Could a South Carolina city assign its police officer to a school outside city limits?

Plain-English summary

In 2018, Anderson County asked whether a municipality could place its officers as school resource officers at schools outside city limits. The Attorney General predicted that the school resource officer statute alone would not allow a city officer to be stationed routinely at an outside school. The municipal police jurisdiction statute generally tied that officer’s powers to city territory, while permitting specified contracts for protection beyond it.

The opinion distinguished an assigned officer’s statewide arrest authority during school activities from authority to take a permanent post at a school outside the city. It used an away football game as an example of the first situation. Its conclusion expressly allowed for an appropriate contract under the municipal police statute.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2018. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did statewide school activity arrest authority let a city officer work at any school?
A: The AG predicted no. It read that authority as extending an existing officer’s jurisdiction for school events, not creating a routine posting anywhere in the state.

Q: Could a city SRO make an arrest at an away school event?
A: The opinion used a traveling school football team to illustrate how an assigned SRO’s arrest authority could follow school activity beyond the city.

Q: Did the opinion rule out an outside city school assignment under a contract?
A: No. Its conclusion was expressly qualified by the possibility of an appropriate contract under the municipal police statute.

Background and statutory framework

The AG read the school resource officer provision alongside the municipal police jurisdiction provision. The former addressed designation of officers for school systems and statewide arrest authority connected to a school activity or event. The latter set the usual municipal territorial limits and described a contractual route for police protection outside them.

Citations and references

• The opinion said the statewide SRO rule contemplated “extension of preexisting jurisdiction; not creation of an entirely new jurisdiction.”
• Its conclusion was qualified by “absent some appropriate contract pursuant to S.C. Code 5-7-110.”

Official title

On whether a municipality can provide school resource officers to schools outside of its geographical limits (S.C. Code Ann. Section 5-7-12).

Requester

Leon C. Harmon, Esquire, Attorney for Anderson County.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/march-6-2018-1/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Harmon-L.-OS-10195-FINAL-Opinion-3-6-2018-01616925xD2C78.pdf-01621353xD2C78.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

ALAN WILSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

March 6, 2018

Leon C. Harmon

County Attorney for Anderson County
PO Box 8002

Anderson, SC 29622-8002

Dear Mr. Harmon:

We received your request seeking an opinion on the jurisdiction of municipal police officers to serve as school resource officers outside of the geographic boundaries of a municipality. The following opinion sets out our understanding of your question and our response.

Issue (as quoted from your letter):

1. Does S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-12 allow a municipality to provide school
   resource officers to schools outside the geographical limits of the municipality?

2. If the answer to question 1 above is in the affirmative, are there any
   geographic restrictions on a municipality providing school resource officers to a school district?

Law/Analysis:

It is the opinion of this Office that a court faced with the question presented in your letter

most likely would conclude that Section 5-7-12 is not intended to extend the jurisdiction of

• municipal officers such that they may routinely be stationed at schools outside their municipality
  merely by virtue of their status as municipal officers. See S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-110 (2004).

REMBERT C. DENNIS BUILDING ¢ POST OFFICE BOX 11549 » COLUMBIA,SC 29211-1549 « TELEPHONE 803-734-3970 FACSIMILE 803-253-6283

Leon C. Harmon, Anderson County Attorney
Page 2
March 6, 2018

Section 5-7-110 of the South Carolina Code establishes the jurisdiction of municipal police officers, and states in relevant part:

Any such police officers shall exercise their powers on all private and public property within the corporate limits of the municipality and on all property owned or controlled by the municipality wheresoever situated; provided, that the municipality may contract with any public utility, agency or with any private business to provide police protection beyond the corporate limits. Should the municipality provide police protection beyond its corporate limits by contract, the legal description of the area to be served shall be filed with the State Law Enforcement Division, the office of the county sheriff and the Department of Public Safety.

S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-110 (2004) (emphasis added). Therefore, while municipal police jurisdiction might be extended by contract, in the absence of such a contract, jurisdiction does not extend beyond municipal limits (absent some other legal principle, such as hot pursuit). Jd.

Section 5-7-12 describes law enforcement serving as school resource officers ("SROs") and states in relevant part:

(A) The governing body of a municipality or county may upon the request of another governing body or of another political subdivision of the State,

including school districts, designate certain officers to be assigned to the duty of a school resource officer and to work within the school systems of the municipality or county. The person assigned as a school resource officer shall have statewide jurisdiction to arrest persons committing crimes in connection with a school activity or school-sponsored event.

S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-12 (Supp. 2017) (emphasis added).

Because the office of municipal police officer is a creature of statute which did not exist under the common law, a court faced with the questions presented in your letter most likely would rely on established rules of statutory construction to give. effect to the legislative intent of the statutory sections set out above. See Richardson v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 350 S.C. 291, 298, 566 S.E.2d 523, 527 (2002) (discussing the office of municipal police officer as a creature of statute). As this Office has previously opined:

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent whenever possible. State v. Morgan, 352 S.C. 359, 574 S., E.2d

Leon C. Harmon, Anderson County Attorney
Page 3
March 6, 2018

203 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Baucom, 340 S.C. 339, 531 S.E.2d 922 (2000)). All rules of statutory interpretation are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in light of the intended purpose of the statute. State v. Hudson, 336 S.C. 237, 519 S.E.2d 577 (Ct. App. 1999).

Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2005 WL 1983358 (July 14, 2005). The South Carolina Supreme Court also has held that:

However plain the ordinary meaning of the words used in a statute may be, the courts will reject that meaning, when to accept it would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not possibly have been intended by the Legislature, or would defeat the plain legislative intention; and if possible will construe the statute so as to escape the absurdity and carry the intention into effect.

State ex rel. McLeod v. Montgomery, 244 S.C. 308, 314, 136 S.E.2d 778, 782 (1964) (quoting Stackhouse v. County Board, 86 S.C. 419, 68 S.E. 561 (1910).).

Turning to the text of Section 5-7-12 and 5-7-110, we believe that a court would conclude that the evident intent is for a city or county government to be able to place their officers in their schools, and for such officers’ jurisdiction to extend as necessary to adequately address the special nature of school activities. See S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-12 (Supp. 2017) (a "school resource officer shall have statewide jurisdiction to arrest persons committing crimes in connection with a school activity or school-sponsored event") (emphasis added). However, it appears that the statute contemplates extension of preexisting jurisdiction; not creation of an entirely new jurisdiction. See id. For instance, in the event that a Columbia-area school football team traveled to Charleston for an away game, it appears that, per Section 5-7-12, the arrest jurisdiction of the SRO assigned to the Columbia-area school would travel with those students while they are engaged in that school-sponsored event. See id. But we do not believe that a court would conclude that the statute would allow, for example, a City of Columbia officer to serve as an SRO in a Charleston school by virtue of the “statewide jurisdiction” language given that a municipal officer's jurisdiction is limited to the geographic boundaries of the municipality. See S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-110 (2004).

Leon C. Harmon, Anderson County Attorney
Page 4
March 6, 2018

Conclusion:

In conclusion, for the reasons set forth above, it is the opinion of this Office that absent some appropriate contract pursuant to S.C. Code 5-7-110, a court faced with the questions presented in your letter would conclude that a municipal police officer may not serve as a SRO in a school outside of the geographic limits of the municipality. See S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-110 (2004) & discussion, supra.

Sincerely,

vid S. Jones
Assistant Attorney Géneral

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Robert D. Cook
Solicitor General