re: "Household Member" Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §16-25-10
Dear Ms. Peahuff:
By letter to this Office, you have requested an opinion relating to the above-referenced Code Section. Specifically, you ask " ... whether or not 2 brothers fighting in the home is CDV or Assault?" The general prohibition of criminal domestic violence is found in S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-20 which provides that "[i]t is unlawful to: (1) cause physical harm or injury to a person's own household member, (2) offer or attempt to cause physical harm or injury to a person's own household member with apparent present ability under circumstances reasonably creating fear of imminent peril." Section 16-25-10 provides that " ... 'household member' means spouses, former spouses, parents and children, persons related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, persons who have a child in common, and a male and female who are cohabiting or formerly have cohabited (emphasis added)." Consanguinity is the relationship of persons of the same blood or origin. See Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999). As this Office has previously recognized, a "(r]elationship 'within the second degree' refers to husband and wife, parent and child, grandparent and grandchild, and brother and sister." See OP. ATTY. GEN. DATED MARCH 1, 1963. Therefore, the act of a person causing physical harm or injury (or an attempt to commit such an act) to his or her sibling would qualify as a prohibited act pursuant to Section 16-25-20. This position was recently stated by our Supreme Court in Arthurs ex rel. Estate of Munn v. Aiken County, 551 S.E.2d 579, 346 S.C. 97 (2001). While not directly related to its holding, the Court in Arthurs noted that a victim's brother was within the second degree of consanguinity under Section 16-25-10. 551 S.E.2d at 584.

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POST OFFICE Box 11 549

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COLUMBI A, S.C. 292 11-1 549

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TELEPHONE : 803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE : 803-253-6283

Ms. Peahuff
Page 2
October 15, 2002

This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General and not officially published in the manner of a formal opinion.

David K. Avant
Assistant Attorney General
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