Could South Carolina's Commission for Minority Affairs meet less than once a month in 2000?

Plain-English summary

The Commission for Minority Affairs asked whether its board could hold fewer than monthly meetings until January 2001. The 2000 informal opinion read the statute's command that the commission "shall meet at least monthly" as mandatory. It said the commission could not meet less often while complying with that provision.

The letter suggested exploring meetings by telephone because South Carolina's FOIA permitted them. That was presented as a possible less costly way to fulfill the monthly schedule, not as an exception to it. The AG also noted that the legislature could consider amending the meeting requirement.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did "at least monthly" permit the commission to skip a month?
A: No. The AG interpreted it as requiring a meeting not less than once each month.

Q: Could a telephone meeting count toward the schedule?
A: The letter suggested that possibility, saying FOIA permitted telephonic meetings. It did not supply a detailed procedure for conducting one.

Q: Could the board itself change the monthly requirement?
A: The AG found no way to meet less often under the existing law and mentioned legislative amendment as a possible change.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion read § 1-31-20's meeting command according to the ordinary meaning of "shall" and "monthly." It noted the FOIA provision at §30-4-20( d) when proposing telephonic meetings as an alternative format for complying with the same frequency requirement.

Citations and references

• § 1-31-20, the monthly meeting mandate.
• §30-4-20( d), the FOIA provision cited in connection with telephonic meetings.

Official title

Inquiring “what options are available to the members of the board regarding deviating from holding monthly meetings between now and January 2001, as [required by S.C. Code Ann. §1-31-20].”

Requester

Janie A. Davis, Executive Director, Commission for Minority Affairs

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/june-21-2000/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/00june21davis.pdf

Original opinion text

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The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLIE CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

June 21, 2000

Janie A. Davis, Executive Director
Commission for Minority Affairs
2611 Forest Drive, Suite 203
Columbia, South Carolina 29204

I

RE: Informal Opinion
Dear Ms. Davis:
Thank you for your letter of June 14, 2000, inquiring '\vhat options are available to the members of the board regarding deviating from holding monthly meetings between now and January 2001, as [required by S.C. Code Ann. §1-31-20].'' As you know, S.C. Code Ann. § 1-31-20 provides as follows: The commission shall meet at least monthly to study the causes and effects of the socio-economic deprivation of minorities in the State and to implement programs necessary to address inequities confronting minorities in the State . (Emphasis added.) In attempting to determine the meaning of§ 1-31-20, a number of principles of statutory interpretation are relevant. .. In interpreting any statute, the primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the legislature.·· State v. Martin. 293 S.C. 46. 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). State v. Harris. 268 S.C. 117. 232 S.E.2d 231 (1977). Words used must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction for the purpose of limiting or expounding the statute's operation. In other words, the real purpose and intent of the lawmakers will prevail over the literal import of the words. Caughman v. Cola. Ylvf.CA., 212 S.C. 337, 4 7 S.E.2d 788 ( 1948). Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165. 318 S.E.2d 14 ( 1984). The Court must presume that the Legislature intended by its action to accomplish something and not do a futile thing. State ex rel. lv!cleod v. iV!ontgomery, 244 S.C. 308. 136 S.E.2d 778 ( 1964 ). Moreover, use of the word "shall" in a statute generally connotes mandatory

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FACSIMILE : 803-25:1-6 28.1

Ms. Davis
Page 2
June 21, 2000

compliance. S. C. Dept. ofHighways and Public Transportation v. Dickinson, 288 S.C. 189, 341 S.E.2d 134 (1986). '·Monthly'" has been defined by the courts as once a month or once in every month. Smith v. Board of Trustees of the City of Des Moines et al.. 238 IO\va 127. 25 N.W.2d 858 (1947). Another helpful decision is State ex rel. Franklin v. Raborn et al., 60 S.C. 78, 38 S.E. 260 ( 1901 ). In that case the South Carolina Supreme Court examined language contained in an Act of 1899 that required County Boards of Road Commissioners to meet monthly. The Court concluded, inter alia, that such language evidenced the legislature's intent that the commissioners should meet not less than once a month. Thus, applying the previously stated rules of statutory construction in conjunction with the mandatory nature of the word "shall", the only reasonable interpretation of §1-31-20 is that the legislature intended for the Commission for Minority Affairs to meet not less than once a month. While I can offer no guidance that complies with this statutory mandate and allmvs the Commission to meet less frequently than once a month. perhaps the Commission may explore the possibility of convening telephonically until such time as the General Assembly can consider amending § 1-31-20. Such meetings are permitted by the South Carolina Freedom of Information Act see, S.C. Code Ann. §30-4-20( d) (enclosed) and may provide the Commission with a less expensive and time consuming means of folfilling its statutory obligation. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Deputy Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General not officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I remain Very truly yours.

Zeb C. Williams, II I
Deputy Attorney General
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