Could South Carolina pass a landfill siting restriction that applied only in Spartanburg County?

Plain-English summary

In March 1995, a South Carolina legislator asked whether proposed S.494 could restrict commercial construction, demolition, and land-clearing landfills near aquaculture farms only in Spartanburg County. Assistant Attorney General Patricia Petway concluded that the bill would be of doubtful constitutionality because it affected only that county and the state constitution barred laws for a specific county. She did not declare the bill invalid: legislation was presumed constitutional, and only a court could strike it down.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Legislators and county officials

The letter treated the county-specific reach of S.494 as the central constitutional concern. It compared the proposal with earlier enactments struck down under Article VIII, Section 7, while preserving the usual presumption in favor of a legislative act.

Landfill and aquaculture interests

As drafted, the proposal would have barred a specified type of new commercial landfill within three thousand feet of an existing aquaculture farm or facility in Spartanburg County. It expressly excluded existing permitted landfills of that type. The letter evaluated the proposal's constitutionality, not any individual permit.

Common questions

Why did the letter question the landfill bill?
Because the proposed restriction applied only in Spartanburg County, raising the state constitution's ban on laws for a specific county.

Did the AG say the bill was already invalid?
No. The writer called its constitutionality doubtful but explained that only a court could invalidate an enacted law.

Would the proposal have covered existing permitted landfills? No. The bill text quoted in the letter excluded existing permitted commercial construction, demolition, and land-clearing debris landfills.

Background and statutory framework

Article VIII, Section 7 of the South Carolina Constitution supplied the special-legislation issue. The letter first described the presumption of constitutionality and then cited decisions applying the county-specific-law restriction. Its conclusion concerned S.494 as proposed in 1995.

Citations and references

• Article VIII, Section 7: constitutional restriction on laws for a specific county.
• Thomas v. Macklen and Townsend v. Richland County: decisions cited for the presumption of constitutionality.
• Cooper River Parks and Playground Commission v. City of North Charleston, Torgerson v. Craver, Hamm v. Cromer, and Pickens County v. Pickens County Water and Sewer Authority: examples cited concerning county-specific enactments.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/march-15-1995/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/1995mar15vaughn.pdf

Original opinion text

CHAAlr:s MolONY CoNdON
ATTORNEY C£N£AAI

The State of South Carolina
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March 15, 1995

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The Honorable Lewis R. Vaughn
Member, House of Representatives
534 Blatt Building
Columbia, South Carolina 29211
RE: Informal Opinion
Dear Representative Vaughn:

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By your letter of March 6, 1995, to Attorney General Condon, you have sought an opinion as to the constitutionality of S.494, a bill concerning solid waste landfills in Spartanburg County. You have questioned whether this is special legislation which would violate Article VIII, Section 7 of the South Carolina Constitution. In considering the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly, it is presumed that the act is constitutional in all respects. Moreover, such an act will not be considered void unless its unconstitutionality is clear beyond any reasonable doubt. Thomas v. Macklen, 186 S.C. 290, 195 S.E. 539 (1937); Townsend v. Richland County, 190 S.C. 270, 2 S.E.2d 777 ( 1939). All doubts of constitutionality are generally resolved in favor of constitutionality. While this Office may comment upon potential constitutional problems, it is solely within the province of the courts of this State to declare an act unconstitutional. The bill in question contains the following provisions: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no commercial construction, demolition, and land-clearing landfill in Spartanburg County may be located within three thousand feet of an existing aquaculture farm or facility. This section does not apply to existing permitted commercial construction, demolition, and land-clearing debris landfills. For purposes of

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The Honorable Lewis R. Vaughn
Page 2
March 15, 1995
this section, "commercial landfill" means a landfill providing landfill services to other persons or entities for compensation. An analysis of this bill clearly indicates that the bill is one which would affect only Spartanburg County.

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As you observe in your request, Article VIII, Section 7 of the South Carolina Constitution provides in relevant part that "[n]o laws for a specific county shall be enacted.... " Enactments by the General Assembly similar to the instant bill have been struck down by the South Carolina Supreme Court as violative of Article VIII, Section 7. See Cooper River Parks and Playground Commission v. City of North Charleston, 273 S.C. 639, 259 S.E.2d 107 (1979); Torgerson v. Craver, 267 S.C. 558, 230 S.E.2d 228 (1976); Hamm v. Cromer, 305 S.C. 305, 408 S.E.2d 227 (1991 ); Pickens County v. Pickens County Water and Sewer Authority,_ S.C. __, 439 S.E.2d 840 ( 1994). I am of the opinion that the instant bill would be of doubtful constitutionality, based on the reasoning and precedent of these and other similar cases, though of course the presumption of constitutionality would attach and only a court could declare the enactment invalid. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. I trust that the foregoing is satisfactorily responsive to your inquiry. With kindest regards, I am Sincerely,

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Patricia D. Petway
Assistant Attorney General