Could Chesterfield County let its sheriff operate the county animal shelter, and must that shelter serve towns?

Plain-English summary

In 2011, the South Carolina Attorney General concluded that Chesterfield County could have its sheriff's office operate the county animal shelter. Section 47-3-30 let the county establish a shelter and use necessary personnel, including law enforcement personnel. The AG advised the county council to formalize its delegation to the sheriff by county ordinance. The opinion addressed an arrangement that had existed since 2008 without a formal agreement.

The AG drew a geographic limit. Under the statutes it examined, a county shelter was responsible for the unincorporated county, not automatically for municipalities inside the county. The opinion relied on earlier AG guidance that a county ordinance could apply inside a municipality through an agreement between the county and city. A town seeking county shelter coverage therefore could not assume that county operation alone extended the service into its limits.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2011. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Could county council assign shelter operations to the sheriff's office? A: Yes. The AG read the shelter statute's permission to use necessary personnel, including law enforcement personnel, as allowing the sheriff to administer the county shelter.

Was the county's informal arrangement enough?
A: The AG advised formalizing the delegation by county ordinance. It reached that conclusion by reading the shelter authorization together with the county and municipal power to enact animal care ordinances.

Did the county shelter have to serve incorporated towns? A: No. The opinion said the county government's shelter responsibility under the statute extended to unincorporated areas. Municipalities were separately named in the shelter statute.

How could a town receive service from the county shelter? A: The opinion cited earlier AG guidance that a county ordinance could apply in a municipality through an agreement between the two governments. It did not supply terms for such an agreement.

Background and statutory framework

The Chesterfield County sheriff asked about a county council delegation made in July 2008 and about the reach of a county shelter. Section 47-3-30 authorized a county or municipality to establish a shelter and employ necessary personnel. Section 47-3-20 authorized either government to enact animal care and control ordinances. The AG used those provisions to address both the delegation and the boundary between county and municipal service.

Citations and references

The opinion quotes Sections 47-3-30 and 47-3-20 and discusses a May 20, 1996 AG opinion on county ordinances inside municipalities. Its conclusion concerns the arrangement described by Chesterfield County.

Official title

Regarding the operation of the animal shelter for Chesterfield County.

Requester

The Honorable Sam Parker, Chesterfield County Sheriff

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/july-29-2011/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/parker-s-os-9307-7-29-11-animal-shelters.pdf

Original opinion text

ALAN WILSON
AITORNEY GENERAL

July 29, 2011

The Honorable Sam Parker
Chesterfield County Sheriff
200 West Main Street
County Courthouse
Chesterfield, South Carolina 29709
Dear Sheriff Parker:
You seek an opinion regarding the operation of the animal shelter for Chesterfield County. You reference S.C. Code Ann. Section 47-3-30. By way of background, you note that "[i]n July, 2008, Chesterfield County Council delegated authority to operate the animal shelter for Chesterfield County to the Sheriffs office." You further indicate that "[s]ince July, 2008, the Sheriffs office has been responsible for the operation of the animal shelter although no formal agreement between the County and the Sheriff has ever been implemented." Your inquiry focuses on the following two questions: I.

Is the arrangement described above a permissible delegation of authority by the governing body of the County, in this case the County Council, pursuant to the cited statute? If so, should this delegation of authority be formalized by county ordinance or resolution?

2.

If the county governing body undertakes to establish and operate an animal shelter pursuant to § 47-3-30 (or delegate the authority to the Sheriff, if permissible), is that animal shelter required to serve only the unincorporated areas of the county or must it also serve the incorporated areas? Law I Analysis

Section 47-3-30 provides as follows:
[t]he governing body of the county or municipality is authorized to establish an animal shelter for the county or municipality for the purpose of impounding and quarantining dogs and quarantining cats and shall employ such personnel, including law enforcement personnel, as may be necessary to administer the provisions of this article. If an animal shelter is established, funds to establish and operate the shelter and employ necessary personnel may be provided in the annual county or municipal appropriations. (emphasis added).

