Could a South Carolina deputy pursue and arrest someone inside a town in the deputy’s own county?

Plain-English summary

The South Carolina Sheriffs' Association asked whether a pursuit-law amendment that referred to “unincorporated areas” of a deputy's own county had taken away authority to pursue and arrest offenders inside municipalities in that county. The Attorney General said no. It read the amendment as expanding pursuit authority into contiguous counties without withdrawing a deputy's existing countywide law-enforcement authority at home.

The letter reasoned that a contrary reading would give deputies broader pursuit authority across the county line than within their own county. It also relied on the sheriff's traditional countywide jurisdiction and other statutes. The linked July 8 PDF presents an earlier informal version of substantially the same answer; this July 9 letter includes deputy attorney general review and is the record reproduced below.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could a deputy cross into a town in the deputy's county during pursuit?
A: The AG said the sheriff and deputies retained authority to pursue and arrest offenders throughout their home county, including incorporated areas.

Q: Did the amendment limit deputies to unincorporated areas at home?
A: The AG said no. It read the law as expanding authority to contiguous counties without narrowing preexisting countywide authority.

Q: Why did the opinion reject the narrower reading?
A: It said that reading would produce an unreasonable result: greater pursuit authority next door than inside a municipality in the deputy's own county.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion addressed Act No. 265's amendment of Sec. 17-13-40 against existing sheriff and deputy powers throughout their county. It distinguished an expansion of pursuit across county lines from a supposed reduction of authority inside home-county towns.

Citations and references

• Sec. 17-13-40, the pursuit statute at issue.
• Act No. 265, the amendment considered by the letter.

Official title

Asking about the General Assembly’s decision to enact H.3215 (Act 265) which amended S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 17-13-40 to expand police jurisdiction while in “pursuit” of an offender.

Requester

Jeffrey B. Moore, Executive Director, South Carolina Sheriff’s Association

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/july-9-1998/

• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/98july9moore.pdf

• Earlier informal PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/98july8moore.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES M. CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

July 9, 1998

Jeffrey B. Moore, Executive Director
South Carolina Sheriffs' Association
P. 0. Box 21428
Columbia, South Carolina 29221-1428
Dear Mr. Moore:
You indicate that in January of this year, the General Assembly enacted H.3215 (Act 265) which amended S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 17-13-40 to expand police jurisdiction while in "pursuit" of an offender. You further state by way of background that
[s]ubsection B expanded county police authorities'
jurisdiction to allow for an arrest "at a place within a contiguous county ... ". At the same time, and in the same subsection, the jurisdiction of a county law enforcement officer to effect an arrest of an offender in pursuit cases is narrowed to the "unincorporated areas" of their own county. Obviously in light of the expanded jurisdiction in a contiguous county, where an arrest may be made 'at any place,' incorporated or otherwise, such intent to narrow jurisdiction within one's own county is clearly not what was intended. Still, the language is clear and I suppose must be read literally as to its intent, whether intended or not, and despite it conflicting with longstanding law. Our question deals with what course of action should a sheriff's deputy take when in pursuit of an offender within an incorporated area of their own county. Do they proceed and place the individual under arrest, as has been the standard R1'Mlll'lff

c. DFNNIS BUILDING

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POST OFFICE Box 11549

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COUJMOIA,

s.c. 29211-1549

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TELEPHONE: 803-714-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

Mr. Moore
Page 2
July 9, 1998
practice, or must they request assistance from an officer from the municipality where the stop has been affected? Further, in those incorporated areas that do not have a local police force, but rely exclusively upon the sheriffs office for their public safety, are no such pursuit arrests to be made and would this apply to simple traffic violations where a uniform traffic ticket would be issued? Obviously, this problem will be addressed next January when the General Assembly reconvenes, however the next six months are problematic and clarification is needed as soon as possible. Law I Analysis The title to Act 265 of 1998 provides as follows:

