Did South Carolina sheriffs have general law-enforcement authority outside their own counties?

Plain-English summary

The South Carolina Sheriffs' Association asked whether a sheriff's constitutional office or classification as a state official carried general statewide jurisdiction. Some sheriffs believed it did; others understood their authority to stop at county lines except where law provided otherwise.

The Attorney General concluded that territorial jurisdiction was ordinarily limited to the sheriff's county. The opinion read statutes assigning patrol and other duties by county and relied on earlier AG advice and a state Supreme Court decision about the common-law county boundary. It distinguished a deputy's statutory authority to pursue a suspected freshly committed crime into an adjoining county from a general power to act anywhere in the state.

The opinion recognized another narrow situation: a sheriff acting as an officer of the court could be bound by a court order outside the sheriff's county. It also explained that cases calling sheriffs and deputies state officials for other legal purposes did not enlarge their territorial powers. The association was considering legislation to grant statewide jurisdiction; the opinion assessed the law as it stood in 1998.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Did being a state official give a sheriff statewide arrest authority? A: The AG said no. It treated state-official status as separate from the county boundary of a sheriff's ordinary territorial jurisdiction.

Could a deputy pursue a suspect into an adjoining county? A: The opinion quoted Section 23-13-60 as authority for a warrantless arrest in pursuit of a suspected freshly committed crime in an adjoining county. It said that exception did not confer broader jurisdiction.

Could a sheriff ignore an order from a court in another county? A: No. The opinion discussed a state Supreme Court case that upheld a court order directed to a sheriff acting as an officer of that court, despite the court sitting in an adjoining county.

Did the AG identify a general statewide authority for sheriffs? A: No. It concluded that authority outside the home county required a particular statute or the sheriff's role as an officer of the court.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion compared the constitution's creation of the sheriff's office with statutes describing county patrol, court attendance, and limited cross-county pursuit. It addressed the association's question directly while distinguishing official status from territorial power.

Citations and references

The opinion quoted Section 23-13-60 and Section 23-13-70 and discussed a South Carolina Supreme Court case involving a court order to a sheriff. Its PDF contains the full statutory and case analysis.

Official title

Indicating that there is “confusion and disagreement among the sheriffs concerning the subject of statewide jurisdiction.”

Requester

Jeffrey B. Moore, Executive Director, South Carolina Sheriffs’ Association

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/november-17-1998-1/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/98nov17moore.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES M. CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

November 17, 1998

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Jeffrey B. Moore, Executive Director
South Carolina Sheriffs' Association
P. 0. Box 21428
Columbia, South Carolina 29221-1428
Re: Informal Opinion

Dear Mr. Moore:
You indicate in a letter to this Office that there "is confusion and disagreement among the sheriffs concerning the subject of statewide jurisdiction." By way of background, you state that

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[i]t is felt by some that due to the sheriffs' constitutional status, and lacking any statutory prohibition to the contrary, they currently, as well as historically, enjoy statewide jurisdiction. Others, on the other hand, have looked to both the statute and the court to determine their jurisdictional status. As a result, they have come to the conclusion that this jurisdictional authority, with certain exceptions as provided by law, is confined to the boundaries of their respective counties. SCSA, would appreciate the Attorney General's opinion concerning this issue, as we are currently considering legislation that would grant a sheriff, and his deputies, statewide jurisdiction.

REMBERT c. DE'iNIS BUILDING •
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POST OFFICE Box 11549

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COLUMBIA, S.C. 29211-1549

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TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970

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FACSl~llLE: 803-253-6283

Mr. Moore
Page 2
November 17, 1998
Law I Analysis

As you have noted, the Office of Sheriff is a constitutional office. Art. V, Section 24 of the State Constitution provides that

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[t]here shall be elected in each county by the electors thereof a clerk of the circuit court, a sheriff, and a coroner . . . . All of these officers shall serve for terms of four years and until their successors are elected and qualify. The General Assembly shall provide by law for their duties and compensation .... A number of statutes relate to the authority and jurisdiction of a sheriff and his deputies. S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 23-13-60, for example, provides that
[t]he deputy sheriffs may for any suspected freshly committed crime, whether upon view or upon prompt information or complaint, arrest without warrant and, in pursuit of the criminal or suspected criminal, enter houses· or break and enter them, whether in their own county or in an adjoining county.

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Section 23-13-70 further states that "[t]he deputy sheriffs shall patrol the entire county at least twice a week by sections assigned to each by the sheriff, remaining on duty at night when occasion or circumstances suggest the propriety thereof to prevent or detect crime or make an arrest." (emphasis added). In addition, § 23-15-70 authorizes a sheriff or his deputy to "call out the bystanders or posse comitatus of the proper county to his assistance
.... (emphasis added). Pursuant to § 23-15-80, the sheriff or his deputy is required to "attend all the circuit courts that may be held within their respective counties and enforce such rules as such courts may establish." (emphasis added). Section 23-15-100 mandates sheriffs and deputy sheriffs to execute all legal orders directed to them by the governing bodies of their respective counties. In other words, the various statutes relating to the jurisdiction of a sheriff or deputy sheriff clearly indicate that such jurisdiction is limited to that county in which the sheriff is elected and serves. Opinions of the Attorney General and South Carolina case law is in accord. A February 4, 1980 Opinion of the Attorney General states as follows:
[i]nasmuch as the officer in question would in fact be a duly qualified Lexington County deputy sheriff, he would be

Mr. Moore
Page 3
November 17, 1998
restricted to the powers and duties of a deputy sheriff generally. As to your question of whether such a deputy sheriff would have jurisdiction in both Lexington and Richland Counties, Section 23-13-60, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, provides as to deputy sheriffs generally: (t)he deputy sheriffs may for any suspected freshly committed crime, whether upon view or upon prompt information or complaint, arrest without warrant and in pursuit of the criminal or suspected criminal, enter houses or break and enter them, whether in their own county or in an adjoining county .... Therefore, based on the above, a Lexington County deputy sheriff would be authorized to arrest without warrant while in 'hot pursuit' as referenced by Section 23-13-60 in Richland County. This authority however should not be construed to authorize any additional jurisdiction than that expressly specified by the statute.

