Could a private car display POLIZEI lettering and police-style markings in South Carolina?

Plain-English summary

A city prosecutor asked about a private vehicle shown in a photograph with stripes, a shield-like door decal, and the word “POLIZEI.” The prosecutor said it had no blue lights or other emergency equipment. The AG read South Carolina's then-applicable prohibition on displaying the word “police” on a vehicle that was not an authorized emergency vehicle used by approved and certified officers.

The AG reasoned that the combination of German police lettering and police-style markings could mislead the public or law enforcement and conflicted with the legislature's aim to prevent people from masquerading as police. He concluded that the displayed markings violated the provision, while acknowledging that the answer was “not free from doubt” and that the conduct violated the statute's spirit, if not its literal wording. The absence of emergency lights did not change his analysis of the markings.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2005. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did the car have to display blue lights for the AG to object to its markings?
No. The prosecutor said the car had no blue lights or other emergency equipment, and the AG still concluded that its overall police-style display violated the marking restriction.

Did the law literally spell out the German word “POLIZEI”?
No. The opinion quoted a restriction on the word “police.” The AG based his conclusion on legislative purpose and expressly acknowledged doubt about whether the display fell within the literal wording.

What markings were considered together?
The opinion described the word “POLIZEI,” stripes, and what appeared to be a shield-shaped decal on the front passenger door.

Background and statutory framework

The AG applied the then-current vehicle-marking provision and discussed South Carolina decisions on legislative intent and ordinary meaning. He also noted the general misdemeanor penalty provision for chapter violations. His answer was an opinion on the photographed vehicle, with express uncertainty about the statute's literal reach.

Citations and references

The original letter reproduced below discusses Section 56-5-170(C) and S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-6190.

Official title

Questioning the legitimacy of foreign police markings displayed on a private vehicle.

Requester

Dale L. DuTremble, City Prosecutor, City of North Charleston

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/july-29-2005/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/05july-29-DuTremble.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
HENRY McMAsrER
A1TORNEY GENERAL

July 29, 2005

Dale L. DuTremble, City Prosecutor
City of North Charleston
2536 Fourth Street
North Charleston, South Carolina 29406
Dear Mr. DuTrembJe:
In a letter to this office you questioned the legitimacy of foreign police markings displayed on a private vehicle. You forwarded a photograph of the vehicle in question which shows a vehicle with stripes and what appears to be a shield-type decal on the front passenger door of the vehicle. Also displayed below the shield decal is the word "POLIZEI" which r understand to be German for the word "police". See: International Armament Corp. v. Matra Manurhin International, 630 F. Supp. 741 (E.D. Va. 1986). You indicated that there are no blue lights or other emergency equipment displayed on the vehicle.

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Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-l 70(C) (Supp. 2004), "(a) vehicle shall not display the word 'police' unless it is an authorized emergency vehicle for use only by sworn police or other officers who are approved and certified by the South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy." In reviewing such provision, certain rules of statutory construction are relevant. First and foremost, is the cardinal rule ofstatutory interpretation, which is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent, whenever possible. State v. Morgan, 352 S.C. 359, 574 S.E.2d 203 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Baucom, 340 S.C. 339, 531 S.E.2d 922 (2000). All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail ifit can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and such language must be construed in light of the statute's intended purpose. State v. Hudson, 336 S.C. 237, 519 S.E.2d 577 (Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied as improvidently granted, State v. Hudson, 346 S.E. 139, 551 S.E.2d 253 (2001). Moreover, a statutory provision should be given a reasonable and practical construction consistent with the purpose and policy expressed in the statute. Hay v. S.C. Tax Comm., 273 S.C. 269, 255 S.E.2d 837 (I 979). In construing statutes, the words used must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to a subtle or forced construction for the purpose oflimiting or expanding their operation. Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14 (1984). Further, as our Supreme Court stated in Greenville Baseball. Inc. v. Bearden, 200 S.C. 363, 20 S.E.2d 8 13, 816 (1942), "it is a familiar canon of construction that a thing which is within the intention of the makers of the statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the Jetter. It
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~~ { /~Ull.DING • POST OFFICE Box 11549 • COWMBIA, S.C. 29211-1549 • TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970 • FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

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Mr. DuTremble
Page2
July 29, 2005

is an old and well established rule that the words ought to be subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words." Admittedly, as a general rule, statutes regarding criminal procedure and authority are strictly construed. S.C. Ops. Atty. Gen. dated October 18, 1994 and September 25, 2001. While there is no specificpenaltyprovisionattached to Section56-5-170(C), generally,pursuantto S.C. Code Ann.
§ 56-5-6190,

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It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions of this chapter unless such violation is by this chapter or other law of this State declared to be a felony. Every person convicted of a misdemeanor for a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter for which another penalty is not provided shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment not more than thirty days.

Section 56-5-170(C) is included in Chapter 5 of Title 56.

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In my opinion, displaying on a vehicle the word "POLIZEI" along with the appearance of stripes and what appears to be a shield-type decal on the front passenger door of the vehicle, violates the spirit if not the literal language of Section 56-5-170(C). In my opinion, such actions violate the legislative intent which is to prevent individuals from masquerading as police so as to possibly mislead the public or law enforcement. While not free from doubt, it is my opinion that such actions are a violation of Section 56-5-170(C).

If there are any questions, please advise.
Sincerely,

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Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

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ObertD:Cook
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Assistant Deputy Attorney General