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AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION 17-13-40, CODE OF
LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO A
TOWN OR CITY POLICE OFFICER'S WRISDICTION
WHEN HE IS IN PURSUIT OF AN OFFENDER, SO AS TO
PROVIDE THAT THE OFFICER MAY ARREST AN
OFFENDER WITHIN THE TOWN OR CITY'S CORPORATE LIMITS, WITHIN THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE TOWN OR CITY IS LOCATED, ORAT A PLACE WITHIN THREE MILES OF THE CORPORATE LIMITS, TO PROVIDE THAT WHEN COUNTY POLICE AUTHORITIES ARE IN PURSUIT OF AN OFFENDER FOR VIOLATING A COUNTY ORDINANCE OR STATE STATUTE COMMITTED WITHIN THE UNINCORPORATED AREAS OF THE COUNTY, THE AUTHORITIES MAY ARREST THE OFFENDER WITHIN THE UNINCORPORATED AREAS OR AT A PLACE WITHIN AN ADJACENT COUNTY, AND TO PROVIDE THAT WHEN A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER'S JURISDICTION IS EXPANDED, CERTAIN AUTHORITY, RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND IMMUNITIES THAT ARE APPLICABLE TO AN OFFICER EMPLOYED WITHIN HIS JURISDICTION ARE EXTENDED TO HIS EXPANDED JURISDICTION.

Mr. Moore
Page 3
July 9, 1998

The text of the statute reads:
SECTION 1. Section 17-13-450 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:

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"Section 17-13-40. (A) When the police authorities ofa town or city are in pursuit of an offender for a violation of a municipal ordinance or statute of this State committed within the corporate limits, the authorities may arrest the offender, with or without warrant, at a place within the corporate limits, at a place within the county in which the town or city is located, or at a place within a radius of three miles of the corporate limits.

When the police authorities of a county are in
pursuit of an offender for a violation of a county ordinance or statute of this State committed within the unincorporated areas of the county, the authorities may arrest the offender with or without a warrant, within the unincorporated areas or at a place within an adjacent county. (B)

(C)
When a law enforcement officer's jurisdiction is
expanded pursuant to this section, the authority, rights, privileges, and immunities, including coverage under the worker's compensation laws, and tort liability coverage obtained pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 78, Title 15, that are applicable to an officer within the jurisdiction in which he is employed are extended to and include the expanded areas of jurisdiction granted pursuant to this section." (emphasis added). A number of principles of statutory construction are relevant to your inquiry. First and foremost, in interpreting a statute, the primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). An enactment should be given a reasonable and practical construction, consistent with the purpose and policy expressed in the statute. Hay v. S.C. Tax Comm., 273 S.C. 269, 255 S.E.2d 837 (1979). Words used therein should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. First South Sav. Bank v. Gold Coast Associates, 301 S.C. 158, 390 S.E.2d 486 (Ct. App. 1990).

