Could Colleton County charge the same fire-protection millage countywide but give different fire districts different budgets?

Short answer The AG said Colleton County’s fire commission did not receive final budget authority because county council reviewed and could change its proposals. Different district allocations under a common millage were unlikely to be struck down merely because staffing or funding differed, but whether services were truly unequal was a factual question the office could not decide.
State
South Carolina
Opinion
2001-july-31-2001
Issued
July 31, 2001
Issued by
Office of the South Carolina Attorney General
Requested by
The Honorable David J. Owens, II, Member, House of Representatives

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 2001. Ask about yours and see what current South Carolina law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official South Carolina Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed South Carolina attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
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Plain-English summary

A legislator asked whether Colleton County could charge one countywide fire-protection millage while its fourteen districts received different funding, and whether council had improperly delegated its budget power to a five-person fire commission. The July 2001 informal opinion said the commission prepared a proposed budget, but council could approve, reject or change it. On that clarified process, the commission was advisory and council had retained budget authority.

On the millage question, the AG said different staffing or allocations did not by themselves prove unequal service. The actual level of service in each district was a factual question outside the office’s reach. The letter cited state law allowing different tax rates by service area and a court decision saying tax benefits need not match payments with mathematical precision. It viewed a court ruling against the county’s differing allocations as unlikely on the facts presented.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2001. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

County council and fire commission

The commission’s budget recommendations were not binding. Because council kept final review and approval, the opinion found no delegation of council’s budget power on the described process.

Fire districts and taxpayers

The opinion did not equate unequal allocations with unequal protection. It declined to determine actual service levels and said a common millage with differing allocations was unlikely to be invalidated merely for that difference.

Common questions

Did the fire commission set the final district budgets?
A: No. The letter said county council could approve, disapprove or revise the proposed budget.

Did identical millage guarantee identical district spending? A: The opinion said no mathematical symmetry was required between tax payments and benefits, and different staffing alone did not prove unequal service.

Did the AG find all district service levels equal?
A: No. The office said that comparison required facts it could not determine in an opinion.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion cited Section 4-9-30 for county taxing and appropriation powers and Davis v. County of Greenville for the equal-protection principle that benefits and payments need not be mathematically identical. It applied those rules to council’s retained budget control and district allocations.

Citations and references

  • Section 4-9-30: county taxation and appropriation authority.
  • Davis v. County of Greenville: unequal tax benefits do not alone violate equal protection.

Official title

Concerning fire protection in Colleton County.

Requester

The Honorable David J. Owens, II, Member, House of Representatives

Source

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLIE CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

July 31, 2001
The Honorable David J. Owens, II
Member, House of Representatives
103 W. Murray Street
St. George, South Carolina 294 77

RE:

Informal Opinion

Dear Representative Owens:
By your letter of July 17, 2001, you have requested an opinion of this Office concerning fire protection in Colleton County. You write: In the past, Colleton County had fourteen separate fire districts. Each district received its own funding from the county based upon a formula that assessed each property owner one dollar for every thousand dollars for fire protection. The onedollar assessments went to the fire districts. The money collected in each fire district went to the fire department in that district and covered things such as personnel and equipment. Jn recent years Colleton County revised this system and instituted a different funding formula for its fire districts. Under this current funding formula, each property owner is assessed a certain number of mills for fire protection. The money collected from the fire protection assessment then goes into the County's general fund for distribution by a five-person fire commission. County Council requires each fire district to submit its proposed budget and budget requests to the five-person fire commission. These requests cover personnel and equipment. My understanding is that the five-person fire commission makes the determination of the amount of funding each of the fourteen fire districts receives from the county. You now ask two specific questions: 1) Is it legal for everyone in the county to pay the same millage for fire protection yet not receive the same level of funding for its fire district? 2) Is it legal for County Council to delegate its budget authority to the five-person fire commission?

REMBERT

c. DENNIS BUILDING

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POST OFFICE Box 11549

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COLUMBIA,

s.c. 29211-1549

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TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

Representative Owens
Page 2 of3
July 31, 2001
I will address your second question first, which may be resolved by a clarification of the facts. I have talked to the county attorney, as well as officials in the county administrator's office, and they have provided more detail concerning the fire commission's involvement in the budget process. As you have noted, the fire commission does formulate a budget for the various fire districts based upon the information submitted by the districts for consideration. However, the fire commission then submits the proposed budget to the County Council for their review. The County Council reviews the budget and then approves, disapproves, or modifies the budget as it deems necessary. In this respect, the fire commission serves in an advisory capacity to the County Council because the Council is not obligated to accept the commission's proposals. See OP. ATTY. GEN. Feb. 19, 1986. Thus, the Council has not delegated its budget authority to the commission.

I

Your first question concerns the imposition of the same millage rate throughout the county and the level of funding received by the various fire districts. Your letter states that "some residents feel they are receiving lower levels of fire protection while paying the same amount as those receiving higher levels. One fire district may have a full-time employee, while others have only parttime employees or no employees." Section 4-9-30 of the South Carolina Code of Laws authorizes a county to "assess property and levy ad valorem property taxes and uniform service charges, including the power to tax different areas at different rates related to the nature and level of governmental services provided and make appropriations for functions and operations of the county, ... " The statute permits the county to tax different areas at different rates depending on the level of service, but it is highly speculative to conclude that the differences between full-time and part-time staffing in the various districts necessarily entails an inequitable variance in service levels. For example, it may require forty fulltime hours in one district to attain the level of services achieved in another district with only nine full-time hours. This is a question of fact which is beyond the scope of an opinion of this Office to resolve. Furthermore, with regard to the disparate provision of services in areas of the county, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has said the following: Although some services are not rendered in the incorporated areas, these services are still provided for the maintenance of county government and, therefore, benefit all the residents of the county. The equal protection clause does not require that mathematical symmetry be attained between benefits received and payment for those benefits. Cf Decatur Tax Payers League. Inc. v. Adams, 226 S.E.2d 69 (1976) (Federal and State constitutions do not require persons paying taxes to receive equal benefits from the facilities for which the taxes are used). Davis v. County of Greenville, 313 S.C. 459, 465, 443 S.E.2d 383, 386(1994). Thus, the law gives some deference to the county's discretion in the exercise of its taxing authority. It seems unlikely that a court would strike down as illegal Colleton County Council's distribution of varying amounts of funding among the different fire districts.

Representative Owens
Page 3of3
July 31, 2001
This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I remain Very truly yours,

Susannah Cole
Assistant Attorney General

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