Could South Carolina pay 911 equipment vendors directly from the wireless program fund?

Plain-English summary

South Carolina's Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office asked whether it could direct the State Treasurer to pay a vendor for equipment a local public safety answering point had approved. In 2015, the Attorney General said no under the wireless 911 funding provision it reviewed. That provision used a reimbursement process for specified program participants, with expense invoices and review by the fiscal office on an advisory committee's recommendation.

The AG contrasted this language with nearby provisions that expressly allowed distributions to other recipients. It said the ordinary meaning of reimbursement was paying back an expense already incurred, not paying the vendor directly. The opinion did not question whether eligible answering points and providers could be reimbursed for approved costs under the statutory process.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2015. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could the fiscal office pay a vendor directly for an approved purchase?
A: The AG said the reimbursement language did not authorize it to direct the Treasurer to pay vendors directly.

Q: Who could receive payments under the provision the AG analyzed?
A: The opinion described reimbursement to public safety answering points and licensed mobile radio service providers for approved eligible expenses.

Q: What process did the statute require before reimbursement?
A: It required invoices detailing expenses and fiscal office approval on the 911 Advisory Committee's recommendation.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion interpreted the wireless 911 account's reimbursement provision in light of neighboring provisions using different language for direct distributions. It relied on the ordinary meaning of “reimbursement” and the stated invoice and approval steps.

Citations and references

• The AG concluded the provision “cannot be read in a manner that would allow the RFAO to direct the State Treasurer to disburse payment directly to vendors.”

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/november-10-2015/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Rainwater-F.-OS-9911-FINAL-Opinion-11-10-2015-00795032xD2C78.pdf

Original opinion text

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Attorney General

November 10, 201 5
Mr. Frank A. Rainwater
Executive Director
South Carolina Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office
1000 Assembly St. Suite 425
Columbia. SC 29201
Dear Mr. Rainwater:

We are in receipt of your opinion request concerning the interpretation of Section 23-47 65 of the South Carolina Code.

Specifically, you ask whether the South Carolina Revenue and

Fiscal Affairs Office ("RFAO") and its" "authority to provide reimbursements" to certain entities involved in the Wireless 91 1 Program under S.C. Code of Laws § 23-47-65(C)( 1 )(b) "includes the flexibility to allow direct payments to vendors for purchases approved by a local PSAP

[Public-Service Answering Points]." Our response follows.
I.

Law/Analysis

As indicated in your letter, your question requires us to interpret Section 23-47-65: particularly whether subsection (C)(l)(b)"s "reimbursement" language can be interpreted in a manner which would authorize direct payment to vendors for certain approved purchases.

We

believe it cannot.

Section 23-47-65 of the South Carolina Code establishes, via subsection (A), the South Carolina 91 1 Advisory Committee. The role of the Committee, pursuant to subsection (A), is "to assist the [RFAO] in carrying out its responsibilities in implementing a wireless enhanced 91 1 system . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 23-47-65(A)(l) (2014 Supp.). Continuing, subsection (B) of the

statute highlights the Committee's responsibilities, while subsection (C) details those of the RFAO. One of the RFAO's responsibilities, as detailed in Section 23-47-65(C)( 1 )(b). is "to direct the State Treasurer in the management and disbursal of the funds in and from an interestbearing account" including the duty to: hold and distribute not more than fifty-eight and two-tenths percent of the total

monthly revenues in the interest-bearing account solely for the purposes of complying with applicable requirements of FCC Docket Number 94-102. These funds may be utilized by the PSAP and the CMRS providers licensed to do business in this State for the following purposes in connection with compliance with the FCC requirements: upgrading, acquiring, maintaining, programming, and

