Would a random cash prize for people who voted count as an illegal lottery in South Carolina in 2000?

Plain-English summary

A legislator proposed drawing a voter at random from everyone who cast a ballot in a primary or general election and giving that person a cash prize. He argued that the drawing lacked the ticket purchase or other consideration traditionally associated with a lottery. The June 2000 AG opinion did not decide whether the proposal was legal.

The letter explained that an older state Supreme Court decision described a lottery through prize, consideration, and chance. A later decision, Johnson v. Collins, described the constitutional term more narrowly and made that traditional test uncertain. Because of the new ruling, the AG said it could not opine with high confidence whether this voter drawing violated South Carolina's lottery prohibition and offered no further guidance until the court spoke again.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the AG approve a cash drawing for voters?
A: No. The opinion expressly declined to decide whether the drawing violated the state constitution.

Q: Why did the lack of a ticket purchase not settle the issue?
A: The AG said a recent state Supreme Court ruling had unsettled the older three-element lottery test, so it would not give a definitive answer based on consideration alone.

Q: Did the letter identify a final legal test for the proposed prize?
A: No. It contrasted the older and newer court decisions and said further guidance would require another court ruling.

Background and statutory framework

Article XVII, Section 7 barred lotteries. The opinion compared Darlington Theatres v. Coker, which used the traditional three elements, with Johnson v. Collins, which described a lottery more narrowly than every game of chance. The AG treated that change as preventing a confident answer about the proposed voter prize.

Citations and references

• Article XVII, Section 7, South Carolina Constitution.
• Darlington Theatres v. Coker and Johnson v. Collins, the competing lottery analyses discussed in the letter.

Official title

Inquiring as to the legality of awarding a cash prize to a voter whose name is drawn at random from a listing of all who vote at either a primary or general election.

Requester

The Honorable James S. Klauber, Member, House of Representatives

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/june-5-2000/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/00june5klauber.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLIE CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

June 5, 2000

The Honorable James S. Klauber
Member, House of Representatives
406 E. Henrietta A venue
Greenwood, South Carolina 29649

RE:

Informal Opinion

Dear Representative Klauber:
By your letter of May l, 2000, you have inquired as to the legality of m:varding a cash prize to a voter whose name is drawn at random from a listing of all who vote at either a primary or general election. In your letter you state, "[ t ]his would not be considered a lottery in that there is no consideration for the prize nor is there a purchase of any ticket involved. Eligibility would be predicated on purely those who cast ballots in a certain election.·· Article XVII, Section 7 of the South Carolina Constitution ( 1895 as amended) forbids the operation of lotteries in South Carolina and provides as follows:
[n]o lottery shall ever be allowed or be advertised by
newspapers, or otherwise, or its tickets be sold in this State. The game of bingo, when conducted by charitable, religious or fraternal organizations exempt from federal income taxation or when conducted at recognized annual state and county fairs, shall not be deemed a lottery prohibited by this Section. For years the leading case in South Carolina interpreting this section has been Darlington Theatres v. Coker, et al. 190 S.C. 282, 2 S.E.2d 782 ( 1939). The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the traditional definition of a lottery required the three elements of: (I) the offering of a prize: (2) payment of consideration for the opportunity to win the prize: and (3) the opportunity to win the prize based on chance. In keeping vvith

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The Honorable James S. Klauber
Page 2
June 5, 2000

Darlington, courts and this Office have traditionally viewed any game or contest containing these elements as violative of the State Constitution's prohibition on lotteries. The traditional characteristics of a lottery have recently been called into question by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Johnson v. Collins, 333 S.C. 96, 508 S.E.2d 575 ( 1998). In determining whether video poker machines are illegal lotteries, the Court distinguished between the terms "lottery'' and "games of chance.'' The Court found that "lottery" as prohibited by the Constitution, could only be defined, in the narrowest sense, as a game in which ·•a large number of tickets are sold and a drawing is held for certain prizes." Id. at 579, (quoting Random House Dictionary of English Language) Not all games of chance or ....gambling..., devices fall within this definition and, accordinglv,
.,. are not necessarilv
violative of the Constitution. Id at 578.
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The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Collins has introduced uncertainty into the lottery analysis. No longer are the traditional three elements espoused in Darlington the determinative test for legality. As a result this Office cannot opine, with any high degree of confidence, that the games you describe do or do not violate the State Constitution's prohibition on lotteries. Enclosed is a copy of Johnson v. Collins, but until the Court speaks again on this issue, we can provide no further guidance. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Deputy Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kindest regards, I remain Very truly yours,

Zeb C. Williams, III
Deputy Attorney General
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