Did housing and caring for seized animals automatically entitle a humane organization to half of an animal-cruelty fine?

Plain-English summary

The South Carolina Attorney General's office considered whether a nonprofit humane organization that housed and cared for animals during an animal-cruelty prosecution had a right to part of any fine. Under the statute quoted in the 1999 letter, a trial court finding that a local nonprofit organization was materially involved in or aided the prosecution directed half the fine to that organization. Without that finding, the fine followed ordinary distribution rules.

The writer did not give a blanket answer for every shelter or case. He read material involvement as substantial help with the institution and conduct of the legal proceeding, but said the trial court had to determine from the facts whether animal housing and care met that standard. Some cases might qualify; others might not. A footnote suggested legislative clarification because interpretations of the phrase differed.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1999. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Was housing an animal during a cruelty case enough by itself to receive half the fine? A: The office did not say so. It left the material-involvement finding to the trial court on each case's facts.

Q: What did the statute require for a humane organization to share in the fine? A: The trial court had to find that a nonprofit humane organization in the municipality or county was materially involved in or aided prosecution of the violation.

Q: How was the fine divided after that finding?
A: Under the provision quoted in the letter, one-half went to the qualifying organization and the remainder was distributed as otherwise provided by law.

Q: Who decided whether the organization's care materially aided prosecution? A: The trial court made that decision based on the particular record, according to the opinion.

Background and statutory framework

The requester reported that some courts had denied a share to animal organizations that housed animals pending cruelty cases. Section 47-1-160 governed the fines but did not define “materially involved in or aiding in the prosecution.” The office applied ordinary-language definitions and left the application to trial courts rather than assuming care alone always satisfied the rule. This was an informal opinion by the signing assistant attorney general.

Citations and references

• Fine distribution: Section 47-1-160, quoted in the letter for the trial-court finding and one-half share.
• Possible clarification: The letter's footnote suggested a legislative definition of material involvement or aid.

Official title

Regarding South Carolina Code 47-1-160, which deals with a nonprofit animal humane organization.

Requester

The Honorable Glenn F. McConnell, Senator, District No. 41

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/march-2-1999/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/99march2mcconnell.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

March 2, 1999

The Honorable Glenn F. McConnell
Senator, District No. 41
311 Gressette Senate Office Building
Columbia, South Carolina 29202
Re:

Informal Opinion

Dear Senator McConnell:
You have asked for an opinion on the following:
The South Carolina Code provides in section 47-1-160 that if a trial court finds that a nonprofit animal humane organization in the county or municipality was materially involved in or aided in the prosecution of a violation, then one-half of the fine must be distributed to the nonprofit animal humane organization. I have been informed that courts have been denying the distribution of this share of fines to animal agencies that house the animals during the pendency of these cases. A period of time that sometimes lasts several months. I assume that the reasoning of the courts is that these groups housing the animals are not involved in or aiding the prosecution of the violation. However, a common sense reading of 4 7-1-160 would seem to indicate that an agency's involvement in the care and housing of these animals while the charges of abuse are pending and until they are disposed of would make the animal agency materially involved in the prosecution of a violation. I would appreciate your legal opinion as to whether the housing of an animal and care of an animal while a violation of our animal protection laws is being prosecuted does in fact entitle an agency to share in the disposition of any fine

m'
i

~cy~
c.
RE~IBERT

D ENN IS B UILDING

•

POST OFFICE Box 11 549

•

C o u .: MBIA. S.C. 29211 - 1549

•

T ELEPH ONE: 80:1- 734 -39 70

•

F.\CSl."1 1LE: 80.1-253-6283

Senator McConnell
Page2
March 2, 1999
collected.
Chapter 1 of Title 47 is entitled "Cruelty to Animals." The chapter contains, among other things, several different criminal provisions regarding animal cruelty and penalties for violating these provisions. Section 4 7-1-160 governs the distribution of fines collected under the chapter. This section reads as follows: All fines collected for violations of this chapter must be distributed as follows:

I
I

(1) If the trial court finds that there was a nonprofit animal humane organization in the municipality or county materially involved in or aiding in the prosecution of the violation, one-half of the fine must be distributed to the nonprofit animal humane organization and the remaining one-half must be distributed as is otherwise provided by law. (emphasis added).

(2) If there is no finding of material involvement or aiding in the prosecution of the violation by a nonprofit animal humane organization, the fine must be distributed as is provided by law. A number of principles of statutory construction are important in resolving your

("'fl

inquiry. First and foremost, in interpreting a statute, the primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). The words of a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 368 S.E.2d 899 ( 1988). The Court must apply the clear and unambiguous terms of a statute according to their literal meaning. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991).

I

Under Section 47-1-160, if the trial court determines there was a nonprofit animal humane organization in the municipality or county materially involved in or aiding in the prosecution of a violation, that organization is entitled to a portion of the fine levied by the court. Unfortunately, the statute does not define what is meant by the phrase "materially involved in or aiding in the prosecution." Therefore, attention must be turned to the plain and ordinary meaning of the relevant terms. "Materially" is defined as "[t]o a significant extent or degree; substantially." The American Heritage Dictionary 83 7 (3rd ed. 1993). "Prosecution" is defined as "[t]he institution and conduct of a legal proceeding." The American Heritage Dictionary 1098 (3rd ed. 1993 ). Applying the aforementioned rules of

Senator McConnell
Page 3
March 2, 1999
statutory construction leads to the following: the trial court, in its discretion, must determine whether a nonprofit animal humane organization in the municipality or county was substantially involved in or aided in the institution and conduct of a legal proceeding.

I

Whether the housing and care of an animal while a violation of Chapter 1 of Title 4 7 is being prosecuted constitutes substantial involvement in or aid in the institution and conduct of a legal proceeding and thus entitles the nonprofit organization to share in the disposition of the fine collected is a decision that must be made by the trial court based on the particular facts of the case before it. Therefore, I cannot give you a blanket answer that would cover every case brought under the chapter. There may be numerous instances in which the trial court determines, based on the facts of the case, that the nonprofit organization's activities rise to the level of material involvement and aid in the prosecution of a violation. In reaching this decision, deference must be paid to the wisdom of the trial court. 1 This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated assistant attorney general and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kindest regards, I remain
~lyyours,

/;.J )I. I{J.
Paul M. Koch
Assistant Attorney General

1

Since there seems to be varying interpretations of the language contained in Section 4 7-1-160, the General Assembly may wish to clarify what is meant by the phrase "materially involved in or aiding in the prosecution of the violation" by legislative act.