Did Darlington County have to appoint each school superintendent for a three-year term?

Plain-English summary

Darlington County’s school board chair asked whether the three-year superintendent appointment in Section 3 of a 1978 local act applied only to the first appointment or to every appointment. The Assistant AG said the section had not been amended or repealed at the time. He also saw no constitutional defect on its face, citing South Carolina cases that had upheld school-district legislation against some special-legislation challenges and the usual presumption of validity.

On the term question, he observed that other enactments expressly distinguish an initial term from later ones when the legislature intends to do so. This act made no such distinction. Its reference to filling vacancies for the remainder of “the term” reinforced his reading. He concluded the board had to appoint the superintendent for a three-year term until the General Assembly amended or repealed the act. The opinion did not decide the validity of every conceivable application of the act.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Was the three-year term limited to the first superintendent appointed under the act? A: No. The author said the text did not separate the first term from later terms.

Q: What happened if a superintendent left early?
A: The opinion quoted the act as providing a board vote to fill a vacancy for the unexpired part of the term.

Q: Did the author say the act had already been repealed? A: No. He said it had neither been amended nor repealed as of the 1997 letter.

Background and statutory framework

Section 3 of Act No. 748 of 1978 supplied the three-year appointment and vacancy language. The letter cited State v. Martin and State v. Blackmon for giving effect to legislative intent and clear text, and Bradley v. Cherokee School District One on challenges to school-district legislation.

Citations and references

Local act discussed: Section 3 of Act No. 748 of 1978. Cases discussed: Bradley v. Cherokee School District One; State v. Martin; State v. Blackmon.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/june-27-1997-1/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/97june27jeffords.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

June 27, 1997

The Honorable Warren J. Jeffords
Chairman
Darlington County Board of Education
P.O.Boxlll7
Darlington, South Carolina 29532
Dear Mr. Jeffords:
You have requested this Office's opinion regarding the status and constitutionality of Section 3 of Act No. 748 of 1978 and, more particularly, whether the provision that "the superintendent shall be appointed for a term of three years" can be interpreted to apply only to the initial appointment of a superintendent, or is it to be interpreted as requiring the Board to appoint the superintendent for a three year term not only initially but always and only for a three year term. First of all, as we advised you previously, Section 3 of Act No. 748 of 1978 has neither been repealed nor amended since its passage. Additionally, the face of the law (the law as it reads) does not indicate any constitutional problems. The South Carolina Supreme Court has upheld many challenges to laws for particular school districts as special legislation because of the authority given to the General Assembly to provide for public education. See, Bradley v. Cherokee School District One, 470 S.E.2d 570 (S.C. 1996); Moye v. Caughman, 265 S.C. 140, 217 S.E.2d 36 (1975). Moreover, a court would uphold the law "... unless shown to violate the constitution clearly and beyond reasonable doubt." Hercules Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 274 S.C. 137, 262 S.E.2d 45 (1980).

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In resolving your question concerning the superintendent's term, several fundamental principles of statutory construction are applicable. In interpreting any statute, the primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). The words of a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 368 S.E.2d 899 (1988). The Court must apply the clear and unambiguous terms of the statute according to their literal meaning. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991). The full effect must REMBERT

c. DENNIS BUILDING

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JJon,h~..,.'/-- ~i7r;;,,

POST OFFICE Box 11549

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COLCMBIA, S.C. 29211-1549

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TELEPHONE:

803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

The Honorable Warren J. Jeffords
Page 2
June 27, 1997
be given to each section of a statute, giving the words used their plain meaning, and in the absence of ambiguity, words must not be added or taken from the statute. Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. City ofSptg., 185 S.C. 313, 194 S.E. 139 (1938).

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With those principles in mind, it must be noted that the South Carolina Code of Laws as well as the Acts and Joint Resolutions are replete with enactments wherein the Legislature so specified when it has sought to distinguish between the duration of an initial term and subsequent terms of a particular office. In the absence of such distinction here, it is the opinion of this Office that the Legislature did not intend to differentiate between the superintendent's initial and subsequent terms of office. Additional support for this interpretation is found in the statute's sole mechanism for filling vacancies in the office of superintendent. In relevant part, Section 3 provides, "[y]acancies shall be filled by a majority vote of the board for the unexpired portion of the term." (Emphasis added.) By using the plural, "vacancies," the Legislature recognized that those who hold the office of superintendent may vacate their office prior to the conclusion of their three year term. The statute's use of the singular, "term," reinforces the Legislature's intent not to distinguish between the initial term and subsequent terms. Accordingly, it is our opinion that until the General Assembly amends or repeals Act No. 748 of 1978, the Darlington County Superintendent of Education must be appointed for a three year term. With kind regards, I am Very truly yours,

Paul M. Koch
Assistant Attorney General
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REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

ffeb C. Williams, III
Deputy Attorney General
cc:

The Honorable Edward E. Saleeby
Senator, District No. 29