Can a South Carolina jail director start a work program for people held in civil contempt?

Plain-English summary

In 1999, the South Carolina Attorney General's office told the Pickens County Prison director that he could not establish a work program for inmates held under civil-contempt orders. The director proposed having courts decide who could work, with employers sending paychecks to the Clerk of Court for arrearages, fines, daily expenses, and medical costs. The office said a jail administrator's role was to carry out the commitment order, while the sentencing judge controlled the sanctions and the use of earnings.

The opinion distinguished civil contempt, which seeks compliance with a court decree, from criminal contempt, which punishes. It said a judge could create a work program through the contempt order. The letter was expressly an informal opinion of the signing attorney.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1999. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Could the prison director establish the proposed civil-contempt work program? A: The AG's office said no. Designing the program would exceed a jail administrator's duty to carry out the court's commitment order.

Who could decide which civil-contempt inmates worked?
A: The opinion assigned that decision to the judge who issued the contempt order.

Who could direct how an inmate's wages were used?
A: The sentencing judge could provide in the order for earnings to be applied to arrearages, fines, or expenses the judge considered appropriate. The director could not set those terms independently.

Background and statutory framework

Pickens County already had resolutions for work release on private jobs. The prison director proposed a separate arrangement for civil-contempt inmates. The office relied on the judge's control of civil-contempt sanctions and its prior view that jail officers perform a ministerial duty under commitment orders.

Citations and references

The opinion discussed Curlee v. Howle and two earlier South Carolina AG opinions on the jailer's duty to follow commitment orders.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/november-5-1999/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/99nov-5-floyd.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLIE CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

November 5, 1999
W. Jerry Floyd, Director
Pickens County Prison
186 Prison Camp Road
Pickens, South Carolina 29671
Dear Mr. Floyd,
Thank you for your letter of August 9, 1999, to Attorney General Condon which has been referred to me for a response. You ask for an opinion concerning a possible work program for inmates sentenced for civil contempt.

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By way of background you provide the following information: The county council has passed resolutions implementing work release programs in which incarcerated inmates may continue to work on private jobs. You would like to begin a work program for civil contempt inmates in which the court determines eligibility and the paychecks are sent directly from the employers to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk would then apply the monies to arrearages, fines, per diem expenses, and necessary medical expenses. It is well-settled that the imposition of a sentence for contempt is a matter generally within the discretion of the trial judge. Mosley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 306 S.E.2d. 624 (1983) (Lewis, C.J., dissenting). As is also commonly recognized,
[i]n the absence of legal restrictions, the nature or character of the punishment for contempt is within the discretion of the court, and the court may imprison or fine, or do both, or impose some other penalty, or may discharge the offender absolutely or conditionally. 17 C.J.S., Contempt, § 92. Furthermore, criminal contempt and civil contempt serve separate functions. The principal purpose of criminal contempt is punishment. In civil contempt, however. the contemnors "carry the keys of prison in their own pockets" as the contempt serves to secure "compliance with judicial decrees." Curlee v. Howle, 277 S.C. 377, 384, 287 S.E.2d 915, 919 ( 1982). Only the judge who issues the civil contempt order, which is designed to ensure a specific goal, has the discretion to control the sanctions imposed on the inmate.

W. Jerry Floyd
Page 2
November 5, 1999

This Office has previously opined that the duty of a jail administrator or officer is ministerial in nature and is strictly limited to compliance with the court's commitment orders. Op. Atty. Gen. May 8, 1995; Op. Atty. Gen. March 27, 1995. Because the jailer can only carry out the mandate of the court order, the jail administrator does not have the authority to design or implement a program for civil contempt inmates. Instead, it is the judge's contempt order that not only should determine the eligibility of a contemnor for a work release program, but should also provide for the disposition of monies earned to any arrearages, fines, or expenses the judge deems appropriate.

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Given the specific remunerative nature of the civil contempt order and the limited ministerial authority of a jail administrator, the sanctions imposed on the contemnor are solely within the discretion of the sentencing judge. It is the opinion of this Office, therefore, that your proposal to implement a work program for civil contempt inmates would encroach upon the authority of the courts. Of course, the court itself could institute such a program as part of its order should it so desire. Accordingly, you may wish to contact the Family Court judges in the area concerning this matter. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Senior Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General not officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I remain

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Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General