Could South Carolina legislators change a county initiative statute after the state Supreme Court interpreted it?

Plain-English summary

In a March 2011 follow-up letter, the South Carolina Attorney General said the General Assembly could amend the county voter-initiative statute after the state Supreme Court had interpreted it. The change would operate prospectively. Lawmakers could not apply an amendment backward to overrule the court's interpretation or disturb existing judgments.

The request followed a separate opinion issued the same day about the county initiative statute's exclusion for measures appropriating money. The AG relied on state Supreme Court decisions explaining the legislature's broad lawmaking authority and the separation-of-powers limit on retroactive statutory amendments.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2011. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Could lawmakers change the county initiative statute after a Supreme Court decision? A: The AG said yes, if the new legislation operated prospectively and stayed within constitutional limits.

Could a new amendment overturn the court's interpretation for earlier disputes? A: No. The opinion said a later amendment could not be applied retroactively to overrule a judicial interpretation or interfere with existing judgments.

Did this letter decide whether a particular county initiative was valid? A: No. It addressed the legislature's power to amend the statute following the court's interpretation.

Background and statutory framework

The question concerned the court's interpretation of the money-appropriation exclusion in § 4-9-1210, the county initiative statute. The AG quoted JRS Builders, Inc. v. Neunsinger for the rule that an amendment contrary to an earlier judicial interpretation could take effect only from enactment forward, consistent with separation of powers.

Citations and references

The opinion discussed § 4-9-1210, JRS Builders, Inc. v. Neunsinger, and other South Carolina Supreme Court decisions on prospective statutory amendments.

Official title

Follow-up opinion questioning whether the Legislature possesses authority to “overrule” or alter the Supreme Court’s decision in Focus on Beaufort County on Behalf of Certain Registered Voters of Beaufort County v. Beaufort County, 318 U.S. 227, 456 S.E.2d 910 (1995).

Requester

The Honorable Chip Huggins, Member, House of Representatives

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/march-1-2011/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/huggins-c-os-9196-3-1-11rdc-county-voter-ballot-initiatives.pdf

Original opinion text

ALAN WLLSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

March 1, 2011

The Honorable Chip Huggins
Member, House of Representatives
323B Blatt Building
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Dear Representative Huggins:
As a follow up to the opinion issued to you today, you have also asked whether the Legislature possesses authority to "overrule"or alter the Supreme Court's decision in Focus on Beaufort County on BehalfofCertain Registered Voters ofBeaufort County v. Beaufort County, 318 U.S. 227, 456 S.E.2d 910 (1995). As we noted in today's opinion, that decision addressed the portion of§ 4-9-1210 covering the exclusion for ordinances appropriating money. Only recently, our Supreme Court emphasized that
[t]he power ofour state legislature is plenary, and therefore, the authority given to the General Assembly by our Constitution is a limitation of legislature, not a grant .... This means that "the General Assembly may enact any law not expressly, or by clear implication, prohibited by the State or Federal Constitutions." CityofRockHillv. Harris, _ S.E.2d _ , 2011WL204799 (January 24, 2011), quoting Moseley v. Welch, 209 S.C. 19, 39 S.E.2d 133 (1946). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the Legislature is free to alter its construction of statutes so long as it does so prospectively and does not interfere with existing judgments. In JRS Builders, Inc. v. Neunsinger, 364 S.C. 596, 600, 614 S.E.2d 629, 631 (2005), the Court emphasized as follows:
[b]ecause the legislature does not have the authority to overrule a decision by this Court, the amended statute cannot apply retrospectively. See Steinke v. South Carolina Dep 't. ofLabor, Licensing and Regulation, 336 S.C. 373, 520 S.E.2d 142 (1999) (holding legislature lacked authority to retroactively overrule Court' s interpretation of a statute). Moreover, we have found that "a judicial interpret[ation] of a statute is determinative of its meaning and effect, and any subsequent legislative amendment to the contrary will only be effective from the date of its enactment and REMBERT

c. D fiNNlS B UILDING • Posr 0Ff'ICE B ox 11549 • COLUMBIA, SC 29211-1549 • TELEPHONE 803-734-3970 • FACSIMlLE 803-253-6283

The Honorable Chip Huggins
Page 2
March 1, 2011

cannot be applied retroactively." Lindsay v. Nat'! Old Line Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 621, 629, 207 S.E.2d 75, 78 (1974). Because a prior, on-point judicial decision has been rendered, any subsequent statutory amendments apply prospectively only. To decide otherwise would allow the legislature, in effect, to overrule judicial decisions in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Accordingly, so long as any additional legislation does not apply retroactively, the General Assembly is free to amend a statute which is contrary to an interpretation of our Supreme Court. Sincerely,

~»/~
Robert D. Cook
Deputy Attorney General