Could Greenville handle civil parking-ticket appeals through city administrators instead of municipal court?

Plain-English summary

In 2019, South Carolina's Attorney General predicted that a court would find Greenville's civil parking-ticket appeal process sufficient as written. The ordinance let a ticket recipient submit a written challenge for review by a city designee and allowed the city manager to create further administrative procedures. The AG treated that optional extra administrative appeal as distinct from the constitutional right to judicial review.

The requesting Charleston judge had asked about routing appeals to a municipal department rather than municipal court, using Greenville's ordinance as the example. After a clarifying phone call, the AG confined its answer to whether Greenville had to supply an administrative review process. It expressly did not decide municipal-court jurisdiction, the form of judicial review, or any challenge based on how the rule was applied to specific facts.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2019. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could a Greenville parking ticket be reviewed within city administration? A: The ordinance the AG examined provided written review by a city designee and authorized the manager to add procedures.

Q: Did the AG say a second administrative appeal was mandatory? A: No. It read the ordinance as authorizing, but not requiring, the city manager to add another administrative appeal step.

Q: Did an internal city review replace judicial review?
A: No. The AG distinguished the optional internal process from the constitutional right to judicial review.

Q: Did the opinion decide whether every actual parking-ticket decision was fair? A: No. It considered the ordinance in the abstract and expressly left fact-specific challenges unresolved.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion quoted Greenville's civil parking ordinance, including written review of a ticket and the city manager's authority to establish more procedures. The AG cited municipalities' power over roads and parking, then the state constitutional guarantee of notice, an opportunity to be heard, and judicial review for administrative decisions affecting private rights. It predicted the ordinance supplied adequate avenues for appeal on its face.

Citations and references

• S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-30: general municipal authority discussed by the AG.
• S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-710: municipal parking regulation provision quoted in the opinion.
• S.C. Const. art. I, § 22: judicial review guarantee quoted in the opinion.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/november-14-2019-1/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/FloresP-OS-10381-FINAL-Opinion-11-14-2019-02141186xD2C78-02143483xD2C78.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

ALAN WILSON

ATTORNEY GENERAL

November 14, 2019

The Honorable Phyllis Alesia Rico Flores
Administrative Judge

City of Charleston Municipal Court

180 Lockwood Boulevard

Charleston, SC 29403

Dear Judge Flores:

You have requested an opinion from this Office regarding appeals of municipal parking violations. Specifically, you state the following:

The City of Charleston Municipal Court is seeking an opinion regarding legal matters surrounding classifying parking violations as civil violations, unless otherwise subject to criminal penalties pursuant to the South Carolina Code of Laws. May rulings or decisions made by parking administrators regarding civil parking violations be appealed for further review to a department within the municipality, other than the Municipal Court?

The Code of Ordinances, City of Greenville, 42-95 and 42-178 reads: 42-95. — Civil fines for municipal parking violations.

All municipal parking violations established under this
article shall be subject to civil fines only, and not subject
to criminal penalties, except as otherwise mandated by
the general law of the state. Enforcement and
administration shall be pursuant to such written policies
and procedures as are approved by the city manager for
that purpose, inclusive of the amount of such fines,
which shall be approved in reasonable amounts and
incorporated into a schedule of fees.

Sec. 42-178. — Payment and administrative review.
(a) The timed parking fee shall be due and owing to the city
as of the date referenced on the ticket. Failure to pay by

the due date shall result in additional sums due as
provided for on the ticket.

ReniBeRTC. DENNIS BUILDING © POST OFFICE Box 11549 « COLUMBIA, SC 29211-1549 » TELEPHONE 803-734-3970 « FACSIMILE 803-253-6283

The Honorable Phyllis Alesia Rico Flores
Page 2
November 14, 2019

(b) Any person aggrieved by the issuance of the ticket may
seek administrative review by submitting a written
statement as to why the ticket was improvidently issued.
Such written statement must be submitted with payment
of the fee due and received by the city at the address
which appears on the ticket no later than the original due
date for payment referenced on the ticket.

(c) The city manager shall designate such person or persons
in one or more departments as he determines to be
appropriate to review such written statements and to
determine whether a ticket was improvidently issued. If
the designated person determines that the ticket was
improvidently issued, then the fee shall be returned to
the person making the request for review. If the
designated person determines that the ticket was not
improvidently issued, the fee shall be retained and a
written statement of the finding shall be sent to the
person making the request for review.

(d) The city manager is authorized, but not required, to
establish additional procedures for appeal and review as
the manager in administrative discretion determines is
necessary or appropriate, including a hearing before a
hearing officer. The city manager is authorized to
coordinate the administration of this division addressing
timed and reserved parking with other provisions in this
article so that persons being cited with violations may
have their citations administered and adjudicated in
accordance with the general laws of the state as well as
the interests of efficient and fair municipal
administration.

