Could a South Carolina town use its own careless-driving or speed ordinance instead of state traffic charges?

Plain-English summary

An Edgefield County magistrate asked about nearby towns using local speed or careless-driving ordinances instead of charging drivers under the statewide traffic code. The July 2001 informal opinion said municipalities had authority over local roads, but could not enact or enforce ordinances that conflicted with the state’s Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways. State law also permitted additional local traffic rules that did not conflict.

The letter reaffirmed an earlier AG opinion on a careless-operation ordinance. A local charge that avoided state point-system consequences appeared to conflict with statewide traffic regulation. Yet the office said it could not definitively conclude that the ordinance was so inconsistent as to be unenforceable, given the presumption of validity for local ordinances. It said judicial review might be needed for a final answer on a particular ordinance.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2001. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Town officials and traffic officers

The opinion described a limit on local traffic rules: they could add nonconflicting requirements but could not override uniform state provisions. It did not supply an across-the-board approval or invalidation of the towns’ ordinances.

Magistrates and drivers

The letter left the enforceability of a particular local careless-driving or speed charge unresolved. It identified the state point system as a potential source of conflict.

Common questions

Could a town have its own traffic ordinance?
A: The cited state law allowed additional local regulations that did not conflict with uniform statewide traffic rules.

Did avoiding state driver points make a town ordinance invalid? A: The AG said that appeared to conflict with state law but did not make a definitive validity determination.

Who could settle the issue for a specific ordinance?
A: The letter suggested judicial review for a final determination.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion discussed § 5-7-30 on municipal powers and §56-5-30 on statewide uniformity and nonconflicting local traffic rules. It framed the question against §56-5-1520 and the state’s point-system consequences.

Citations and references

• § 5-7-30: municipal ordinance authority.
• §56-5-30: uniform statewide traffic law and local-rule limit.
• §56-5-1520: state speed provision mentioned in the request.

Official title

Regarding “towns that have passed city ordinances on speed restrictions or careless driving.”

Requester

The Honorable Davis R. Parkman, Chief Magistrate, Edgefield

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/july-17-2001/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/01july17parkman.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLIE CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

July 17, 2001

The Honorable Davis R. Parkman
Chief Magistrate, Edgefield County
P.O. Box 664
Edgefield, South Carolina

Re:

Your Letter of June 19, 2001
Town Ordinances -Traffic Regulation

Dear Magistrate Parkman:
In your above-referenced letter, you "request a written opinion on Towns that have passed city ordinances on speed restrictions or careless driving." By way of background, you indicate that " ... three towns within close proximity of Edgefield County have town ordinances that they use at their discretion rather than charging an individual under the state code 56-5-1520." Your question relates to the propriety of such ordinances in light of the general statewide requirements concerning speed limits as set out in §56-5-1520.

L

•

Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann.§ 5-7-30, municipalities are authorized to enact ordinances " .. . not inconsistent with the Constitution and general law of this State, including the exercise of such powers in relation to roads, streets, ... law enforcement .... " As a general rule, an ordinance of a municipality will be presumed valid in the same way that a statute enacted by the General Assembly is entitled to a presumption of correctness. As this Office stated in an Opinion dated May 23, I 995 :
[a]ny municipal ordinance adopted pursuant to Section 5-7-30 [of the Code] is presumed to be valid. Town of Scranton v. Willoughby, 306 S.C. 421, 412 S.E.2d 424 (1991). Thus, an ordinance will not be declared invalid unless clearly inconsistent with the general law. See Hospitality Ass'n of S.C. v. County of Charleston, 320 S.C. 219, 224, 464 S.E.2d I I 3, 116 (1995). In an opinion dated February I 6, 1988 (copy enclosed), this Office issued an opinion on

REMBERT

J

c. DENNIS BUILDING

t7 /).-a1Mt

~ 7/,, .

•

POST OFFICE Box 11549

•

COLUMBIA,

s.c. 29211-1549

•

TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970

•

FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

The Honorable Davis R. Parkman
Page 2
July 17, 2001
virtually the same issue raised in your letter. In reviewing a Florence municipal ordinance concerning "careless operation" ofa vehicle, this Office recognized the authority of the municipality to enact ordinances in relation to roads and streets, but also noted that Chapter 5 of Title 56 of the Code is the "Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways" and that §56-5-30 provides:

f

I
I

(t)he provisions of this chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout this State and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance, rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this chapter unless expressly authorized herein. Local authorities may, however, subject to the limitations prescribed in § 56-5-930, adopt additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter. The February 16, 1988 opinion concluded that, while municipal ordinances which avoid the assessment of administrative penalties such as those imposed by §56-5-720 (uniform point system) appear to conflict with state law regulating the operation of motor vehicles, it could not be definitively said that the "ordinance is so inconsistent with state statutory provisions regulating traffic as to preclude enforcement of such ordinance." The opinion went on to state that perhaps judicial review is necessary to "determine the issue ... with finality." Given the presumption of validity assigned to such ordinances, this remains the opinion of this Office. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General and not officially published in the manner of a formal opinion.

I

David K. Avant
Assistant Attorney General
DKA/an
Enclosure