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I am unaware of any other statutory authority which
would permit any other official acts by such a deputy sheriff in Richland County. By Section 23-13-50, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, 'a duly qualified deputy sheriff may perform any and all of the duties appertaining to the office of his principal.' In the case ofDuRant v. Brown Motor Company, 147 S.C. 88, 144 S.E. 705 (1928), the Supreme Court in holding that a county sheriff is without authority to make seizure in replevin outside his county quoted the following: '(a)t common law a sheriff has no jurisdiction beyond the borders of his own county, the rule being that the acts of an officer outside of his county or bailiwick are unofficial and necessarily void, unless expressly or impliedly authorized by some statute.' 147 S.C. at 92. Therefore, with reference to the authority of

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Mr. Moore
Page4
November 17, 1998
Section 23-13-50 and inasmuch as a sheriffs
jurisdiction is limited to his own county as
expressed above. a deputy sheriffs jurisdiction
would similarly be limited to his own county
except as specifically authorized by statute, as by
Section 23-13-60.

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See also, Op. Atty. Gen., Op. No. 84-70 (June 20, 1984); Op. Atty. Gen., June 21, 1995 (Informal Op.) [police officer limited to his own jurisdiction except where authorized by specific statute]. Our Supreme Court has held that where a Sheriff is acting as an officer of the court, such status may place him in a unique position with respect to the Sheriffs jurisdiction. The case of State v. Brantley, 279 S.C. 215, 305 S.E.2d 234 (1983) is particularly instructive. In Brantley, the trial judge was presiding over a guilty plea proceeding in Hampton County. Leaming that the Sheriff of Jasper County was in possession of certain records, the judge asked the Solicitor's Office to notify the Jasper County Sheriff to appear in court with the records at a designate time. The Sheriff refused to appear, choosing to send the records via a deputy. Upon the Sheriffs failure to be present, the trial judge had word sent back to the Sheriff to appear in court the next morning "without fail." However, the Sheriff again refused. The trial court found the Sheriff in contempt of court. On appeal, the Sheriff argued that the lower court erred in holding him in contempt because he had received no subpoena or subpoena duces tecum and because he was sheriff in an adjoining county rather than the county where court was being held." The Supreme Court found the Sheriffs arguments to be without foundation, however. Reasoning that the order directed to the Sheriff was binding, the Court stated: (t]he court's order was valid, was directed to appellant in his official capacity as an officer of the court, and his wilful failure to comply constituted a constructive contempt of court, which tended to "obstruct and embarrass or prevent the due administration of justice." Long v. McMillan. et al., 226 S. C. 598, 609, 86 S.E.2d 477 (1955). 279 S. C. at 217. Clearly, however, the Court's decision hinged upon the Sheriff in his

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Mr. Moore
Page 5
November 17, 1998
capacity as an officer of the court, rather than any suggestion that the Sheriff possessed statewide jurisdiction generally.

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The confusion regarding the Sheriff's jurisdiction apparently stems from recent cases considering the question of whether the Sheriff is a "state'' or a "county" officer. Most recently. in Cone v. Nettles, 308 S. C. 109, 417 S.E.2d 523 (1992), the Supreme Court of South Carolina found that sheriffs and their deputies are state officers. The Courts reasoning was based upon Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947 (D.C.S.C.), aff'd., 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1989). The Court in Cone stated:
[i]n Gulledge, the court concluded that in South Carolina sheriffs and deputies are state, not county, officials, noting that: (1)

the South Carolina constitution establishes the
office of sheriff and the term of office. S.C.
Const. art. V, § 24;

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(2)

the duties and compensation of sheriffs and
deputies are set forth by the General Assembly;

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(3)

their arrest powers are related to state offenses;
and

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(4)

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the Governor of South Carolina has the authority
to remove a sheriff for misconduct and fill the
vacancy.

Based upon these factors, the court found that the State has the "potential power of control" over the office of sheriff, qualifying the sheriff as a state official. Moreover, a deputy, as an agent of the sheriff, is also "more closely connected to the state than to the county," hence, a state official. 691 F.Supp. at 955. Further, in Heath v. County of Aiken, 295 S.C. 416, 368 S.E.2d 904 (1988), this Court held that deputies are not employees of the county and, accordingly, not covered by county personnel policy and procedure.

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Mr. Moore
Page 6
November 17, 1998
Given this authority, we hold that Deputy Frier is a state official .... 308 S. C. at 112. It should be noted that even though the Court in Gulledge concluded that the Sheriff in South Carolina was a state officer for purposes of the 11th Amendment, still the Court also recognized that" ... the sheriffs territorial jurisdiction, namely county-wide, is in effect prescribed by the legislature through the statutory designation of county boundary lines." (emphasis added). Thus, the Court deemed it not inconsistent to hold the Sheriff was a State officer, but that the Sheriffs jurisdiction is "county-wide".

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Based upon the foregoing, it is my opinion that, notwithstanding the referenced cases, the territorial jurisdiction of the Sheriff is limited to his county except where functioning as an officer of the Court or pursuant to some other specific statute enabling the Sheriff to possess authority outside his county.
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This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I am

Assistant Deputy Attorney General
RDC/ph

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