Did a federal carjacking acquittal bar South Carolina kidnapping and murder charges in 1995?

Official title

Asking the ramifications of the Double Jeopardy Clause (U.S Const. Art. V; South Carolina Const. Art. I Sec. 12) where a defendant is tried in federal court for carjacking and acquitted, and the State tried to try the same defendant for kidnapping and murder.

Requester

The Honorable Bill Coffey, Sheriff, Spartanburg County

Plain-English summary

A sheriff asked whether a federal carjacking acquittal prevented South Carolina from bringing kidnapping and murder charges involving the same defendant. The 1995 informal opinion answered generally no. It applied the separate-sovereigns principle: a federal prosecution and a state prosecution were attributed to different governments, so the first did not itself trigger a constitutional bar against the second. The author said he did not know the particular facts and therefore did not decide whether a specific contemplated prosecution could proceed.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the federal acquittal automatically prohibit state charges? A: The letter said no, as a general constitutional matter, because federal and state governments were separate sovereigns.

Q: Did the AG approve the particular kidnapping and murder prosecution? A: No. The author said he lacked the specific facts and could not comment on that prosecution.

Q: Did the letter address two prosecutions by the same government? A: No. Its conclusion turned on the distinction between federal and South Carolina sovereigns.

Background and statutory framework

The letter discussed the Double Jeopardy Clause and cited federal cases applying the separate-sovereigns rule to federal and state prosecutions based on the same underlying events.

Citations and references

• U.S. v. Ebens and U.S. v. Aboumoussallem, among the cited separate-sovereigns cases.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/july-3-1995/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/95july3coffey.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICEOFTHEATTORNEYGENERAL
I

CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

July 3, 1995

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The Honorable Bill Coffey
Sheriff, Spartanburg County
P. 0. Box 771
Spartanburg, South Carolina 29304
Re: Informal Opinion
Dear Sheriff Coffey:
Attorney General Condon has referred your letter to me for reply. You have asked the ramifications of the Double Jeopardy Clause (U.S. Const. Art. V; South Carolina Const. Art. I Sec. 12), where a defendant iS tried in federal court for carjacking and acquitted, and the State desires to try the same defendant for kidnapping and murder. It is my opinion that the Double Jeopardy Clause, as a general matter, would not preclude such state prosecutions. The following principle regarding Double Jeopardy is well-recognized:
... in the absence of statute, the rllle against double jeopardy applies only to offenses against the same sovereignty. Unless otherwise provided by statute, where the same act constitutes an offense under two or more jurisdictions ... it is well settled that jeopardy under one jurisdiction is no bar to jeopardy under another, as each offense will be considered distinct. It follows then that when two sovereigns prosecute a person, and one sovereign foregoes its prosecution, the second sovereign is not compelled to forego its prosecution.

22 C.J.S., Criminal Law,§ 254. Pursuant to this fundamental rule, numerous courts have held that both federal and state prosecutions concerning the same matter, do not REMBERT

c. DENNIS BUILDING

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POST 0FF1CE Box 11549

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COLUMBIA,

s.c. 29211-1549

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TELEPHONE:

803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

The Honorable Bill Coffey
Page 2
July 3, 1995
contravene the principles of Double Jeopardy. U.S. v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1986), on remand, 654 F.Supp. 144 (E. D. Mich. S. D. 1987); U.S. v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Bronk, 604 F.Supp. 743 (W. D. Wis. 1985); U.S. v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1984) cert. den. 469 U.S. 838, 105 S.Ct. 136, 83 L.Ed.2d 76 (1984). 1

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Of course, I am not cogniunt of the particular facts regarding the charges you reference. Thus, I cannot comment upon a specific prosecution. However, as a general matter, there is no constitutional prohibition against both federal and state prosecutions arising out of the same facts. The federal government and the State of South Carolina are separate sovereigns and thus, Double Jeopardy does not apply in these circumstances. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I am Very truly yours,

.-.~)~

,.~cf-Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General
RDC/an