Who had rights to vending-machine proceeds in South Carolina school-district administrative buildings: employees or the Commission for the Blind?

Plain-English summary

In 1999, Charleston County School District asked whether employees or the South Carolina Commission for the Blind had rights to proceeds from vending machines in two district administrative buildings. Employees used the proceeds for charitable donations and group functions. The Attorney General's office found no settled answer because the statutory exception for “public elementary and secondary schools” did not say clearly whether it included separate administrative buildings.

The writer gave both sides of the issue. School offices could be viewed as part of the district's educational facilities even when housed apart from classrooms. On the other hand, the legislature's wording could be read more narrowly to cover school buildings rather than every district-owned administrative property. He said a court might construe exceptions to the blind-vendor law narrowly, but he did not decide who was entitled to the proceeds. He recommended a declaratory judgment or statutory amendment for clarification. The statute also contained a separate allowance for up to two coin-operated machines in certain public buildings without a Commission-operated vending facility.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1999. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did district ownership alone make its administrative offices exempt public schools? A: The office did not say so. It found the statutory wording ambiguous and described arguments for including or excluding separate administrative facilities.

Q: Did the opinion award vending proceeds to employees or blind vendors? A: No. The writer declined a definitive resolution of that question without judicial or legislative clarification.

Q: What separate machine allowance did the letter quote? A: It quoted a provision permitting up to two coin-operated vending machines in public-property buildings if they were not in a building with a Commission-operated vending facility.

Q: What path did the writer suggest for resolving the uncertainty? A: He recommended a declaratory judgment or a statutory amendment clarifying the legislature's intent.

Background and statutory framework

The Commission for the Blind was authorized to establish blind persons as operators of vending facilities on public property. Section 43-26-90 listed exempt facilities, including public elementary and secondary schools, and the separate limited machine allowance. The requester described two administrative buildings, one housing the superintendent and instructional staff and another housing the business office. The office found no prior state opinion on that specific situation. This was an informal opinion by the signing assistant deputy attorney general.

Citations and references

• Blind-vendor program: S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 43-26-30, cited for the Commission's licensing and placement authority.
• Exempt facilities and machines: Section 43-26-90, quoted in the letter.

Official title

Concerning Chapter 26 of Title 43, Operation of Vending Facilities by Blind Persons.

Requester

Gerry Urbanic, Director, Department of Legal Services, Charleston County School District

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/march-16-1999-1/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/99march16urbanic.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES M. CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

March 16, 1999
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Gerry Urbanic, Director
Department of Legal Services
Charleston County School District
75 Calhoun Street
Charleston, South Carolina 29401

Re: Informal Opinion
Dear Ms. Urbanic:
Thank you for your letter to Attorney General Condon which has been referred to me for response. Therein, you seek an opinion from this Office concerning Chapter 26 of Title 43, Operation of Vending Facilities by Blind Persons.

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You indicate that the Charleston County School District has two administrative facilities: one houses the Superintendent's Office, Instructional Services and Personnel; the other contains the Business Office. Both facilities have vending machines, the proceeds from which employee groups use for charitable donations and group functions. The specific issue which you raise is whether the employees of the school district or the Commission of the Blind have the right to the proceeds from the machines when such machines are housed in these buildings owned by the school district. LAW I ANALYSIS The South Carolina Commission for the Blind is authorized by statute to license and establish blind persons as operators of vending facilities in or on public property. See, S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 43-26-30. However, the General Assembly has exempted certain buildings.

REMBERT

c. DENNIS BUILDING

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POST OFFICE Box 11549

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COLL'\fBIA. S.C. 29211-1549

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F ("SIMILE: HOJ-253-6283

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Ms. Urbanic
Page2
March 16, 1999
Section 43-26-90 provides as follows:

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[t]his chapter shall not apply to hospitals, four-year institutions of higher learning and their branches, public elementary and secondary schools, technical education institutions, facilities devoted primarily to athletics or to state, municipal, county or civic center auditoriums and assembly halls nor shall there be any prohibitions to the placement of up to two coin operated vending machines in buildings on the public property provided they are not located in a building where there is a vending facility operated by the Commission. (Emphasis added). Thus, the issue is whether the term "public elementary and secondary schools" embraces the situation where school property is involved, but the purpose of the buildings concerned is primarily administrative, rather than providing education in the purest sense of the word. I have searched the opinions file and can find no previous opin_ion of this Office which addresses this question or any other similar issue. Thus, the issue is novel in this State.

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The statute is ambiguous and I am not at all certain how a court would apply the law in the context you have presented. On the one hand, it could be argued that Section 43-2690 lists several large public facilities as exempted from the Chapter. Hospitals, "four-year institutions ofhigher learning and their branches," and "technical education institutions" are all typically comprised of many buildings. Often, as these facilities are outgrown, additional buildings are incorporated into these institutions and hospitals for the purpose of housing administrative offices. These offices, although perhaps once located within the confines of a single building, continue to function as part of their facilities despite their removed location. The term "public elementary and secondary schools," when placed in its context of a large campus setting, could thus be construed to include administrative offices or buildings. In many school districts today, as the buildings are becoming increasingly populated, the perimeters of the school are constantly changing. Thus, an administrative building owned by the school district, but housed separately from the classroom buildings could be considered by a court as part of the school. See, Yttrup Homes v. Countv of Sacramento, 73 Cal. App.3d 279, 140 Cal.Reptr. 680 (1977)[fact that dictionary did not define "schools" as incorporating administrative officer or warehouses did not establish that property used for such purposes is not a part of the schools]; Trustees of Cola. v. Bd. of Trustees of Rich. Co. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 265 S.C. 194, 217 S.E.2d 587 ( 1975) [administrative

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Ms. Urbanic
Page 3
March 16, 1999
offices of the School District is a use for public school purposes].

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On the other hand, the language of the statute makes only "public elementary and secondary schools" exempt. An administrative building owned by the district, but entirely removed from the school campus, could thus be deemed by the court as not falling within the statute's terms. It could be argued that ifthe General Assembly had intended to include entirely separate administrative facilities within the exemptions, the statute would have used the more inclusive terms such as "branch" or "institution" to refer to these locations. The failure to use the inclusive terms for certain locations could be considered by a court as indicating the Legislature's intention to narrow the scope of the exceptions when referring to public school districts. Furthermore, it could be argued that if the Legislature had intended that the term "school" encompasses all district-owned buildings, it arguably would not have needed to include both "elementary" and "secondary" in the language of the section or would have phrased the section more in keeping with this all-inclusive intent. In short, based upon the fact that Section 43-26-90 is ambiguous and that good arguments could be made for both interpretations outlined above, legislative or judicial clarification would be advisable. Thus, I would recommend that this matter be resolved either though a declaratory judgement or by statutory amendment to clarify the Legislature's intent. Typically, a court would deem the statute as remedial in nature and exceptions thereto would thus be narrowly interpreted. However, unless and until a court or the General Assembly speaks definitively to the question you have raised, I can only advise as to the statute's ambiguity and the need for judicial or legislative clarification. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I am

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Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General
RDC/ph