Could owner-occupied homes be included in a South Carolina multicounty business park?

Short answer The Attorney General said residential property did not appear to fit a multicounty industrial or business park, but recommended a declaratory judgment for a final answer. It declined to decide the related tax exemption and school-fund questions unless a court first allowed residential property in the park.
State
South Carolina
Opinion
2010-march-17-2010
Issued
March 17, 2010
Issued by
Office of the South Carolina Attorney General
Requested by
Ray N. Stevens, Director, Department of Revenue

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This page answers the general question as of 2010. Ask about yours and see what current South Carolina law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official South Carolina Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed South Carolina attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

The Attorney General concluded that owner-occupied residential property did not appear to fit within a South Carolina multicounty industrial or business park. The governing provision did not expressly list eligible property types, so the opinion relied on the ordinary meaning of “industrial” and “business.” It recommended that the county seek a declaratory judgment so a court could decide the issue with finality.

The Department of Revenue had also asked whether such homes could receive a property tax exemption and how school-district reimbursements in the Homestead Exemption Fund should be distributed. The opinion did not answer those questions, saying they were unnecessary unless a court first determined that residential property could be included in a park.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2010. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the AG approve owner-occupied homes inside a multicounty park? A: No. The opinion said the legislature did not appear to intend residential property for an industrial or business park and recommended a court determination.

Q: Did the opinion decide whether a home in such a park qualified for the requested tax exemption? A: No. It left that issue open unless a court first determined that homes could be included in the park.

Q: Did it resolve how the Homestead Exemption Fund should be distributed? A: No. The opinion treated that school-fund question as unnecessary until the threshold property question was resolved.

Background and statutory framework

The Department of Revenue asked whether owner-occupied homes could enter a multicounty park and, if so, how specified tax and school-fund provisions would apply. The office referred to its March 1, 2010 residential-property opinion and interpreted the park statute through the ordinary meaning of its industrial and business terms.

Citations and references

The original opinion text below discusses S.C. Code Ann. § 4-1-170 and the requested exemption under Code Section 12-37-220(B)(47).

Source

Original opinion text

HENRY McMAsTER
A'ITORNEY GENERAL

March 17, 2010

Ray N. Stevens, Director
Department of Revenue
P. 0. Box 125
Columbia, South Carolina 29214
Dear Mr. Stevens:
We received your letter requesting an oplnton of this Office concerning Owner-Occupied Residential Property Located in a Multicounty Park. You asked if mulitcounty parks may include owner-occupied residential property, and if so, "whether such property may receive the [property tax] exemption contained in Code Section 12-37-220(B)(47)." Additionally, you asked how reimbursements paid to school districts and deposited in the Homestead Exemption Fund are to be distributed. As noted in your request, on March 14, 1990, this Office issued an opinion addressing the manufacturing exemption contained in Code Section 12-37-220(A)(7) for property located in a multicounty park. Additionally, on March l, 2010, this Office issued an opinion specifically addressing your question regarding residential property. The March 1, 2010 opinion is enclosed for your converuence. Law/Analysis

Article VUI, Section 13(D) of the South Carolina Constitution provides that counties have the authority to develop industrial or business parks with other counties, and that such multicountyparks are "exempt from all ad valorem taxation." However, the "owners and lessees of any property situated in the park shall pay an amount equivalent to the property taxes or other in-lieu-of payments that would have been due and payable except for the exemption herein provided." S.C. Code Ann. § 4-1-170 also provides that participating counties, "by written agreement ... may develop jointly an industrial or business park with other counties within the geographical boundaries." The written agreement should explain 1) how expenses will be shared, 2) the percentage of revenue allocated to each county, and 3) the manner in which revenue must be distributed

REMBERT C. DENNlS BUILDING •

POST OFFICE Box 11549

• CouJMBIA, SC 29211-1549 •

TELEPHONE 803-734-3970

•

FAcs1MJLE 803-253-6283

Mr. Stevens
Page2
March 17, 2010

In an opinion of this Office dated March 14, 1990, we stated as follows:
[M]unicipalities only have such powers as are granted them by the state in their characters or by legislative enactment. Williams v. Wylie, 217 S.C. 247, 60 S.E. 586 (1950). These powers may be expressly granted or may be fairly implied from or necessarily incidental to those powers expressly granted. Marshall v. Rose. 213 S.C. 428, 49 S.E.2d 720 (1948). In an opinion of this Office dated March 1, 2010, we stated as follows: S.C. Code Ann. § 4-1-170 does not specifically state the type of property that may be included in such a park. Thus, we must employ the rules of statutory interpretation in order to determine whether such a park may include residential property. Our Supreme Court recently stated in SCANA Corp. V. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 384 S.C. 388, 392, 683 S.E.2d 468, 470 (2009): The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ..
. The Court should give words their plain and ordinary meaning ... Sloan v. S.C. Bd. Of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370 S.C. 452, 469, 636 S.E.2d 598, 607 (2006) .... According to Webster's New World Dictionary, "industrial" means "having the nature of or characterized by industries ...."Webster's New World Dictionary 718 (2nd ed. 1976). The plain and ordinary meaning of the term "business" is "a commercial or industrial establishment; store, factory, etc." Id. at 192.

Conclusion
Since S. C. Code Ann. § 4-1-170 does not specifically address what type of property can be included in a multi county industrial or business park, one must look to the plain and ordinary meaning. Based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms industrial and business, as described above, it does not appear that the Legislature intended for residential property to be included in an industrial or business park created pursuant to § 4-1-170. Nevertheless, consistent with our prior opinion, we believe the County should institute a declaratory judgment action in order for a court to decide with finality whether or not residential property may be included in a multicounty park.

Mr. Stevens
Page 3
March 17, 2010

Unless the court determines that residential property may be included in a multicounty park, it is unnecessary to address the tax exemption and Homestead Exemption Fund distribution questions. Sincerely, Henry McMaster Attorney General

By:

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Robert D. Cook
Deputy Attorney General

Leigha Blackwell
Assistant Attorney General

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