Could a technical college area commission require each county to pay a particular share of operating costs?

Plain-English summary

The chair of the Piedmont Area Technical College Area Commission asked what authority the commission had to encourage counties in its service district to pay a fair share of operating expenses. The Assistant Deputy AG quoted a statute saying each participating county's share was determined by agreement between the district commission and that county's governing body. He read the language as leaving the funding amount and agreement process without further legislative direction.

The letter suggested seeking legislative clarification of the funding process and consulting other multi-county commissions or the State Board for Technical Education. It did not identify a separate mechanism by which the commission could impose a particular county share.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the opinion set a formula for each county's contribution? A: No. The author said the cited provision left each county's share to agreement with the commission and supplied no further formula.

Q: Could the commission compel a county to pay the amount it considered fair? A: The letter identified no such power. It treated the contribution as a matter of agreement with each county government.

Q: What did the author suggest when the parties could not settle on a process? A: He suggested legislative clarification and discussion with other area commissions or the State Board for Technical Education.

Background and statutory framework

The extracted opinion cites §50-53-1250 as the provision on participating counties' operating expenses. The letter applied its agreement language literally and quoted South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation v. Dickinson in a footnote on statutory interpretation. The section number here follows the original text as extracted; the opinion provides no separate funding formula.

Citations and references

Statute discussed: §50-53-1250. Case discussed: South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation v. Dickinson.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/march-7-1997/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/97march7roberts.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

March 7, 1997

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E.W. Roberts, Chair
Piedmont Area Technical College Area Commission Box 1467 Greenwood, SC 29648 Dear Mr. Roberts: You have requested the advice of this Off ice as to what power or authority the above Commission has to " ... encourage the count[ies] within the [Commission's service] district to pay its fair share." s.c. Code Ann. §50-53-1250 (1990) provides that " [ t] he share of each participating county in the operating expenses of the district shall be determined by agreement between the district commission and the respective county governing bodies." (emphasis added). Giving this provision a plain reading indicates that the legislature left the matter of county funding of expenses to "agreement without further legislative guidance as to how agreement should be reached or funding determined. " 1 Given the absence of other legislative direction, I suggest that you consider seeking legislative clarification as to the funding process. You may also want to confer with other multi-county area commissions or the State Board for Technical Education for suggestions. This letter is an informal opinion. It has been written by the designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the opinion of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally reviewed by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion.

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The " ... primary function in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature .... " Where the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation, and we must apply them according to their literal meaning. South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation v. Dickinson, 288 s.c. 134, 341 S.E. 2d 134 (1986).

E.W. Roberts, Chair

March 7, 1997
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If you have further questions, please let me know.
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