Did South Carolina’s 1974 local act still support New Ellenton police jurisdiction over the school campus outside town?

Plain-English summary

New Ellenton's city attorney asked in 2005 whether a 1974 local act still gave town police jurisdiction over school grounds beyond the town limits. The Attorney General said the act carried a presumption of constitutionality. A special local law could be justified by distinctive circumstances concerning the schools, and the AG could not determine those facts in an opinion. Only a court could declare the act unconstitutional. He therefore said the presumption should prevail in this instance.

The AG also pointed to a separate statutory route if officials had doubts about using the 1974 act. The statute, as quoted in the opinion, allowed a municipality to contract with a public agency for police protection outside municipal limits, with the service area's legal description filed with specified state and county offices. He noted an earlier AG opinion treating a school district as a public agency for that provision. He did not find that a particular contract had been made.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2005. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did the AG declare New Ellenton's 1974 school-policing act invalid?
No. He said its presumption of constitutionality should prevail on the facts available to his office.

Did he decide whether the schools had the distinctive local circumstances needed to support a special law?
No. He said determining those facts was outside the scope of an AG opinion.

What alternative authority did the opinion identify for police service beyond town limits?
It quoted the statute on a municipality contracting with a public agency for police protection outside its boundaries.

Background and statutory framework

Act No. 1135 of 1974 named a school campus beyond New Ellenton's corporate limits. The AG considered the state constitution's restriction on special legislation and decisions describing the presumption favoring enacted laws. He then discussed the separate municipal contract authority in § 5-7-110.

Citations and references

• Act No. 1135 of 1974: school-campus jurisdiction provision discussed in the request.
• § 5-7-110: municipal police authority and contract provision quoted in the opinion.

Official title

Questioning whether local law is effective giving the New Ellenton police department jurisdiction on the grounds of the New Ellenton Middle School.

Requester

Kelly F. Zier, Esquire

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/november-9-2005/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/05nov9zier.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
HENRv McMAsTER
ATfORNEY GENERAL

November 9, 2005

Kelly F. Zier, Esquire
New Ellenton City Attorney
502 West A venue
North Augusta, South Carolina 29841
Dear Mr. Zier:

In a letter to this office you indicated that in 1974 local legislation was enacted giving the New Ellenton police department jurisdiction ofthe campus ofthe New Ellenton Middle School. Act No. 1135 of 1974 states: The police department of the Town of New Ellenton in Aileen County shall have the same jurisdiction at the combined campus of the New Ellenton Junior High School and the Talatha Hawthorne Elementary School, which is located on Whiskey Road approximately one mile beyond the corporate limits of the town, as it has within the corporate limits of the town itself. You have questioned whether such local law is effective as to give the New Ellenton police department jurisdiction on the grounds of the New Ellenton Middle School. (!!''

It appears that you are questioning whether such legislation is constitutional in light of the provisions of Article Ill, Section 34(1X) of the State Constitution which prohibit the adoption of a special law where a general law may be made applicable. However, as stated in Shillito v. City of Spartanburg, 214 S.C. 11, 20, 51 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1948),

The language of the Constitution which prohibits a special law where a general law can be made applicable, plainly implies that there are or may be cases where a special act will best meet the exigencies of a particular case, and in no wise be promotive of those evils which result from a general and indiscriminate resort to local and special legislation. There must, however, be a substantial distinction having reference to the subject matter of the.. .legislation , between the objects or places embraced in such legislation and the objects and places excluded. The marks ofdistinction upon which the classification is founded must be such, in the nature of things, as will in some reasonable degree, at least, account for or justify the restriction of the legislation.

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Mr. Zier
Page2
November 9, 2005

In Medical Society of South Carolina v. Medical University of South Carolin~ 334 S.C. 270, 279, 513 S.E.2d 352, 358 (1999) it was stated that

The General Assembly must have a logical basis and sound reason for resorting to special legislation ... [and the Supreme Court] ... will not overrule the legislature's judgment that a special law is necessary unless there has been a clear and palpable abuse oflegislative discretion.

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As stated in a prior opinion of this office dated July 31, 2003 also dealing with the question of constitutionality pursuant to Article ID, Section 34,
... one key consideration as to whether an act is unconstitutional under Article III, Section 34 is whether there are any peculiar local circumstances which would justify special treatment for the local area in question. Generally, there is a strong presumption of constitutionality that attaches to any legislation enacted by the General Assembly. University of South Carolina v. Mehlman, 245 S.C. 180, 139 S.E.2d 771 · (1964). While this office may comment upon potential constitutional problems, it is solely within the province of the courts of this State to declare an act of the General Assembly unconstitutional. While Act No. 1135 contains no legislative findings, there may be ''marks of distinction" regarding the two schools provided for in the legislation which require a special set of laws to authorize increased police jurisdiction. Of course, ascertainment of any such facts would be outside the scope of an opinion of this office. Because these ''marks of distinction" may well have been taken into account by the General Assembly in enacting such legislation, I am of the opinion that the presumption of constitutionality should prevail in this instance. However, if there is any doubts as to proceeding pursuant to the referenced legislation, consideration could be given to the provisions ofS.C. Code Ann.§ 5-7-110 which states: Any municipality may appoint or elect as many police officers, regular or special, as may be necessary for the proper law enforcement in such municipality and fix their salaries and prescribe their duties. Police officers shall be vested with all the powers and duties conferred by law upon constables, in addition to the special duties imposed upon them by the municipality. Any such police officers shall exercise their powers on all private and public property within the corporate limits of the municipality and on all property owned or controlled by the municipality wheresoever situated; provided. that the municipality may contract with any public utility, agency or with any private business to provide police protection beyond the corporate limits. Should the municipality provide police protection beyond its corporate limits by contract, the legal description of the area to be served shall be

Mr. Zier
Page3
November 9, 2005

filed with the State Law Enforcement Division, the office of the county sheriff and the Department of Public Safety. (emphasis added). Therefore, there may be expanded police protection outside the corporate limits of a municipality pursuant to a contract with a public agency. I am enclosing a copy of a prior opinion of this office dated May 28, 2002 which concluded that a school district could be considered a public agency for purposes of such provision. You may wish to consider such statute with regard to the possibility of providing police protection outside the municipal limits.

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With kind regards, I am,
Sincerely,

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Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

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Assistant Deputy Attorney General