Could a South Carolina school district let students keep cell phones locked in their cars in 1998?

Plain-English summary

A district student-personnel supervisor asked whether parents could sign forms allowing students to keep cell phones locked in their vehicles on school property. At the time, a statute generally barred student possession of paging devices at school or school activities, with a medical-need exception. The Attorney General read the statute as excluding cellular telephones from “paging devices” and concluded that individual districts had authority to set reasonable rules about student phone possession and use.

The letter recognized that the statute's device definition might be read broadly. It reasoned that the legislature knew cellular phones existed when it enacted the rule yet did not expressly include them. The opinion did not establish a statewide right to carry or use phones; it left reasonable phone rules to districts. The letter mentions an enclosed Texas AG opinion that is absent from the linked PDF.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the 1998 paging-device ban cover cell phones?
A: The AG said no under its reading of the statute as a whole, despite the broad wording of “paging device.”

Q: Could a district allow phones locked in students' cars?
A: The opinion said districts could set reasonable rules for student cell phones. It treated the proposed parent-permission policy as within that authority.

Q: Did a school have to allow students to use phones on campus?
A: No such statewide permission came from this opinion. The AG described district authority to adopt reasonable possession and use rules.

Background and statutory framework

The request turned on the meaning of “paging device” in §59-63-280(B). The AG compared that term with the statute's definition and used ordinary-meaning and legislative-intent principles to conclude that the ban did not encompass cellular telephones.

Citations and references

• §59-63-280(B), the school paging-device provision interpreted in the letter.

Official title

Regarding S.C. Code Ann. 59-63-280 (B) (1976).

Requester

Ms. Ann T. Robbins, Supervisor of Student Personnel School District 5 of Lexington and Richland Counties

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/july-16-1998/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/98july16robbins.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES M. CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

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July 16, 1998

Ms. Ann T. Robbins
Supervisor of Student Personnel
School District 5 of
Lexington & Richland Counties
P. 0. Box 938
Ballentine, South Carolilna 29002

Re:

Informal Opinion

Dear Ms. Robbins:
Thank you for your recent letter requesting an Attorney General's oplillon regarding S.C. Code Ann. §59-63-280(B) (1976). You note that this law prohibits students from possessing "a paging device while on school property or while attending a school sponsored or school related activity .. . unless the student needs the device for a legitimate medical reason." In view of this statute, you inquire as to the legality of a policy authorizing parents to sign permission forms, thereby allowing their children to keep cellular telephones locked inside of their vehicles while on school property. Crucial to answering your question is determining the proper interpretation of the term "paging device" that appears in §59-63-280(B). In interpreting any legislative act, the primary objective is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent if at all possible. Bankers Trust of South Carolina v. Bruce, 275 S.C. 35, 267 S.E.2d 424 (1980). Also, words used in a statute are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 207, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991). (Emphasis added). Section 59-63280(A) defines 'paging device' as "a telecommunications device that emits an audible signal, vibrates, displays a message, or otherwise summons or delivers a communication to the possessor." Although it may be debated whether a cellular telephone falls within this definition, it is my opinion, when reading the statute as a whole, that the legislature did not intend for the prohibition to be read so broadly. While perhaps cellular telephones

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Page 2
July 16, l 998

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were not as pervasive in 1991, the year §59-63-280 was enacted, as they are today, the General Assembly was certainly aware of their existence. Consequently, had the legislature intended for cellular telephones to be encompassed by this definition, it would have been a simple matter for them to do so expressly. Thus, accordant with the rules of statutory constructed noted above, it is my opinion that cellular telephones are not paging devices for the purposes of §59-63-280 and that individual school districts have authority to adopt reasonable rules pertaining to the use or possession of cellular telephones by students on school property. Moreover, this conclusion is consistent with a closely analogous opinion of the Texas Attorney General, dated September 18, 1990, which I have enclosed for your review. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Deputy Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. Again, thank you for your letter. I trust this information is responsive to your inquiry and that you will not hesitate to contact me if I can be of additional assistance. With best wishes, I am Very truly yours,

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Zeb C. Williams, III
Deputy Attorney General
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Enclosure
cc:
David Eckstrom, Chairman
Lexington-Richland School District Five Board