Did an under-21 driver’s 2002 breath-test refusal cause an unlawful second suspension under South Carolina law?

Plain-English summary

In 2006, the South Carolina Attorney General reviewed Brandon Kent's one-year driver's-license suspension for refusing a breath test while under twenty-one. The requester argued that a statutory rule preventing duplicate suspensions from the same incident should apply. The Attorney General found that the record showed a suspension under the under-21 implied-consent provision, with no separate suspension under the other provision. It therefore found no violation of the duplicate-suspension rule.

The opinion also noted that the record showed prior driving-under-the-influence convictions within the preceding five years, which supported the one-year term under the under-21 statute as the office read it. The answer was tied to the particular DMV record the office reviewed.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2006. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the Attorney General find two suspensions from the same refusal?
A: No. It found one suspension under the under-21 provision and none under the separate section cited in the request.

Q: Why did the duplicate-suspension provision not change the result?
A: The rule applied to prevent overlapping suspensions under two specified sections from the same incident; the office found no second suspension in the record.

Q: Why was the suspension one year?
A: The opinion connected that duration to the driver's under-21 status and prior DUI convictions shown in the DMV record.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion compared the general refusal-to-test suspension section with the under-21 implied-consent section and its repeat-offense period. It applied their overlap rule to the DMV record before it rather than declaring that duplicate suspensions could never happen. The letter also described the office's general practice of giving weight to a reasonable agency interpretation of its governing statutes.

Citations and references

The original opinion quotes South Carolina's 2006 implied-consent and under-21 suspension provisions.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/july-28-2006/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/06july28mcleod.pdf

Original opinion text

HENRY MCMASTER
ATTORNEY GENERAL

July 28, 2006

The Honorable Walton J. McLeod
Member, House of Representatives
308 Pomaria Street
Little Mountain, South Carolina 29075

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Dear Representative McLeod:
In a letter to this office you requested our review of the one year suspension of the driving privilege ofMr. Brandon Kent for the period of2/I 9/2002 until 2/19/2003. According to the driving record of Mr. Kent as prepared by the State Department of Motor Vehicles, such suspension was imposed for implied consent under 21. The copy of the summons ticket forwarded with your request indicated that Mr. Kent refused a breathalyzer test.

In your letter you referred to the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2951(L) which state that The department must not suspend the privilege to drive of a person under the age of twenty-one pursuant to Section 56-1-286 if the person's privilege to drive has been suspended under this section arising from the same incident.

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In your letter you requested that this office issue an opinion that the provisions of Section 56-5295l(L) cannot result in an additional suspension when the person ' s privilege to drive has already been suspended.

Section 56-5-2951(A) states that
The Department of Motor Vehicles must suspend the ddver's license, permit, or nonresident operating privilege of or deny the issuance of a license or permit to a person who drives a motor vehicle and refuses to submit to a test provided for in Section 56-5-2950 or has an alcohol concentration of fifteen one-hundredths of one percent or more. Therefore, Section 56-5-2951 provides for the suspension ofadrivingprivileges in the circumstances provided. However, S.C. Code Ann. § 56-J -286(F) also provides for the suspension of driving privileges. Such provision states:

The Honorable Walton J. McLeod
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July 28, 2006
If a person refuses upon the request of the primary investigating officer to submit to chemical tests as provided in subsection (C), the department must suspend his license, permit, or any nonresident operating privilege, or deny the issuance of a license or permit to him ... (for the period provided) ....

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Such suspension is authorized as to a driver under the age of 21. See: S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1286(B). By that provision, a driver under the age of 21 who drives a motor vehicle in this State is considered to have given consent to a chemical test of his breath or blood for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol. Inasmuch as according to the driving record of Mr. Kent, a driver under the age of 21, he had prior convictions for driving under the influence within the preceding five years, the suspension would have been one year pursuant to Section 56-l-286(F)(2). According to my review, there was no suspension pursuant to Section 56-5-2951. The suspension was pursuant to Section 56-1-286 inasmuch as Mr. Kent was under 21. As a result, there was no suspension in violation of Section 56-5-2951 (L). I would further advise that it is well recognized that an administrative agency possesses discretion in the area of effectuating the policy established by the General Assembly in the agency's governing law. As our Supreme Court has recognized, "construction of a statute by the agency charged with executing it is entitled to the most respectful consideration [by the courts] and should not be overruled absent cogent reasons." Op. S.C. Atty. Gen., October 20, 1997, quoting Logan v. Leatherman, 290 S.C. 400, 351 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1986). The Courts have stated that it is not necessary that the administrative agency's construction be the only reasonable one or even one the court would have reached if the question had initially arisen in a judicial proceeding. Ill. Commerce Comm. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 749 F.2d 825 (D.C.Cir. 1984). Consistent with such, typically, so long as an administrative agency's interpretation of a statutory provision is reasonable, this office defers to that agency's construction. See: Ops. Atty. Gen. dated January 20, 2006 and July I, 2004. With kind regards, I am, ly yours,

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Char es H. Ri{kaidson
Senior Assistant Attorney General
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:
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Robert D. C o o k ' - - - Assistant Deputy Attorney General