Did Jacob’s Law cover church youth trips unrelated to school or child care?

Plain-English summary

A legislator asked whether South Carolina's Jacob's Law, which addressed vehicles transporting school students, applied when a church took a youth group on outings unrelated to school, such as trips to the beach or mountains. The AG agreed with the narrower reading for those trips. He interpreted the law's references to school, school-related activities, and child care as describing student transportation to those places, not every recreational event involving school-age children.

The AG stressed the limit of that answer. A church could fall within the law when it transported students to or from school, school-related activities, or child-care facilities. He also repeated that the statutory wording was ambiguous, that a court might read a child-safety law broadly, and that only legislative or judicial clarification would settle the scope definitively. The opinion was expressly advisory.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2005. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did the AG say ordinary church youth outings were covered?
No. For the beach and mountain trips described, he read the statute as inapplicable because they were unrelated to school or child-care transportation.

Could a church ever be covered by Jacob's Law?
Yes. The AG said the law could apply when a church transported school students to or from school, school-related activities, or child-care facilities.

Was the statutory scope settled beyond doubt?
No. The opinion described ambiguity and called for a court or the legislature to clarify the law.

Background and statutory framework

The letter revisited two earlier AG opinions, examined the law's “any entity” wording and its references to students and child care, and read related provisions together. Its construction of child care as a facility rather than any church-sponsored activity drove the answer to the specific trip question.

Citations and references

The opinion analyzed Jacob's Law and Sections 56-5-195 and 56-5-196, with the statutory language reproduced below.

Official title

As to the applicability of Jacob’s Law to churches. Specifically, the request of an opinion in order that churches not in compliance with the statute may comply with the law if need be.

Requester

The Honorable Michael A. Pitts, Member, House of Representatives

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/june-10-2005/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/05june10pitts.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
HENRY MCMASTER
A'TTORNEV GENERAL

June 10, 2005

[
The Honorable Michael A. Pitts
Member, House of Representatives
3 72 Bucks Point Road
Laurens, South Carolina 29360

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Dear Representative Pitts:
By letter, you request an opinion as to the applicability of Jacob's Law to churches. In your letter, you express the belief that churches are only subject to Jacob 's Law when transporting children for specifi c school related activities. Therefore, you interpret Jacob 's Law as inapplicable when churches are transporting youth groups to events unrelated to school activities. Finally, you request an opinion in order that churches not in compliance with the statute may comply with the law if need be.

Law I Analysis
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Jacob 's Law was introduced following an incident in which a Heathwood Hall Episcopal School 15-passenger van, which was transporting children as part of its summer program, coll ided with a tanker causing the death of 6-year-old Jacob Strebl er. It was later discovered that the 15passenger van did not meet the federal safety standards established for school buses. ln response, the General Assembly enacted Jacob 's Law during the 2000 Session. The Governor signed this legislation into law on May 26, 2000. Jacob's Law amended the South Carolina Code of Laws by adding Sections 56-5-195 and 56-5-196. Section 56-5-195 provides:

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(A) Effective July 1, 2000, any entity transporting preprimary, primary, or secondary school students to or from school, school-related activities, or child care, and utilizing a vehicle defined as a ''school bus" under 49 U.S.C. Section 30125, as defined on April 5, 2000, must transpo11 these stu~knts in a vehicle meeting federal school bus safety standards, as contained in 49 U.S.C. Section 3010 1, et seq., or any successor statutes, and all applicable federal regulations. Nothing in this section proh ibits the transportation of children to or from child care in nonconfonning vehicles by a State of South Carolina hum an service provider or pub I ic transportation authmity as long as each child is accompanied by a parent or legal guardian whose transportati on is in connection with his work, education. or trairung.