RembertC. Dennis Building

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Post Office Box 1 1549

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Columbia, SC 2921 1-1549

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Telephone 803-734-3970

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Facsimile 803-253-6283

Mr. Frank Rainwater
Page 2

November 10, 2015
installing necessary data, hardware, and software. Invoices detailing specific expenses for these purposes must be presented to the Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office in connection with any request for reimbursement, and the request must be approved by the Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office, upon recommendation of the

committee. Any invoices presented to the Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office for reimbursements of costs not described by this section may be approved only by a

unanimous vote of the committee, but in no event shall reimbursement be made for costs unrelated to compliance with applicable requirements of FCC Docket Number 94-102[.] S.C. Code Ann. § 23-47-65(C)(l)(b) (2014 Supp.). As noted above, it is the meaning of the term

"reimbursement" within the context of the RFAO's responsibility to direct the State Treasurer to expend funds derived from E91 1 user fees that serves as the basis for your question. "The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative

intent whenever possible."

Hodges v. Rainev. 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000).

"What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will" and "courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature." Media General Communications. Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Revenue. 388 S.C. 138, 148, 694 S.E.2d 525, 530 (2010); Wade v. State. 348 S.C. 255, 259, 559 S.E.2d 843, 844 (2002).

When determining the effect of words utilized in a statute, a court typically looks to the "plain meaning" of the words.

City of Rock Hill v. Harris. 391 S.C. 149, 154, 705 S.E.2d 53, 55

(201 1). Nevertheless, courts do not focus on isolated portions of the language contained within a

statute, but instead consider the statute's language as a whole.

See Mid-State Auto Action of

Lexington. Inc. v. Altman. 324 S.C. 65, 69, 476 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1996) ("In ascertaining the

intent of the legislature, a court should not focus on any single section or provision but should consider the language of the statute as a whole.").

This is because "[a] statute is passed as a

whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent."

2A

Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction. § 46.5 (7th ed. 2007). However, courts will reject the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in

a statute when doing so would defeat the intent of the legislature.

Greenville Baseball v.

Bearden. 200 S.C. 363, 368, 20 S.E.2d 813, 815 (1942).

Here, when reviewing the entirety of the statute in conjunction with the plain meaning of the term "reimbursement" we believe Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(b) cannot be read in a manner that

would allow the RFAO to direct the State Treasurer to disburse payment directly to vendors for expenses incurred in complying with FCC Docket Number 94-102.

Specifically, a review of

Section 23-47-65(C)(l)'s other provisions reflect that had the Legislature intended for the RFAO to disburse payment directly to vendors, it would have said as much. See Rainev. 341 S.C. at 86 87, 533 S.E.2d at 582 (explaining with respect to statutory construction that, "to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of another or the alternative.").

Mr. Frank Rainwater
Page 3

November 10, 2015
For instance, Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(a) explains that the RFAO is empowered to direct the Treasurer to "distribute" ftinds to "PSAP administrators" based on expenses incurred in "answering, routing, and proper disposition of [Commercial Mobile Radio Service] 911 calls." Unlike Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(b), Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(a) does not require the submission of

"[ijnvoices

detailing

specific

expenses"

nor

does

it

discuss

procedures

related

to

"reimbursement." See S.C. Code Ann. § 23-47-65(C)(l)(b) (describing that "[i]nvoices detailing specific expenses" for upgrading, acquiring, maintaining, programming, and installing necessary data, hardware and software "must be presented to the [RFAO] . . . and the . . . request must be approved by the

[RFAO], upon recommendation of the committee.") (emphasis added).

Similarly, it does not premise the distribution of funds upon the approval of the RFAO at the recommendation of the 911 Advisory Committee as is required by Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(b). See S.C. Code Ann. § 23-47-65(C)(l)(b) (describing that "[i]nvoices detailing specific expenses"

for upgrading, acquiring, maintaining, programming, and installing necessary data, hardware and software "must be presented to the [RFAO] . . . and the . . . request must be approved by the
[RFAO], upon recommendation of the committee.") (emphasis added).

