Did Lexington School District Four need county governing-body consent before selling or leasing school property?

Plain-English summary

A senator asked whether Lexington School District Four remained subject to the county-consent rule for selling or leasing school property after Act No. 601 abolished the county board of education and transferred its powers. The Assistant Deputy AG concluded that the local act did not appear to exempt the district from §59-19-250. Under the quoted statute, where a county lacked a county education board, the county governing body’s consent was required before trustees sold or leased district property.

The author noted that earlier informal opinions had reached the same bottom line without expressly discussing Act No. 601. He used the history of the consent provision, added when other counties had already abolished their boards, to support continued application after devolution. He distinguished an earlier Spartanburg analysis because that county board had not been abolished; its powers were only limited. The letter did not decide a particular proposed sale.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did abolishing the Lexington county education board remove the consent requirement? A: The author said no; the statute assigned consent to the county governing body when no county education board existed.

Q: Had the prior AG letters discussed Act No. 601 expressly? A: No. This letter said they had reached the result but had not expressly addressed that local act.

Q: Why was the Spartanburg opinion different? A: The letter said Spartanburg’s board still existed, though its powers had been limited.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion read §59-19-250 with Act No. 601, 1994 s.c. Acts 6068 and the legislative history of county consent. It treated the statute’s county-governing-body clause as applicable when the county education board had been abolished.

Citations and references

Authorities discussed: §59-19-250; Act No. 601, 1994 s.c. Acts 6068. Case cited: Timmons v. South Carolina Tricentennial Commission.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/october-15-1997/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/97oct15wilson.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
October 15, 1997

CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

The Honorable Joe Wilson
Senator, Lexington County
P.O. Box 5709
West Columbia, South Carolina 29171
{Also by fax 791-8410)
Dear Senator Wilson:
You have requested the advice of this Off ice as to the whether the consent provisions of S 59-19-250 (1976) apply to Lexington County School District Four when the Lexington County Board of Education has been abolished and its powers devolved upon the school districts board of trustees of that County pursuant to Act No. 601, 1994 s.c. Acts 6068. Previous Informal Opinions of this Office {Ops. Atty. Gen. October 30, 1995 and February 26, 1996) have concluded that the District is subject to the provisions of
§59-19-250 which provides as follows:
The school
trustees of the several
districts may sell or lease school property, real or personal, in their school district whenever they deem it expedient to do so and apply the proceeds of any such sale or lease to the school fund of the district. The consent of the county board of education in those counties which do not have a county board of education, the governing body of the county, shall be first obtained by the trustees desiring to make any such sale or lease .... (emphasis added)

or;

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Your question is whether Act 601 exempts the District from §59-19250. The two previous informal opinions did not expressly address that Act which is apparently not indexed in the Index to Local Laws of the Code. The following rules of statutory construction are relevant here:

REMBERT

c. DENNIS BUILDING

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POST OFFICE Box 11549

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COLUMBIA, S.C. 29211-1549

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TELEPHONE:

803-734-3970

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The Honorable Joe Wilson
October 15, 1997
Page 2
"If the intent of the legislature be clearly apparent from the language, the court may not embark upon a search for it dehors the statute. *** "But where the language of the statute gives rise to uncertainty as to the legislative intent , the search for that intent may range; for it must be gathered from a reading of the statute as a whole in light of the circumstances and conditions existing at the time of its enactment." Timmons v. South Carolina Tricentennial Commission, 254 s.c. 378, 175 S.E. 2d 805, 817 (1975), quoting Abel v. Bell, 229 s.c. 1, 91 S.E. 2d 548. Although the language of §59-19-250 is plain that the county governing body must give its consent in counties that do not have a county board of education, the circumstances at the time of the passage of the law adding the county consent provision also support this conclusion. The predecessor to §59-19-250 did not contain the county consent provision until it was added by Act No. 970, 1972 s.c. Acts 2126. See § 21-247, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962. When this change was made in 1972, a number of other county school boards had been abolished and their powers devolved upon county school districts. See~· Act No. 821, 1966 s.c. Acts 2133 (Colleton Co.).; Act No. 930, 1970 s.c. Acts 2013 (Kershaw Co.); see also School Districts of South Carolina, Organization and Adiiiinistration, s.c. Department of Education, Table 1, 1988. That the legislature adopted the county governing body consent requirement of §59-19-250 when other school districts had been devolved the powers of county boards of education indicates a legislative intent that the consent of the county governing body would be required under those circumstances. This process of devolution has continued since then in other counties such as Lexington without exemption from §59-19-250. Act No. 780 §3, 1988 s.c. Acts 6441 (Laurens County); see also School Districts, supra. 1 In conclusion, Act No. 601 of 1994 does not appear to exempt Lexington School District Four from the provisions of §59-19-250. I hope that this information is of assistance to you.

1

These conclusions concerning Lexington are distinguishable from those reached concerning Spartanburg County in another Informal Opinion (December 15, 1996). Al though that Opinion concluded that Spartanburg districts were exempt from §59-19-250, the County Board was not abolished. Instead, the Board's powers were limited to matters unrelated to the sale of district property.

The Honorable Joe Wilson
October 15, 1997
Page 3
Yours veI¥
truly,
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J. Emory Smith, Jr.

Assistant Deputy Attorney General

CC:

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The Honorable Jake Knotts
Jeffrey M. Anderson, Esquire

JESjr.
Reviewed and Approved by:

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Zeb C. Williams, III
Deputy Attorney General