REMBERT
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c. DENNIS Bl.llLDL'IG • POST Orne£ Box 11 549 • COWMBIA, s.c. 292 11-1549 • TEl..£Pt!ONE: 803-734-3970 • FACSIMILE: 803 -253-6283
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The Honorable Michael A. Pitts
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June 10, 2005

(B) Notwithstanding subsection (A) of this section, any vehicle that is purchased before July 1, 2000, and is utilized to transport preprimary, primary, or secondary students to or from school, school-related activities, or child care is not subject to the requirements contained in subsection (A) of this section until July 1, 2006. A vehicle that is purchased on or after July 1, 2000, and is utilized to transport preprimary, primary, or secondary students to or from school, school-related activities, or child care is subject to the requirements contained in subsection (A) of this section once the vehicle is utilized for those purposes. (C) Before July 1, 2006, nothing in this section may be construed to create a duty or other obligation to cease utilizing nonconforming vehicles purchased before the effective date of this act. (D) To facilitate compliance with the provisions contained in this section, any entity contained in this section may purchase conforming vehicles under the State of South Carolina contracts for purchase of these vehicles. (E) Nothing in the section prohibits the transportation of students by common carriers that are not exclusively engaged in the transportation of school students or by the entities subject to this section which own or operate these vehicles. However, the motor carriage used by the common carrier or entity to transport students must be designed to carry thirty or more passengers. Section 56-5-196 further reads as follows: The parents or legal guardians of a student who is eligible to receive public school bus transportation must have the option of designating a child daycare center or other before or after school program as the student's origin or destination for school transportation. We have previously advised that it is probable that the General Assembly intended for Section 56-5-195 to apply to churches in certain respects. In a November 30, 2001 opinion, we explained that:
[a] liberal reading of Section 56-5-195 would lend itself to an interpretation which include churches in those entities covered by its requirements. Particularly those churches which undertake to transport school-aged children to or fi'om school, school-related activities, or childcare [would likely be covered}. Our analysis, however, cannot end here as other factors must be taken into account interpreting this statute. As more fully addressed in the February 21, 2001, opinion, there are some indications that perhaps a more restrictive reading was intended. Accordingly, it is

The Honorable Michael A. Pitts
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June 10, 2005

my opinion that legislative or judicial clarification is needed to fully answer your question. See, Op. Atty. Gen. November 30, 2001. (emphasis added). It is our policy that previous opinions of this Office are not overruled or superseded unless clearly erroneous, or unless applicable law has changed. Ops. S.C. Atty. Gen. October 3, 1986. Thus, based upon your question we must determine whether the November 30, 2001 opinion should be superseded in accordance with this standard. We believe the November 30, 2001 opinion, as well as the February 21, 2001, opinion correctly stated the law.

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Of course, the cardinal rule oflegislative construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, whenever possible State v. Baucom, 340 S.C. 339, 531 S.E.2d 922 (2000). A statute as a whole must receive a practical, reasonable and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design and policy of the lawmakers. Caughman v. Cola. YMCA., 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E.2d 788 (1948). Words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991). As we recognized in the February 21, 2001 opinion, although the Act "as originally drafted,
... was to apply only to public and private schools in the transportation of students," as "eventually passed, ... the Act is much more broadly written, applying to 'any entity transporting [students] to or from school, school related activities or child care .... "' Thus, we noted in the November 30, 2001 opinion that certain situations or factual scenarios exist in which churches may well be covered by Jacob's Law, i.e. when "churches ... undertake to transport school-aged children to or from school, school related activities or child care." We further commented that inasmuch as Jacob's Law is a statute remedial in nature, a court would likely give the law a broad reading. Both opinions concluded that Jacob's Law is ambiguous; thus we recommended either judicial or legislative clarification to make clear the intent of the General Assembly with respect to the scope and reach of this legislation. It is also important to note that the November 30, 2001 opinion did not conclude that Jacob's Law was applicable to churches generally. We did not read the statute so broadly as to find that every church-related activity involving school-aged children is encompassed by the Act. Moreover, the February 21, 2001 opinion commented upon the meaning of the term "child care" as used in Jacob's Law. There, we noted that, while the statute would be entitled to a broad construction, a court could well interpret § 56-5-195 in conjunction with § 56-5-196. We stated as follows:

... [a ]s mentioned above, statutes which are part of the same act are in pari materia and must be read together. In this case, § 56-5-195 applies to entities transpmiing students to or from school, school-related activities or daycare. Section 56-5-196 (Section 2 of Act 301) provides that parents have the option to designate a "child daycare center or other before or after school program as the student's origin or destination for school transportation." Reading the two sections together could lend itself to the following interpretation: that § 56-5-195 applies to entities transporting

The Honorable Michael A. Pitts
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June 10, 2005

students to or from school, school-related activities, or child care facilities designated pursuant to§ 56-5-196. (emphasis added).

