When could a South Carolina municipal judge impose a restraining order in a criminal case?

Plain-English summary

A municipal judge asked when his court could issue a restraining order. In this July 2002 informal opinion, the AG distinguished a civil restraining order from restrictions imposed within a criminal case. The opinion read § 14-25-45 as giving municipal courts criminal jurisdiction comparable to magistrates while denying them civil jurisdiction. A municipal court therefore could not issue an order outside its criminal jurisdiction.

The AG described two settings in which the court could restrain a defendant after a criminal case began: as a condition of bond following an arrest warrant and as a reasonable condition of a suspended sentence. The letter cited an earlier opinion for each example. It did not define the full range of permissible terms.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2002. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could a municipal court issue a civil restraining order under the authority discussed here? A: The AG said no. It read the municipal court statute as withholding civil jurisdiction.

Q: Could a municipal judge tell a defendant to avoid certain conduct while out on bond? A: The opinion said a judge could restrain a criminal defendant's actions as a bond condition after an arrest warrant issued.

Q: Could restrictions be part of a suspended sentence?
A: Yes. The AG said a municipal court could place reasonable restraints on a defendant as a condition of a suspended sentence.

Background and statutory framework

The letter quoted § 14-25-45 on municipal criminal powers and the absence of civil jurisdiction. It cited State v. Fennell for the point that an arrest warrant or uniform traffic ticket gives a municipal court subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal matter. Earlier AG opinions supplied the bond and suspended-sentence examples.

Citations and references

• § 14-25-45: municipal court criminal powers and civil jurisdiction limit.
• State v. Fennell: when municipal criminal jurisdiction begins.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/july-1-2002/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/02july-1-sanders.pdf

Original opinion text

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The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES M. CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

July 1, 2002
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The Honorable Walter H. Sanders, Jr.
Municipal Court Judge
Town of Fairfax
P.O. Box 840
Fairfax, South Carolina 29827

Re: Your Letter of April 16, 2002
Restraining Orders in Municipal Court
Dear Judge Sanders:

In your above referenced letter, you indicate that you " ... need to know under what circumstances a Municipal Court Judge can issue a Restraining Order." You also indicate that "[i]t is your understanding that Municipal Court Judges have no authority or limited authority to issue Restraining Orders."

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As you know, S.C. Code Ann.§ 14-25-45 provides that Municipal Courts have" ... all such powers, duties and jurisdiction in criminal cases made under state law and conferred upon magistrates." That Section also provides, however, that Municipal Courts " ... shall have no jurisdiction in civil matters." Therefore, it would appear that, in order for a Municipal Court to have subject matter jurisdiction to issue any order, that order must be issued in conjunction with the court's criminal jurisdiction. See OP. AITY. GEN. DATED APRIL 2, 1997. A Municipal Court's subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal matter is obtained through the issuance of an arrest warrant or uniform traffic ticket. State v. Fennell, 263 S.C. 216, 209 S.E.2d 433 ( 1974) While a Municipal Court may not have the jurisdiction to issue Restraining Orders outside of its criminal jurisdiction, there are times following the issuance of an arrest warrant when a Municipal Court can properly place restraints on particular defendants. For example, in a previous opinion, we stated that a municipal judge would have the authority to restrain or enjoin a criminal defendant from participating is certain actions as a condition of that defendant's bond. See OP. ATTY. GEN. DATED SEPTEMBER 29, 1988. Further, municipal judges are authorized to suspend sentences upon terms and conditions they deem appropriate. See OP. ATTY. GEN. DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1990. It seems, therefore, that a Municipal Court may appropriately place

REMBERT

c. DENNIS BUILDING

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POST OFFICE Box 11549

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COLUMBIA,

s.c. 29211-1549

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TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

The Honorable Walter H. Sanders, Jr.
July 1, 2002
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reasonable restraints upon defendants as a condition of a suspended sentence. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General and not officially published in the manner of a formal opinion.

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