Could the Patriots Point Development Authority lease property for development?

Plain-English summary

A legislator asked whether the Patriots Point Development Authority could lease roughly 35 acres for development and whether it needed Budget and Control Board approval. The 1996 opinion said the authority’s statutory power to lease property was clear. It relied on an express power to lease real and personal property, along with its broader development powers.

The AG understood that the Board had already approved the master lease and that the Authority planned to submit subparcel leases for review. He did not give a new ruling on a hypothetical approval sequence. He also expressly declined to assess the policy considerations or terms of any particular lease.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1996. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could the Authority enter a property lease under the law discussed in 1996? A: The AG said its statutory lease authority was clear, citing the specific power to lease real and personal property.

Q: Did the opinion say the Board had approved every subparcel lease? A: No. It said the master lease had been approved and that subparcel leases were planned for Board review.

Q: Did the AG endorse this development lease’s terms? A: No. The opinion did not review the policy choices or terms of an individual lease.

Background and statutory framework

The AG relied on a prior opinion about the Authority’s broad development powers and quoted the statutory leasing power. The discussion was limited to legal capacity and the approval facts supplied by the requester.

Citations and references

Statutes discussed: Section 51-13-760 and Sec. 51-13-770(9).

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/july-19-1996-3/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/96july19tripp.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

July 19, 1996

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The Honorable Dan L. Tripp
Member, House of Representatives
P. 0. Box 454
Mauldin, South Carolina 29662
Re: Informal Opinion
Dear Representative Tripp:
You have asked whether the Patriots Point Development Authority must obtain approval from the Budget and Control Board to lease certain property (approximately 35 acres) for development of that property and whether PPDA possesses the authority to enter into such a lease. It is my understanding that PPDA has obtained Budget and Control Board approval of the master lease in question and that PPDA plans to submit the subparcel leases to the Budget and Control Board for review. With respect to the issue of whether PPDA possesses statutory authority to enter into a lease, I am enclosing a copy of an Opinion issued by this Office, No. 94-69 (November 15, 1994) which sets forth in detail the considerable authority delegated by the General Assembly to PPDA. We noted in that opinion that the statute [Section 51-13-760] gives PPDA "very broad and general powers 'to do and perform any act or function which may tend to or be useful toward the development and improvement of Patriots Point."' Section 51-13-760(7). Moreover, we also pointed out that PPDA "has the power 'to do any and all other acts and things authorized or required to be done by the article, whether or not included in the general powers mentioned in Sec. 51-13-770(9). Thus, we concluded from this broad authority that PPDA possessed the authority to create a nonprofit corporation.

In that same opinion, we also noted that PPDA possesses the express authority to "sue and be sued, to make contracts and to adopt and use a common seal ... and to " '1 RL\IBERT c. DENNIS BL'ILDING A/,na I, - LJ'-- ~ ":;;-,...

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POST OFFICE Box 11549

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COLL'MBIA,

s .C. 29211-1549

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TELEPHONE:

803-734-3970

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fACSIMIIE 803-253-6283

The Honorable Dan L. Tripp
Page 2
July 19, 1996
acquire, lease, mortgage and dispose of personal and real property." Secs. 51-13-770(1) and (2) (emphasis added). Based upon the foregoing, it would appear to me that the authority given by the General Assembly to PPDA to lease property is clear. This is distinguished, therefore, from a situation where an agency possesses no such statutory authority. See Op. Atty. Gen., April 4, 1996. Of course, the policy considerations or terms of any particular lease are not reviewed or commented upon herein.

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This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I am Very truly yours,

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Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General
RDC/an
Enclosure