Did a South Carolina coroner regain office after acquittals and a prescription-drug possession conviction?

Plain-English summary

York County's coroner had been suspended after multiple criminal indictments, and the Governor had appointed an interim coroner. The coroner was acquitted on all but one charge, unlawful possession of a prescription drug. The Attorney General concluded in 2008 that this remaining conviction did not bar his return to office because state decisions did not classify that offense as involving moral turpitude.

The opinion said the suspension would end under the constitutional framework once the relevant charges were resolved. It concluded the elected coroner would hold the remainder of his term and receive the office's salary and benefits. It also said county and state officials needed to take no further action to restore him under the facts described.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2008. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the prescription-drug conviction keep the York County coroner out of office? A: The AG said no. The cited state decisions treated that offense as one that did not involve moral turpitude, so it did not prevent his return after the other acquittals.

Q: Who held the coroner's office for the rest of the term? A: The opinion concluded that the elected coroner, rather than the interim appointee, would hold the remainder of the unexpired term.

Q: Who received the office's salary and benefits?
A: The AG said the returning coroner was entitled to the salary and benefits attached to the office.

Q: Was a new order required to end the suspension?
A: The opinion said no further county or state action was required on the facts presented.

Background and statutory framework

The Governor's order suspended the coroner until acquittal or conviction and temporarily appointed a replacement. The AG read the constitutional suspension power together with the state statute, explaining that an indictment had to concern moral turpitude for the suspension framework to apply. The remaining conviction did not meet that standard under the cases cited in the opinion.

Citations and references

Constitution: Article VI, § 8. Statute: S.C. Code Ann. § 8-1-100. Case: State v. Ball, 292 S.C. 71, 354 S.E.2d 906 (1987).

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/may-30-2008-2/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/mckeown-m-b-os-8606-5-30-08-office-of-coroner-york-county.pdf

Original opinion text

May 30, 2008

Melvin B. McKeown, Jr., Esquire
York County Attorney
P. O. Drawer 299
York, South Carolina 29745
Dear Mr. McKeown:
In a letter to this office you referenced that York County Coroner Douglas McKown was indicted in 2006 on one count of distribution of a controlled substance, one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, one count of conspiracy and one count of unlawful possession of a prescription drug. You stated that Governor Sanford issued an Executive Order suspending McKown “...from the office he holds as York County Coroner.” The Order further states that “[t]his suspension shall remain in effect until such time as he shall be formally acquitted or convicted.” By that same Order, Governor Sanford appointed Sabrina Helms Gast as Coroner with the provision that “[t]his appointment shall remain in effect until such time as Mr. McKown is formally acquitted or convicted.” Mr. McKown was tried on the referenced indictments and was found not guilty of all charges except one count of unlawful possession of a prescription drug. As set forth in your letter, the Governor suspended Mr. McKown pursuant to Article VI,
§ 8 of the State Constitution and S.C. Code Ann. § 8-1-100. The referenced constitutional provision states in part that
[a]ny officer of the State or its political subdivisions, except members and officers of the Legislative and Judicial Branches, who has been indicted by a grand jury for a crime involving moral turpitude or who has waived such indictment if permitted by law may be suspended by the Governor until he shall have been acquitted. In case of conviction the office shall be declared vacant and the vacancy filled as may be provided by law. Section 8-1-100 provides that

Mr. McKeown
Page 2
May 30, 2008
[e]xcept as provided in Section 8-1-110, any state or county officer who is indicted in any court for any crime may, in the discretion of the Governor, be suspended by the Governor, who in event of suspension shall appoint another in his stead until he shall be acquitted. In case of conviction, the office shall be declared vacant by the Governor and the vacancy filled as provided by law. Referencing such, you have raised the following questions:

1. What is the effect of the conviction of Mr. McKown of one count of unlawful
   possession of a prescription drug on his service as coroner?
2. Under Article VI, § 8 of the South Carolina Constitution and the provisions of
   Section 8-1-100, who now holds the office of coroner of York County Coroner for the remainder of the unexpired term?
3. To whom shall the salary and benefits of the coroner be paid or applied?
4. What action, if any, is required by county officials and state officials with respect
   to the office of coroner under the facts and circumstances described in this letter? As set forth above, Article VI, § 8 of the State Constitution provides that the Governor may suspend an officer upon indictment “for a crime involving moral turpitude.” Section 8-1-100 provides that a county officer, upon indictment for any crime, may, in the discretion of the Governor, be suspended. It further states that the Governor “...in event of suspension shall appoint another in his stead until he shall be acquitted.” A prior opinion of this office dated March 16, 2004 cited another prior opinion of this office dated June 6, 1979 which concluded that Section 8-1-00 “must be read in conjunction with Article VI, Section 8, of the Constitution, which contains the same general language but restricts the power of the Governor to remove an indicted officer only for crimes involving moral turpitude.” See also: Ops. Atty. Gen. dated February 3, 1998; March 30, 1983. As set forth, the authority of the Governor to suspend an officer upon indictment is limited to an offense involving moral turpitude. That suspension lasts only until the officer is acquitted. The referenced constitutional provision specifically provides that “[i]n case of conviction the office shall be declared vacant and the vacancy filled as may be provided by law.” In the situation involving Coroner McKown, he was only convicted of unlawful possession of a prescription drug. Prior decisions of the State Supreme Court in State v. Ball, 292 S.C. 71, 354 S.E.2d 906 (1987) and State v. Carriker, 269 S.C. 553, 238 S.E.2d 678 (1977) have specifically determined that the unlawful possession of a prescription drug is not an offense involving moral turpitude. As a result, in the opinion of this office, McKown’s conviction for such offense would not prevent him from regaining his office upon acquittal of the other offenses. Therefore, as to your question of pursuant to Article VI, § 8 and Section 8-1-100, who now holds the office of coroner of

Mr. McKeown
Page 3
May 30, 2008
York County Coroner for the remainder of the unexpired term, in the opinion of this office, Coroner McKown would now hold the office of coroner for the remainder of his unexpired term. By holding such office, he would be entitled to the salary and benefits pertinent to that office. As to your question of what action, if any, is required by county or state officials with respect to the office of coroner under the referenced facts and circumstances, the March 16, 2004 opinion cited above referenced other prior opinions of this office which “...reflect that, upon acquittal, ‘the order of suspension [by the Governor] will terminate’...Thus, if the jury returns a verdict of acquittal as to all charges, Article VI, § 8 mandates that the suspension order of the Governor is automatically discharged.” Another opinion of this office dated July 1, 1983 stated that “...the Constitution provides that the person the Governor appoints shall continue to hold the office until the person has been acquitted or the office declared vacant upon a conviction.” Inasmuch as Coroner McKown was acquitted on all charges except the offense of unlawful possession of a prescription drug, which again is not an offense involving moral turpitude, he would be entitled to regain his office and no further action by county or state officials would be required. If there are any questions, please advise. Sincerely, Henry McMaster Attorney General

By:

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

______
Robert D. Cook
Deputy Attorney General

Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General