Does 42-178 offer the Defendant legally sufficient avenues for appeal?

Our telephone conversation with you clarified that you are asking this Office to address whether the City of Greenville is required to provide an appeal or review process for decisions of parking administrators. You are not asking us to opine on either the jurisdiction of the municipal court or the judicial review that is to be afforded to parking violations.

LAW/ANALYSIS:
We will begin our analysis with a brief history of municipal governance. The South Carolina

Constitution provides that “[t]he structure and organization, powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities of the municipalities shall be established by general law .. .” S.C. Const, art. VIII, § 9. In response to the

The Honorable Phyllis Alesia Rico Flores
Page 3
November 14, 2019

State Constitution, the Legislature granted municipalities broad powers, including the power to enact and enforce ordinances regarding roads and streets:

[e]ach municipality of the State, in addition to the powers conferred to its specific form of government, may enact regulations, resolutions, and ordinances, not inconsistent with the Constitution and general law of this State, including the exercise of powers in relation to roads, streets...

S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-30 (1976 Code, as amended).'

Pursuant to the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (“Act”),’ municipalities are allowed to establish traffic ordinances and regulations which are not in conflict with the Act See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-30 (1976 Code, as amended). They are further authorized to regulate “the standing or parking of vehicles” “with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power . . .” S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-710 (1976 Code, as amended).

Municipal ordinances must comply with the due process requirements of the South Carolina Constitution. See S.C. Const, Art. I, §3. The State Constitution grants an individual certain procedural rights in administrative matters:

No person shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi-judicial decision of an administrative agency affecting private rights except on due notice and an opportunity to be heard; nor shall he be subject to the same person for both prosecution and adjudication; nor shall he be deprived of liberty or property unless by a mode of procedure prescribed by the General Assembly, and he shall have in all such instances the right to judicial review.

S.C. Const. art. I, § 22.

' In Glasscock v. Sumter County. 361 S.C. 483, 604 S.E.2d 718, 722 (Ct. App. 2004), the Court of Appeals explained the purpose of granting municipalities such broad power or “home rule”:

[t]hat local governments should be afforded a reasonable degree of latitude in devising their own individual procurement ordinances and procedures is entirely consistent with our state's now firmly rooted constitutional principle of “home tule.” By the ratification of Article VIII of our state constitution in 1973, substantial responsibility for city and county affairs devolved from the General Assembly to the individual local governments. “[I]mplicit in Article VIII is the realization that different local governments have different problems that require different solutions.” [Citation omitted].

2 S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-10 et seq. (1976 Code, as amended).
3 They are also subject to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-930 (1976 Code, as amended), which prohibits municipalities from

placing or maintaining traffic-control devices upon state highways without written permission from the Department of Transportation.

The Honorable Phyllis Alesia Rico Flores
Page 4
November 14, 2019

Greenville ordinance 42-178 establishes an administrative review process and expressly authorizes the city manager to exercise discretionary control to "coordinate the administration of this division . . . in accordance with the general laws of the state." More broadly, it appears that the Ordinance establishes a framework for an administrative process and leaves it to the city manager to ensure an appropriate procedural process. Furthermore, the South Carolina Constitution guarantees the right to judicial review to a person aggrieved by the result of an administrative or quasi-administrative review, which we understand to be distinct from the administrative appeal process which the city manager is authorized but not required to create. The Ordinance does not purport to bar an aggrieved person from seeking judicial review. We also note that the Ordinance is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality.’ For these reasons, we believe that a court most likely would conclude that the Ordinance as written does allow for sufficient avenues for appeal.

CONCLUSION:

For the reasons stated above, we believe that a court most likely would conclude that Greenville ordinance 42-178 as written does allow for sufficient avenues for appeal. Of course, this opinion can only consider the law in the abstract, and this should not be construed as an opinion on the merits of any as- applied challenge in the absence of any given facts.

Sincerely,
Elinor V. Lister

Assistant Attorney General

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

YW LD). Gxf2—~
/ Robert D. Chok

Solicitor General

See Op. S.C. Atty. Gen., 2003 WL 21043502, at *1 (Mar. 21, 2003) (quoting Rothschild v. Richland County Bd. of Adjustment, 309 S.C. 194, 197, 420 S.E.2d 853, 855 (1992) (“it is well settled that ordinances, as with other legislative enactments, are presumed constitutional; their unconstitutionality must be proven beyond a reasonable

doubt.”)