REMBERT C. DENNIS Bun.oING • PosT OFFICE Box 11549 •

COLUMBIA, SC 29211-1549

•

TELEPHONE 803-734-3970

• FACSIMILE 803-253-6283

The Honorable Sam Parker
Page2
July 29, 2011
Section 47-3-20 further states:
[t]he governing body of each county or municipality in this State may enact ordinances and promulgate regulations for the care and control of dogs, cats, and other animals and to prescribe penalties for violations. In interpreting any statute, the overriding principle is determining legislative intent. Our Court of Appeals, in Collins Music Co. v. !GT, 365 S.C. 544, 619 S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 2005), summarized the governing guidelines for interpreting statutes as follows:

"The cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature." Hawkins v. Bruno Yacht Sales, Inc., 353 S.C. 31, 39, 577 S.E.2d 202, 207 (2003); Bayle v. South Carolina Dept. ofTransp., 344 S.C. 115, 122, 542 S.E.2d 736, 739 (Ct. App. 2001). "All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that the legislative intent must prevail if it reasonably can be discovered in the language used, and the language must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute." City of Sumter Police Dept. v. One (1) 1992 Blue Mazda Truck (VIN# jm2uf113n0294812), 330 S.C. 371, 375, 498 S.E.2d 894, 896 (Ct. App. 1998)." Statutes, as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation, consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers." TNA Mills, Inc., v. South Carolina Dept of Revenue, 331S.C.611, 624, 503 S.E.2d 471, 478 (1998). If a statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear meaning, "the rules of statutory construction are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning." Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). The words of the statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp. v. Leatherman, 309 S.C. 174, 178, 420 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1992). "Our goal in construing statutes is to prevent an interpretation that would lead to a result that is plainly absurd." In re Timothy C. M., 348 S.C. 653, 65556, 560 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2001); Carolina Alliance for Fair Employment v. South Carolina Dept of Labor, Lie. & Reg., 337 S.C. 476, 492, 523 S.E.2d 795, 803 (Ct. App. 1999).

Applying the foregoing principles to your first question, it is our opinion that the Council's delegation of the operation of the animal shelter to the Sheriffs Office is consistent with the language contained in § 4 7-3-30, but that such delegation of authority should be formalized by county ordinance. Section 4 7-3-30 provides in pertinent part that the county may establish an animal shelter and "shall employ such personnel, including enforcement personnel, as may be necessary .... " The word "employ" in its common and ordinary usage means "to make use of; use ...." Webster's New World Dictionary 2d ed.). Nothing in this provision precludes the county from using the Sheriffs Office to administer the animal shelter. Indeed, § 47-3-30 makes reference to "enforcement personnel." It would thus be reasonable for Chesterfield County to utilize the Sheriff, the chief law enforcement officer of the County, in administering the County's animal shelter.

The Honorable Sam Parker
Page 3

July 29, 2011
Accordingly, in our opinion, delegation to the Sheriffs Office in this regard is within the language of
§ 47-3-30.
In our view, however, such delegation should be formalized by ordinance. Section 4 7-3-20 expressly states that "[t]he governing body of each county or municipality may enact ordinances and promulgate regulations for the care and control of dogs, cats, and other animals and to prescribe penalties for violations." Reading this statute in conjunction with § 47-3-30, which authorizes the "governing body of the county" to "establish an animal shelter for the county," we believe that delegation by Chesterfield County to the Sheriff for the operation of the animal shelter should be accomplished by county ordinance. Such an approach appears to be the one contemplated by the foregoing statutes and we would advise that this procedure be followed. See, Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 533 S.E.2d 578, 582 (2000) ["to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other."]. With respect to your second question, it is our opinion that if the county governing body undertakes to establish and operate an animal shelter, the shelter is required to serve only the unincorporated areas of the county. Section 4 7-3-30 impliedly recognizes this delineation between city and county through use of the words "[t]he governing body of the county or municipality." (emphasis added). Moreover, in an Opinion dated May 20, 1996, we referenced several previous opinions concerning the powers of municipalities and counties. There, we concluded that "it has consistently been the opinion of this Office that the only way a county ordinance could be made applicable to an incorporated area is by virtue of an agreement between the two political subdivisions, to the effect that county ordinances are applicable within the city limits." We see no reason this rule would be inapplicable in this situation, particularly in light of the fact that § 4 7-3-30 expressly references municipalities as well as counties. Thus, in our opinion, § 47-3-30 contemplates that the county government would be responsible only for the unincorporated areas of the county for the purposes of the operation of its animal shelter.

Deputy Attorney General
RDC/an