Mr. Moore
Page 4
July 9, 1998

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Furthermore, a court will reject the meaning of the words of a statute which will lead to absurd consequences. Robson v. Cantwell, 143 S.C. 104, 141 S.E. 180 (1928). While the plain meaning and literal language rule normally is applicable, the real purpose and intent of the lawmakers will prevail over the literal import of the words. Caughman v. Cola. Y.M.C.A., 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E.2d 788 (1948). Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14 (1984). The context of the statute must be examined as part of the process of determining the intent of the General Assembly. Hancock v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 211 S.C. 432, 45 S.E.2d 850 (1948). The Court must presume that the Legislature intended by its action to accomplish something and not do a futile thing. State ex rel. McLeod v. Montgomery, 244 S.C. 308, 136 S.E.2d 778 (1964). Furthermore, in construing a statute, it is proper to consider legislation dealing with the same subject matter. Fidelity and Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 278 S.C. 332, 295 S.E.2d 783 (1982). Statutes dealing with the same subject matter must be reconciled, if possible. Bell v. S.C. State Hwy. Dept., 204 S.C. 462, 30 S.E.2d 65 (1944). Different statutes in pari materia, though enacted at different times, and not referring to each other must be construed together as one system and as explanatory of each other. Fishburne v. Fishburne, 171 S.C. 408, 172 S.E. 426 (1934). Finally, the implied repeal of a law is disfavored. Lewis v. Gaddy, 254 S.C. 66, 173 S.E.2d 376 (1970). The presumption is always against implied repeal when express terms of repeal are not used. E.M. Matthews Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 102 S.C. 494, 86 S.E. 1069 (1915). Based upon the foregoing, it is my opinion that the General Assembly did not intend to alter the law relating to the pursuit of an individual within incorporated areas of a deputy sheriff's home county. Clearly, the statute was intended to relate only to
. pursuit situations and not other law enforcement activities. Secondly, the statute was intended to expand the jurisdiction of law enforcement officers rather than in any way narrow or restrict such jurisdiction from its previous scope. Thus, to conclude that a county officer now, as a result of the statute, could not pursue an offender in an incorporated area would result in a narrowing of the jurisdiction of a county officer in this respect. I do not believe such is consistent with the intent of the General Assembly. Furthermore, as you point out, it would make no sense to bestow upon a county officer broader jurisdiction in pursuit situations in an adjacent county than the officer would possess in his home county. Subsection (B) now authorizes the officer to pursue "at a place" within "an adjacent county" meaning there were no limitations upon the officer's pursuit anywhere in the adjacent county. It would constitute a complete anomaly

Mr. Moore
Page 5
July 9, 1998
to broaden the officer's pursuit authority in an adjacent county, yet actually narrow such pursuit jurisdiction in the deputy's own county. Finally, any ambiguity created by Subsection (B) is resolved by reference to the officer's general jurisdictional authority. S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 23-13-60 provides that deputy sheriffs

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... may for any suspected freshly committed crime, whether upon view or upon prompt information or complaint, arrest without warrant and, in pursuit of the criminal, enter houses or break and enter them, whether in their own county or in an adjoining county. (emphasis added). Section 23-13-70 authorizes deputy sheriffs to "patrol the entire county ... ". Section 1713-30 further authorizes Sheriffs and the deputies to "arrest without warrant any and all persons who, within their view, violate any of the criminal laws of this State if such arrest be made at the time of such violation of law or immediately after." Based upon these statutes as well as the common law we have stated that

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... it is clear that a sheriff and his deputies who, pursuant to Section 23-13-50 of the Code, are authorized to perform any and all duties of the sheriff, have jurisdiction throughout their respective counties .; .. Therefore, a sheriff and his deputies would have full law enforcement authority in any area of his county ... . (emphasis added). In that same opinion, we also observed that '"(s)ince the sheriff is a county officer, his authority extends over the entire county, and includes all ... (political subdivisions) within his county."' Accordingly, it would, in my judgment, make little or no sense to conclude that Subsection (B) of Act No. 265 removes a county deputy sheriff's authority to pursue offenders and make arrests of such offenders within the incorporated limits of a municipality in the deputy's own county. The intent of the statute is to expand the deputy's jurisdiction, not limit it. To reach any other conclusion would give a deputy greater pursuit authority in an adjacent county than he possessed in his home county. Such would result in an absurdity and this Office declines to adopt such a construction. Regardless of the ambiguities in Act No. 265, however, the bottom line is that a deputy sheriff possesses full law enforcement authority (pursuit and otherwise) over his entire

Mr. Moore
Page 6
July 9, 1998
county. Act No. 265 does not purport to affect such countywide jurisdiction and does not do so. Thus, the county sheriff and his deputies retain, as always, the authority and jurisdiction to pursue and arrest offenders in incorporated areas of their home county as part of their full countywide jurisdiction.

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Assistant Deputy Attorney General
RDC/an
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

fteb C. Williams, III
Deputy Attorney General