Who should investigate a South Carolina traffic crash involving both a sheriff’s vehicle and a Highway Patrol vehicle?

Plain-English summary

In 2013, the South Carolina Attorney General considered a crash between a county sheriff's vehicle and a Highway Patrol vehicle that were both in the same pursuit. The office suggested that the sheriff's office and Highway Patrol contact the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) to investigate. It reasoned that SLED's statewide authority and separation from both vehicle operators would help avoid a conflict of interest.

The opinion explained the usual split under the statute: the Highway Patrol investigated qualifying crashes involving other law enforcement agency vehicles, while the county sheriff investigated qualifying crashes involving Department of Public Safety vehicles, including Highway Patrol vehicles. That split created a problem when both agencies' vehicles collided. The AG rejected a municipal department as the default investigator, even if the crash occurred within a municipality. Its analysis assumed the statutory trigger of injury or death and the vehicles being involved in the collision; it did not resolve every possible collision.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2013. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: If a sheriff's car and Highway Patrol car collided, which agency did the AG suggest? A: For the circumstances it assumed, the AG suggested that both agencies contact SLED to conduct the investigation. It described SLED as the state's chief investigative agency with statewide authority.

Q: Did the answer change when the crash happened inside city limits? A: The opinion said the statute assigned investigation of a DPS vehicle crash to the county sheriff regardless of incorporation and did not make a municipal police department the investigator for these crashes. The collision of both agencies' vehicles led to the SLED suggestion.

Q: Could an agency investigate its own vehicle in the qualifying crash? A: The opinion read the statute to forbid an agency from investigating a qualifying crash involving its own vehicle or employee. It identified avoiding conflicts of interest and ensuring accountability as the statute's purposes.

Q: Did the opinion address a crash with no injury, death, or private vehicle? A: No. Its footnote presumed injury or death and that the patrol vehicles met the statute's involvement requirement.

Background and statutory framework

The Greenwood Police Department had reportedly been asked to investigate two crashes outside Greenwood's limits. The AG reviewed the statutory assignments, the bar on self-investigation, and SLED's statewide investigative powers. Its suggestion addressed the unusual case in which the two ordinarily assigned agencies were themselves involved.

Citations and references

The opinion's central provision is S.C. Code Ann. §56-5-765. The original PDF contains its full discussion of the statute and cited decisions.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/march-20-2013/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/pitts-m-a-os-9565-3-20-13-traffic-accidents.pdf

Original opinion text

ALAN WILSON

A TIORNEY GENERAL

March 20, 2013

The Honorable Michael A. Pitts
Representative, District 14
327-C Blatt Building
Columbia, SC 29201
Dear Representative Pitts:
We received your letter requesting an opinion of this Office on behalf of the Greenwood Police Department ("Department"). By way of background, you indicate that:
[o ]n two separate occasions, the [Department] has been called upon to investigate traffic collisions wherein a Greenwood County Sheriffs Office
["Sheriffs Office"] vehicle and a [South Carolina] Highway Patrol ["Highway Patrol"] vehicle - both engaged in the same pursuit - collided with one another. In both instances, the collisions occurred in Greenwood County outside the corporate limits of the Q!y of Greenwood. I find no provision in Section 56-5765 of the SC Code of Laws for a municipal police department to investigate such a collision. In fact, subsection (B) of 56-5-765 seems to disallow municipal police depattments from investigating collisions involving [South Carolina]. Department of Public Safety ["DPS"] vehicles, 1 even if the collision occurred within the incorporated jurisdiction of that department. Additionally, subsection (C) of 56-5-765 seems to disallow a law enforcement agency from investigating a collision involving any vehicle of that agency, which would preclude either the Sheriffs Office or the Highway Patrol from investigating a collision between their vehicles. [Emphasis in original]. With this background in mind, you ask the following questions: (l) If vehicles of the Sheriff's Office and DPS/Highway Patrol collide within an incorporated jurisdiction, which law enforcement agency should investigate the collision?

The Highway Patrol is a division of DPS. See §23-6-100.

