Could an MUSC trustee remain his congressional district's representative when his spouse claimed residence in another county?

Plain-English summary

The Medical University of South Carolina asked whether a trustee could continue representing District 2 after his wife claimed a Georgetown County beach house as her permanent residence for tax purposes. The Attorney General concluded that he might continue serving because the facts supplied about his own long-standing Columbia residence supported a finding that he remained a resident there.

The letter emphasized that domicile turned heavily on the individual's intent and was a factual question. It cited the trustee's Columbia home, vehicle registration, driver's license, voter registration, and business and social ties. His wife's residence claim did not by itself decide his residence. The opinion did not make a binding factual finding about domicile.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2009. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did a spouse's claim of residence in another county automatically disqualify the trustee? A: No. The opinion said a wife's residence elsewhere was immaterial to deciding the trustee's own domicile.

Q: Was voter registration conclusive proof of residence? A: No. The quoted earlier opinion called voter registration a strong indication, but not conclusive proof. It said the county's voter-registration board determined whether a person qualified as an elector there.

Q: Which facts supported the trustee's continuing Columbia residence? A: The requester reported a Columbia home, car registration, driver's license, voter registration, and business and social ties. The Attorney General said those facts could support continued residence.

Background and statutory framework

S.C. Code Ann. § 59-123-50 provided for trustee seats associated with congressional districts. The office drew on its earlier opinions treating domicile as a mix of legal and factual questions, with personal intent central to the inquiry. It said the trustee could continue representing District 2 on the stated facts, without treating his wife's tax claim as controlling.

Citations and references

Statute: S.C. Code Ann. § 59-123-50.

Prior opinions: South Carolina Attorney General opinions dated March 31, 2008; March 17, 2004; and August 29, 1983, as cited in the letter.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/june-4-2009-1-1/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/good-j-c-jr-os-8791-6-4-09-MUSC-board-of-trustees.pdf

Original opinion text

H ENRY McMASTER
AITORNEY GENERAL

June 4, 2009

Joseph C. Good, Jr., General Counsel
Medical University of South Carolina
Harper Student Center
45 Courtenay Drive
MSCMSC204
Charleston, South Carolina 29425-2040
Dear Mr. Good:

In a letter to this office you questioned the eligibility ofDr. Thomas Rowland to continue to represent District 2 on the Board of Trustees of the Medical University of South Carolina. According to your letter,
[a]pparently what has given rise to this concern is that his wife owns a house at the beach and she has applied for and received a reduced tax rate from Georgetown County by claiming the house as her permanent residence. For the last forty or so years, Dr. Rowland has been a resident of Columbia. He has carefullyprotectedhis Columbia residency by: owning a home in Columbia, registering his car in Columbia, obtaining his driver's license in Columbia, and registering to vote in Columbia. He maintains his business and social contacts in Columbia. As to the election ofa member of the Board ofTrustees ofthe Medical University of South Carolina, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 59-123-50, "[o]ne member of the medical profession from each congressional district and one layman or member of a non.medical profession from each congressional district must be elected." Specifically as to the eligibility to serve on the Board ofTrustees of the Medical University, a prior opinion of this office dated March 31, 2008 stated that
[o]ne's domicile is "the place where a person has a true, fixed and permanent home and principle establishment, to which he has, whenever he is absent, an intention of retuming" ... An intention to remain permanently, or for an indefinite time, in a place is one of the essential elements of domicile... Intent ofthe individual is probably the most important element in determining the residency of an individual .. .Intent is primarily a question of fact, determined on a case by case basis.

REMBERT

c. DENNIS B UlLDING • POST OFFICE Box 11549 • COLUMBIA, SC 29211-1549 • TELEPHONE 803-734-3970 • FACS1Mll.E 803-253-6283

Mr. Good
Page2
June 4, 2009

That opinion further stated that
[i]t is our opinion that in order to be eligible to serve on a Board of Trustees with statutory residency requirements such as the MUSC Board, an individual must demonstrate that he is qualified, by virtue of his residence in the specified congressional district, to be an elector in that district. That an individual is a qualified elector of a particular county would be determined by that county's board of voter registration (Op. S.C. Atty Gen., June 12, 1995), based on the factors of residency referenced above. Thus, the fact that an individual is registered to vote in a particular county strongly indicates (but is not dispositive of the fact) that he is a resident of that county. As stated in Clarke v. McCown 1, the intent of the individual is the controlling element of decision. Another prior opinion of this office dated March 17, 2004 stated that
[g]enerally, residency is a mixed question of fact and law and turns on the individual's intent. Ops. Atty. Gen. dated May 7, 1991 and July 7, 1999. As stated in a prior opinion of this office dated March 8, 1995 citing the decision in Clarke v. McCown, .... [t]he residence of a person is a mixed question oflaw and fact; and the intention of that person with regard to the matter is deemed the controlling element of decision. His intention may be proved by his acts and declarations, and perhaps other circumstances; but when these, taken all together, are not inconsistent with the intention to retain an established residence, they are not sufficient in law to deprive him of his rights thereunder, for it will be presumed that he intends to continue a residence gained until the contrary is made to appear, because inestimable political and valuable personal rights depend upon it. Therefore, it is a serious matter to deprive one of his residence, and it should not be done upon evidence which is legally insufficient. .. That a man does not live or sleep or have his washing done at the place where he has gained a residence, or that his family lives elsewhere, or that he engages in employment elsewhere are facts not necessarily inconsistent with his intention to continue his residence at that place. That opinion further stated that
[t]his office has previously stated that "a person may move from his original home, and voting place, and live elsewhere but retain his legal domicile at his original home and be able to return to the original home to vote. This is a question of fact..." This office has opined that "the permanent residence of an elector is not affected by a

1

107 S.C. 209, 92 S.E. 479 (1917).

Mr. Good
Page3
June 4, 2009

temporary absence when the intention of such absence is not to be permanent." [T]he question of residence depends on the individual's intent, and such is a question of fact. See also: Op. Atty. Gen. dated August 29, 1983 ("Since residency is determined by one's intent, the fact that...( an individual's) ... wife maybe a resident 0£..(one) ... county is immaterial to the question of whether... (that individual) .. .is a resident 0£..(another county)."). Consistent with the above, and particularly referencing the facts set forth in your letter regarding Dr. Rowland which support the conclusion that it could be determined that he remains a resident of Columbia, in the opinion of this office, he may continue to represent District 2 on the Board of Trustees of the Medical University of South Carolina. If there are any questions, please advise. Very truly yours, Henry McMaster Attorney General

cfJ~Vf l/dJJ~
By:

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

~L),~
RObeftD:COok
Deputy Attorney General

Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General