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The foregoing interpretation presented in the February 21, 2001 appears to be consistent with the language of§ 56-5-195 which speaks of "any entity" transporting "students to or from ... child care .... " It is also significant that the Legislature used the word "students" here, suggesting perhaps an intent to encompass only those activities of children who are acting in the capacity of a "preprimary, primary or secondary school" student, rather than covering all general recreational activities. Furthermore, the statute uses the phrase "to or from ... child care", again, indicating that the term "child care" was used in its more formal "daycare" sense rather than any activity in which school-aged children may be involved. These terms indicate that the Legislature's use of the phrase "child care" was not intended in any all-encompassing sense, but was more confined to the transportation of students to and from school, school-related activities or day care as generally defined in§ 56-5-196. It is also helpful to examine the title of Act No. 301 of2001 because" ... the title or caption

of an act may be properly considered to aid in the construction of a statute and to show the intent of the Legislature." Op. S. C. Atty. Gen., October 15, 2004, citing Lindsay v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 258 S.C. 272, 188 S.E.2d 374 (1972). Here, Act No. 301 states that the Act provides "That Any Entity Transporting Preprimary, Primary, Or Secondary School Students To or From Certain Locations ... "and utilizing a school bus, must do so in a school bus which meets certain safety requirements. (emphasis added). In addition, the Act's title states that this provision does not prohibit "The Transportation of Children To And From A Child Care Facility" in nonconforming vehicles, if each child is accompanied by a parent or legal guardian whose transportation is in connection with his work, education or training. Thus, the title of Act 301 strongly suggests that the term "child care" is used in the sense of a specific "location" and is a "facility" rather than an activity such as church-sponsored outing. As we indicated in our previous opinions, § 56-5-195 is admittedly ambiguous. However, the interpretation of "child care," suggested in the February 21, 200 I opinion, is certainly a reasonable construction. Such an interpretation is in accord with the language of the statute as well as the intent as expressed in the Act's title. Moreover, the General Assembly has not amended§ 565-195 and -196 in light of that earlier interpretation. See, Op. S. C. Atty. Gen., December 30, 2004, referencing Scheff v. Township of Maple Shade, 149 N.J. Super. 448, 374 A.2d 43 (1977) [the absence of any legislative amendment following the issuance of an opinion of the Attorney General strongly suggests that the views expressed therein were consistent with the intent of the Legislature.]. Such absence of legislative change, in light of the views expressed in the February 21, 2001 opinion concerning the construction of the term "child care" is an indication that such interpretation was in accordance with the intent of the General Assembly in enacting Jacob's Law.

The Honorable Michael A. Pitts
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June 10, 2005

Conclusion

Your question - the applicability of Jacob's Law to the situation of a church transporting youth groups to and from events unrelated to school activities, such as events at the beach or mountains - is a difficult one. As we have recognized in previous opinions, Jacob's Law is a remedial statute, designed to protect the safety of children, and will likely be broadly construed by a court. Moreover, as we emphasized in an opinion dated February 21, 2001, Jacob's Law "as originally drafted, ... was to apply only to public and private schools in the transportation of students ... ,"but"[ a]s eventually passed, ... the Act is much more broadly written, applying to 'any entity transporting [students] to or from school, school related activities, or child care .... "' That having been said, it is our opinion that the February 21, 2001 opinion presented an interpretation of the term "child care" which a court is most likely to adopt. There, we noted that Jacob's Law could be interpreted as applying to entities "transporting students to and from school, school related activities, or child care facilities" designated pursuant to § 56-5-196. This construction of Jacob's Law, we believe, is most compatible with the language used in the statute, the rules of statutory construction, the Act's title, and the intent of the Legislature (as represented by no change in the statute since the opinion was issued in 2001 ). Thus, our reading of Jacob's Law is in agreement with yours - that the statute is inapplicable to churches transporting youth groups to church-related outings such as the beach or mountains. While Jacob's Law is applicable to "any entity" - including churches - the Legislature did not encompass situations beyond those expressly enumerated in the statute- the transportation of students to or from schools, school related activities or child care facilities. However, we have cautioned previously, and as the July, 2006 deadline for compliance with Jacob's Law nears, we repeat our advice: should the foregoing interpretation of the statute not be in accordance with legislative intent, the General Assembly should clarify the Law consistent with the true legislative purpose. Our opinion herein is advisory only. Either judicial or legislative clarification is required to remove the currently existing ambiguities in the statute. Very truly yours,

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Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General