Could a 2000 South Carolina primary candidate challenge the party pledge before running as an independent?

Plain-English summary

Representative Theodore Brown said he had run in a Democratic Senate primary and signed the party pledge required by Section 7-11-210. He later wanted to run as an independent for his existing House seat and expected the party to seek an injunction. He asked whether the pledge and a possible injunction were constitutional.

The 2000 informal opinion said the South Carolina Supreme Court had already rejected several constitutional challenges to the statute's notice and pledge requirements in Florence County Democratic Party v. Moore. A 2000 amendment did not appear to change that result. The AG emphasized that its office could not declare an act unconstitutional and that the statute had to be followed unless a court held otherwise. It did not rule on whether an injunction against Brown would issue.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Had the pledge statute survived a constitutional challenge?
A: Yes. The opinion reported that the South Carolina Supreme Court had upheld its notice and pledge requirements in Florence County Democratic Party v. Moore.

Q: Did the AG decide whether Brown could appear on the independent ballot?
A: No. The letter addressed the statute's presumed validity and existing court decision; it did not adjudicate Brown's ballot placement or the threatened injunction.

Q: Did the office's earlier concern about federal candidates control this state race?
A: No. A footnote said those concerns about federal-office candidates did not apply to Brown's request.

Background and statutory framework

Section 7-11-210 required a primary candidate's pledge concerning a later general-election campaign, including a stated injunction mechanism. The opinion relied on Florence County Democratic Party v. Moore and the presumption that state legislation remained valid until a court ruled otherwise. It noted an amendment in 2000 but said that amendment did not appear to alter the earlier holding.

Citations and references

• Section 7-11-210, the primary notice and pledge provision quoted in the request.
• Florence County Democratic Party v. Moore, the state Supreme Court decision discussed in the letter.

Official title

Stating: “I ran in the June 2000 primary election for the South Carolina Senate as Democrat. At the time I signed a pledge for the Democratic Party pursuant to Section 7-11-210.” The Honorable Theodore Brown now wishes to run as an Independent candidate for the House seat he now holds. The Democratic Party intends to seek an injunction to prevent him from doing so. Therefore, he has requested an opinion concerning the constitutionality of the pledge and the injunction that may prevent him from running as an Independent candidate per Section 7-11-210.

Requester

The Honorable Theodore Brown, Member, House of Representatives

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/july-13-2000/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/00july13brown.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLIE CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

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July 13, 2000

The Honorable Theodore Brown
Member, House of Representatives
1306 Church Street
Georgetown, South Carolina 29440

RE:

Informal Opinion

Dear Representative Brown:
Your opinion request has been forwarded to me for reply. In your request. you state: I ran in the June 2000 primary election for the South Carolina Senate as Democrat. At that time I signed a pledge for the Democratic Party pursuant to Section 7-11-210 which provides, in part, as follows: " ... I hereby pledge myself to abide by the results of the primary or convention. I shall not authorize my name to be placed on the general election ballot by petition and will not offer or campaign as a write-in candidate for this office or any other office for which the party has a nominee. I authorize the issuance of an injunction upon ex parte application by the party chairman, as provided by law, should I violate this pledge by offering or campaigning in the ensuing general election for election to this office or any other office for which a nominee has been elected in the party primary election, unless the nominee for the office has become deceased or othef\vise disqualified for election in the ensuing general election.,. I now wish to run as an Independent candidate for the House seat that I currently hold. It is my understanding that the Democratic Party intends to seek an injunction to prevent me from running. I am asking for an opinion from you on the constitutionality of the pledge and the injunction that may prevent me from running as an Independent candidate per Section 7-11-2 L0.

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The Honorable Theodore Brown
Page 2
Julv_, 13. 2000

Your question has been addressed by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Florence County Democratic Party v. Moore, 281 S.C. 218, 314 S.E.2d 335 (1984). In this case, a candidate appealed a circuit court order which restrained him from offering or campaigning in a general election for city council and prohibited him from having his name placed on the ballot for the general election. The Supreme Court rejected several constitutional challenges to the statute and concluded the notice and pledge requirements of Section 7-11-210 were constitutional. Section 7-11-210 has been amended by Act No. 236 of2000. However, it does not appear that this amendment alters the conclusions reached by the court in the above cited case. 1 In any event, an Act of the General Assembly must be presumed valid and constitutional. An Act will not be considered void unless its unconstitutionality is clear beyond any reasonable doubt. Thomas v. Macklen, 186 S.C. 290. 195 S.E 539 (1937); Townsend v. Richland Countv, 190 S.C. 270, 2 S.E.2d 777 (1939). Every doubt regarding the constitutionality of an Act of the General Assembly must be resolved favorably to the statute's constitutional validity. More than anything else, only a court, and not this Office may declare an Act to be void for unconstitutionality. A statute "must continue to be followed until a court declares otherwise." Op. Attv. Gen. dated June 11, 1997. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated assistant attorney general and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not. however. been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With best personal regards, I am

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Paul M. Koch
Assistant Attorney General

I note that in an opm1on dated May 27. 1997, this Office questioned the constitutionality of the notice and pledge requirements as they relate to candidates for federal office. These concerns. however, do not apply to the situation raised in your opinion request.