1

REMBERT

c. DENNIS BUILDING • POST OFFICE Box 11549 • COLUMBIA, SC 29211-1549 • TELEPHONE 803-734-3970 • FACSIMILE 803-253-6283

The Honorable Michael A. Pitts
Page 2
March 20, 2013

(2)
If vehicles of the Sheriffs Office and DPS/Highway Patrol collide in an unincorporated jurisdiction, where the Sheriffs office vehicle is registered, which law enforcement agency should investigate the collision? S.C. Code Ann. §56-5-765 provides as follows: (A) When a motor vehicle or motorcycle of a law enforcement agency, except a motor vehicle or motorcycle of the Department of Public Safety, is involved in 2 a traffic collision that: ( 1) results in an injury or a death, or (2) involves a privately-owned motor vehicle or motorcycle, regardless of whether another motor vehicle or motorcycle is involved, the State Highway Patrol must investigate the collision and must file a report with findings on whether the agency motor vehicle or motorcycle was operated properly within the guidelines of appropriate statutes and regulations. (B) When a motor vehicle or motorcycle of the Department of Public Safety is involved in a traffic collision that: (I) results in an injury or a death, or (2) involves a privately-owned motor vehicle or motorcycle, regardless of whether another motor vehicle or motorcycle is involved, the sheriff of the county in which the collision occurred must investigate the collision, regardless of whether the collision occurred within an incorporated jurisdiction, and must file a report with findings on whether the Department of Public Safety's motor vehicle or motorcycle was operated properly within the guidelines of appropriate statutes and regulations. (C) A law enforcement department or agency must not investigate a traffic collision in which a motor vehicle, a motorcycle, or an employee of that department or agency is involved that: (1) results in an injury or a death, or (2) involves a privately-owned motor vehicle or motorcycle, regardless of whether another motor vehicle or motorcycle is involved. (D) A law enforcement agency that has primary responsibility for an investigation involving a motor vehicle, a motorcycle, or an employee of another department or agency, but lacks the expettise to conduct a proper investigation, may request assistance from another agency that has the appropriate expertise, as long as the assisting agency or an employee of the assisting agency is not a subject of the investigation. A request made pursuant

ZSubsection (G) provides that "involved in a traffic collision" includes a law enforcement motor vehicle or motorcycle engaged in a pursuit when a traffic collision occurs.

The Honorable Michael A. Pitts
Page 3
March 20, 2013

to this subsection shall result in a joint investigation conducted by both agencies. The cardinal principle of interpretation is to effectuate legislative intent. Citizens and Southern Systems, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Commission, 280 S.C. 138, 311 S.E.2d 717 (1984). All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can reasonably be discovered in the language used, and that language must be interpreted in light of the intended purpose of the statute. McClanahan v. Richland Co. Council, 350 S.C. 433, 567 S.E.2d 240 (2002). The Legislature's intent should be ascertained from the plain language of the statute. State v. Landis, 362 S.C. 97, 606 S.E.2d 503 (Ct. App. 2004). The language must be read in a sense which harmonizes with its subject matter and accords with its general purpose. Hitachi Data Sys. Comp. v. Leatherman, 309 S.C. 174, 420 S.E.2d 843 ( 1992). What the Legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 533 S.E.2d 578 (2000). Typically, legislative intent is determined by applying the words used by the Legislature in their usual or ordinary significance. Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 256 S.C. 577, 183 S.E.2d 451 (1971). Resort to subtle or forced construction for the purpose of limiting or expanding the operation of a statute should not be undertaken. Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14 (1984). Courts will apply the clean and unambiguous terms of a statute according to their literal meaning and statutes should be given a reasonable and practical construction which is consistent with the policy and purpose expressed therein. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991). Finally, a remedial statute, such as §56-5-765, must be broadly construed in order to effectuate its intended purpose. Auto Owners Ins. v. Rollinson, 3 78 S.C. 600, 663 S.E.2d 484, 488 (2008). We have previously concluded that "[t]he obvious purpose of §56-5-765 is to avoid conflicts of interest and to insure accountability."3 See Ops. S.C. Atty. Gen., June 18, 1998 ( 1998 WL 746030); July 10, 1996 (1996 WL 494 732). The decision of the South Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Sheldon, 344 S.C. 340, 543 S.E.2d 585 (Ct. App. 2001) best illustrates the strict application of the statute by state courts. Sheldon was an on-duty State Trooper involved in an accident with his patrol vehicle in Orangeburg County. The driver and passenger of the other car died in the collision. Although §56-5-765 required the Orangeburg County Sheriffs Office, rather than the Highway Patrol, investigate the collision, the Highway Patrol's Multi-disciplinary Accident Team ("MAIT") assisted in the investigation. The trial court suppressed the evidence gathered or prepared by MAIT, because it was obtained in violation of the statute. The State appealed, arguing the MAIT investigation was not the type of investigation contemplated by §56-5-765 and that the Orangeburg County Sheriff's Office remained the investigating agency while MAIT merely performed technical portions of the investigation, because the Orangeburg County Sheriffs Office had neither the trained personnel nor the equipment to conduct a detailed investigation of the dynamics of the accident. The State also maintained the MAIT report only took into account objective factors which could be measured and replicated, and made no conclusions other than the pre-impact speed of the two vehicles. Id., 543 S.E.2d at 585-86. The Court of Appeals