Likewise, Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(c), unlike Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(b), enables the RFAO to direct the Treasurer to "distribute" funds to an "independent auditor[.]" Notably, and like Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(a), it does so without requiring the submission of "invoices detailing specific expenses" to the RFAO or mandating review by the 911 Advisory Committee as is

required by Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(b).

Compare S.C. Code Ann. § 23-47-65(C)(l)(a) (2014

Supp.) (enabling RFAO to direct the Treasurer to distribute ftinds to an independent auditor "for

expenses which the [RFAO] is authorized to incur by contract, or otherwise, for provision of any administrative,

legal,

support,

or other services

to

assist

the

[RFAO]

in

fulfilling

its

responsibilities under this act[.]") with S.C. Code Ann. § 23-47-65(C)(l)(b) (describing that "[i]nvoices detailing specific expenses" for upgrading, acquiring, maintaining, programming, and installing necessary data, hardware and software "must be presented to the [RFAO] . . . and

the . . . request must be approved by the [RFAO], upon recommendation of the committee.") (emphasis added).

In light of these differences, we believe Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(b) is unique in that it provides a specific process that PSAPs and Commercial Mobile Radio Service ("CMRS")

providers must follow in order to receive payment from the interest-bearing E91 1 account; namely the submission of "invoices detailing specific expenses" to the RFAO and RFAO approval of the payment at the recommendation of the 91 1 Advisory Committee. See S.C. Code Ann. § 23-47-65(C)(l)(b) (describing that "[ijnvoices detailing specific expenses" for upgrading, acquiring, maintaining, programming, and installing necessary data, hardware and software "must be presented to the [RFAO] . . . and the . . . request must be approved by the [RFAO],

upon recommendation of the committee.") (emphasis added).

Indeed, it is this structure in

conjunction with the use of the term "reimbursement" and its plain meaning that lead us to conclude that "reimbursement" is the only approved method of distribution of funds under the terms of Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(b). Again, had the Legislature intended to use a different means

Mr. Frank Rainwater
Page 4

November 10, 2015
of distributing E911 funds it could have done so.

Instead, by using the term "reimburse" we

believe the legislative intent in enacting Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(b) is clear—to reimburse PSAPs and CMRS providers for expenses that are approved by the RFAO with the consent of the Committee rather than permitting the RFAO to direct the Treasurer to disburse funds from the

account directly.
Were we to interpret Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(b)'s reimbursement language in any other way, doing so would render the term superfluous.

As our Supreme Court recently noted in

Freeman v. J.L.H. Investments L.P.. — S.C. —, — S.E.2d — (2015), the plain meaning of the word "reimburse" means to "pay back, to make restoration, to repay that expended, to indemnify; or make whole."

Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1157 (5th ed. 1979)).

Accordingly, we must construe Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(b) with the plain meaning of the word "reimbursement" in mind.

See City of Rock Hill v. Harris. 391 S.C. at 154, 705 S.E.2d at 55

(explaining that when ascertaining a statute's legislative intent, courts must look to the "plain meaning" of the words used within the statute). As a result, it is the opinion of this Office that

Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(b)'s reimbursement language cannot be construed as authorizing the RFAO to direct the Treasurer to disburse funds directly to vendors. II.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we believe that when reviewing the entirety of the statute in conjunction with the plain meaning of the term "reimbursement," Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(b) cannot be read in a manner that would allow the RFAO to direct the State Treasurer to disburse payment directly to vendors.

Specifically, both the structure of Section 23-47-65(C)(l) as well as the

plain meaning of the term "reimbursement" reflect that the Legislature did not intend for such a construction of Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(b). Therefore, while the RFAO, in conjunction with the Committee certainly possesses the power to authorize the reimbursement of PSAPs and CMRS providers pursuant to the terms of Section 23-47-65(C)(l)(b), this authority should not be read as further authorizing the direct payment of vendors. Sincerely,

Brendan McDonald
Assistant Attorney General
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Robert D. Cook
Solicitor General