Would a South Carolina court recognize and enforce a judgment from a Turkish court?

Plain-English summary

In 2015, the South Carolina Attorney General concluded that a state court would recognize a judgment from Turkey under common law principles of comity if the relevant safeguards were met. The opinion noted that South Carolina had not adopted the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act at that time, and relied on a federal district court’s analysis of South Carolina law involving an Australian judgment.

The opinion described four conditions: the foreign court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction; the defendant received notice and an opportunity to be heard; the judgment was not obtained by fraud; and enforcement would not conflict with important public policy. The request did not present a particular Turkish judgment for factual review. The Attorney General’s conclusion therefore depended on those conditions being satisfied.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2015. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the opinion say all Turkish judgments were automatically enforceable?
A: No. It said a South Carolina court would recognize a Turkish judgment if the comity criteria identified in the opinion were met.

Q: What did a defendant need before the foreign judgment could be recognized?
A: Under the opinion’s test, the defendant needed notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the foreign court needed jurisdiction over the person and subject matter.

Q: Could a South Carolina court revisit the merits merely because a party claimed the Turkish court was wrong?
A: The comity passage quoted by the opinion said the merits should not be tried afresh on a bare claim of legal or factual error when the required fairness conditions were satisfied.

Background and legal framework

The Attorney General used the Westpac decision, a District of South Carolina decision that applied comity to an Australian judgment. It also cited examples in which other United States courts considered Turkish judgments. Its answer was an interpretation of how a South Carolina court would likely apply the common law, with each judgment still dependent on its own jurisdiction, process, and public policy facts.

Citations and references

The central source was the Westpac decision, 678 F. Supp. 596 (D.S.C. 1987), as rendered in the extracted opinion text.

Official title

Regarding whether judgments from a Turkish court would be acceptable in South Carolina.

Requester

Mr. Murat Karkin.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/may-20-2015/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Karkin-M.-OS-9922-FINAL-Opinion-5-20-2015-00646322xD2C78.pdf

Original opinion text

^ ^ourH
Alan Wilson
attorney General

May 20, 2015

Mr. Murat Karkin

YukselKarkinKU9uk
Biiyiikdere Caddesi No: 1 27, Astoria
Tower A, Floors 6, 7, 24, 25, 26, 27. Tower B Floor 24
34394 Esentepe Istanbul, Turkey

Dear Mr. Karkin:

A question has arisen regarding whether judgments from a Turkish court would be acceptable in South Carolina.

South Carolina has not adopted the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments

Recognition Act, so the question must be answered based upon general principles of comity. As set forth below, it is our opinion that, based upon well recognized common law comity principles, a court in South

Carolina would recognize and enforce a Turkish judgment.
Law/Analvsis

While there are no decisions from the Supreme Court of South Carolina directly addressing this question, there is a well-reasoned case from the District Court of South Carolina directly on point.

In

South Carolina National Bank v. Westpac Bankiim Corp.. 678 F.Supp 596 (D.S.C. 1987), the Honorable Karen Henderson (now Circuit Judge, D.C. Ct. App.) applied principles of comity, concluding that an

"Australian judgment is enforceable in South Carolina...." Judge Henderson articulated the legal test for enforcement of a judgement obtained in a foreign country, as follows:
[t]he enforceability of judgments rendered by the courts of foreign nations is to be determined under the law of the state in which enforcement is sought.

Sangiovanni

Hernandez v. Dominicana de Aviacioa. C. For. A.. 556 F.2d 611, 614 (l51 Cir. 1977); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.. 453 F.2d 435. 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 1017, 31 L.Ed. 2d 479, 92 S.Ct. 1294 (1972).

The courts of South

Carolina have apparently not considered the enforceability of foreign judgments, . . . but the Court assumes South Carolina would adopt the principles of comity generally applied

by courts in this country to determine the effect of foreign judgments. Guvot. 159 U.S.

In Hilton v.

113, 2020-03, 40 L.Ed. 95, 16 S.Ct. 139 (1895), the United States

Supreme Court formulated the following test for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments: Where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a
•

court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial

upon regular

proceedings after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendants, and

RewbertC. Dennis Building

under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an

. post Office Box 1 1 549

. Columbia, SC 2921 1-1549

impartial

• telephone 803-734-3970

. Facsimile 803-253-6283

Mr. Murat Karkin
Page 2
May 20, 2015

administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and

those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in

procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was erroneous in law or in fact. The test enunciated in Hilton remains the standard applied by most American courts to

determine the enforceability of foreign judgments [citation omitted]. . . .

Following

these principles, courts will generally recognize and enforce the judgments of foreign

courts if (1) the foreign court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the defendant in the foreign action had notice and opportunity to be heard; (3) the judgment was not obtained by fraud; and (4) enforcement will not contravene important public policy. Id. at 403.

678 F.Supp. at 597-8. Such analysis by Judge Henderson is well established and would be controlling for a South Carolina court considering the question as to whether to recognize a judgment rendered by a court in Turkey.

We note also that other courts in the United States have, under the same principles set forth in Westpac. accepted judgments from Turkey. See, e.g. Farma-Tek llac San. Vie Tic Ltd. ST1 v. Dermik Labs. No. 09-3705, 201 1 WL 1 196790 at * 4 (E.D. Pa., March 31, 201 1) ("[i]f a judgment is rendered in

plaintiffs favor by a Turkish court, there is little doubt that plaintiff would be able to enforce it in the United States."); see also. Deep Woods Holdings. L.L.C. v. Sav. Deposit Ins. Fund. 745 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2014) [the state court entered judgment "in the full amount of the judgment obtained in Turkey, plus interest, totaling $11,661,681.09."); Allianz v. Munich Reinsurance Co.. 353 F.Supp. 84, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ["no reason is stated why plaintiffs could not recover promptly against the individual defendant in an independent action based upon the Turkish judgment brought in any neutral forum in which its assets are to be found."]. Conclusion

We believe Judge Henderson's analysis fully states the law in South Carolina.

Thus, if the

aforementioned criteria are met, in our opinion, a Turkish judgment would be enforceable in this State under well-recognized principles of comity. See also, Op. S.C. Att'v. Gen.. June 9, 1939 (South Carolina

would accept a judgment from Denmark, citing Hilton v. Guvot supra, which references the principles of comity articulated by Judge Henderson in Westpacf.

Mr. Murat Karkin
Page 3

May 20, 2015

Accordingly, based upon the foregoing authorities, it is our opinion that a South Carolina court would give recognition to a judgment rendered by a court in Turkey.

Sincerely,

Robert D. Cook
Solicitor General

Signed and sw.cynt'BWWfti/me tthis^O1'1 day of May, 2015.

Notary ^bH6i#f<fr^g^cPj,folir

My commissi3fP«K

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