3

We note that subsection (D) provides for criminal sanctions for a violation of the statute.

The Honorable Michael A. Pitts
Page4
March 20, 20 l 3

disagreed, finding that "[t]here is no exception to the rule." Id. 543 S.E.2d at 586. [Emphasis added]. The Court stated that while the Orangeburg County Sheriffs Office may not have had the necessary resources to perform the speed tests for the investigation of the collision, it should have sought assistance elsewhere to avoid a violation of the statute. Id.4 Clearly, where a police vehicle is involved in a collision in the circumstances stated in the statute the Legislature has deemed it inappropriate that the agency investigate itself with respect to the accident under any circumstances.5 "[T]here is no exception to the rule." Id. Accordingly, in order to avoid the appearance of a conflict, the Legislature has mandated that the Highway Patrol investigate when a police vehicle is involved in a collision. If the Highway Patrol is involved in a collision, however, the county sheriff is required to investigate instead, whether or not the collision occurred within an incorporated jurisdiction. Further giving §56-5-765 what appears to be its plain meaning, there is little doubt the intent of the Legislature is that a municipality may not investigate such a collision which occurs within its corporate limits. The canon of statutory construction "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" or "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius," which holds that "to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of another, or of the alternative," may be used as guidance in construing the statute in this regard. Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 533 S.E. 2d 578, 582 (2000). It would seem to us that such a conclusion is the logical intent of this statute. Based upon the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division ("SLED") is the agency best suited and has the most resources available to investigate the traffic collisions involving the patrol vehicles described in your letter. SLED is the chief investigative agency in the State. Op. S.C. Atty. Gen., July 13, 1979 (1979 WL 43464). SLED was created by §§23-3-10 et seq. and its agents are given a wide range of functions and activities. See §23-3-15. Significantly, the power and authority of SLED agents can be exercised statewide, including within the boundaries of an incorporated municipality. See Ops. S.C. Atty. Gen., May 17, 2001 (200 1 WL 790259); September 28, 2000 (2000 WL 1803612). SLED's investigation would best avoid any potential conflict of interest and insure accountability. We therefore suggest that both the Sheriffs Office and Highway Patrol contact SLED to conduct the investigation of these collisions pursuant to §56-5-765. Finally, the Legislature may wish to consider legislation to address this situation. Op. S.C. Atty. Gen., August 5, 1986 (1986 WL 192045).

The Court acknowledged the availability of criminal sanctions, but it remanded the case to the trial court for a dete1mination of any prejudice to Sheldon from the admission of the MAIT report. Id., 543 S.E.2d at 586. 4

sf or purposes of this opinion, we presume the collision between the two patrol vehicles resulted in an injury or a death, and that the vehicles were otherwise " involved" in a collision, pursuant to the triggering language contained in §56-5-765. See, e.g., Op. S.C. Atty. Gen., July 19, 1995 ( 1995 WL 803716) [patrol vehicle was "involved" in a collision where the accident between another vehicle and a parked car resulted from a chase with the patrol vehicle].

The Honorable Michael A. Pitts
Page 5
March 20, 2013

If you have any further questions, please advise.
Very truly your~
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po port
Senior Assistant Attorney General
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

.~Jiv.Ur!), l~.

/,R~ert D. Cook

,y Deputy Attorney General

CC: Chief Gerald L. Brooks