Could Charleston County’s park district build fitness and senior service facilities?

Short answer The AG concluded that the park district could establish wellness, fitness, and senior service facilities if they were aimed at providing recreational opportunities to the public. He based that conditional answer on the district’s broad authority over parks and similar facilities.
State
South Carolina
Opinion
2007-january-29-2007-3
Issued
January 29, 2007
Issued by
Office of the South Carolina Attorney General
Requested by
Tom O’Rourke, Executive Director, Charleston County Park and Recreation District

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This page answers the general question as of 2007. Ask about yours and see what current South Carolina law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official South Carolina Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed South Carolina attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

In 2007, the Charleston County Park and Recreation Commission asked whether the district it governed could construct and manage wellness, fitness, and senior service facilities. The South Carolina Attorney General concluded that it could, so long as those facilities aimed to provide recreational opportunities to the public.

The district's enabling acts authorized county parks and “other facilities of like nature,” along with operating park facilities. The AG read that language broadly in light of the acts' nonexclusive list of attractions and facilities, which included golf courses, fishing facilities, marinas, and beaches. He said the proposed services were not named expressly, but could fit the district's recreational purpose.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2007. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the district's law expressly list senior service or fitness facilities? A: No. The AG said the enabling acts did not name them but authorized parks and facilities of like nature.

Q: Could the district operate a wellness center under this opinion? A: The AG concluded it could establish facilities offering wellness services if they were aimed at public recreational opportunities. He did not address a facility outside that purpose.

Q: Why did the AG read the district's authority broadly?
A: He relied on the phrase “facilities of like nature” and the enabling acts' varied, nonexclusive list of recreation-related facilities.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion treated the district as a creature of statute, with powers granted expressly or reasonably implied. It examined its 1972 enabling act as amended in 1985 and concluded the Recreation Commission's power to create and operate public recreation facilities extended to the described wellness, fitness, and senior services when tied to that purpose.

Citations and references

Enabling acts: 1972 S.C. Acts 3122; 1985 S.C. Acts 1869.

Source

Original opinion text

January 29, 2007

Tom O’Rourke, Executive Director
Charleston County Park & Recreation Commission
861 Riverland Drive
Charleston, South Carolina 29412
Dear Mr. O’Rourke:
We received your letter requesting an opinion of this Office on behalf of the Charleston County Park and Recreation Commission (the “Recreation Commission”) regarding the Charleston County Park and Recreation District’s (the “District’s”) authority under its enabling legislation. In your letter, you explained: “I am requesting the assistance of your office to render an opinion as to CCRPC’s ability to construct and manage facilities that would provide services in the area of wellness, fitness, and/or senior services within communities in our jurisdictional area.” Law/Analysis As a creature of statute, the District has only has those powers that are specifically granted to it by statute or which may be reasonably implied therefrom. Piedmont Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Cowart, 319 S.C. 124, 459 S.E.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1995); Op. S.C. Atty. Gen., May 19, 2003. Thus, we must examine the District’s enabling legislation to determine the scope of its authority. The Legislature established the District in 1972 pursuant to Act. No. 1595. 1972 S.C. Acts 3122. In 1985, the Legislature amended this legislation by Act No. 263. 1985 S.C. Acts 1869. As amended, the legislation governing the District provides for its governance by the Recreation Commission. 1972 S.C. Acts 3122. The Legislature afforded numerous powers to the Recreation Commission including the power to “acquire, by gift or purchase, lands or interest thereon whereupon to establish county parks and other facilities of like nature,” to operate park facilities, and to “acquire and operate any apparatus or equipment useful in the operation of its facilities.” 1972 S.C. Acts 3122; 1985 S.C. Acts 1869. In order to determine whether the facilities to which you refer are authorized by the District’s enabling legislation, we must consider the rules of statutory interpretation. “It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that the primary purpose in interpreting statutes is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature.” Sloan v. South Carolina Bd. of Physical Therapy Examiners, 370 S.C. 452, 467, 636

Mr. O’Rourke
Page 2
January 29, 2007
S.E.2d 598, 606 (2006). “In ascertaining legislative intent, words must be given their plain and ordinary meanings.” South Carolina Dep’t of Revenue v. Rosemary Coin Machines, Inc., 339 S.C. 25, 28, 528 S.E.2d 416, 418 (2000). “Statutes, as a whole, must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation, consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers. Subtle or forced construction of statutory words for the purpose of expanding a statute’s operation is prohibited.” TNS Mills, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep’t of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 503 S.E.2d 471 (1998) (citations omitted). The enabling legislation does not specifically address the District’s ability to establish and manage facilities providing wellness, fitness, and senior services. This legislation simply vests the District with the authority to establish and manage “county parks and other facilities of like nature.” 1985 S.C. Acts 1869. Thus, whether or not the District is authorized to construct the facilities to which you refer in your letter is dependent upon whether such facilities are parks or facilities of like nature. Unfortunately, the legislation does not give much guidance as to what constitutes a “park or facilities of like nature.” The American Heritage Dictionary describes a “park” as “[a] tract of land set aside for public use, as: a. An expanse of enclosed grounds for recreational use within or adjoining a town b. A landscaped city square. c. A tract of land kept in its natural state.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 953 (New College ed. 1980). According to this broad definition, a park could include a facility providing wellness, fitness, and senior services because such a facility would constitute a tract of land set aside for public use. Furthermore, the Legislature increased the breath of facilities that the District may establish beyond parks to include “facilities of like nature.” Thus, the legislation establishing the District indicates the Legislature’s intent to give the Recreation Commission broad authority with regard to the types of facilities it may create and operate. A provision in the District’s enabling legislation discussing necessary costs for which the Charleston County Legislative Delegation may levy taxes provides further evidence of the Legislature’s intent to give the Recreation Commission broad authority in relation to the types of facilities it may establish. These costs include the cost of “providing, maintaining and supervising park and tourist attractions including, but not limited to: (1) Golf courses, (2) Fishing facilities, (3) Historical preservation, (4) Marinas and boat landings, (5) County parks, (6) Public beaches . . . .” 1985 S.C. Acts 1869 (emphasis added). Given the varying types of facilities listed in this provision and the fact that the Legislature did not intend for this list to be exclusive, we further understand the Legislature’s intent to allow the Recreation Commission to establish many types of facilities related to the purpose of providing recreational opportunities to the public. In reading the District’s enabling legislation in accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms used and based on our understanding of the Legislature’s intent, the Legislature intended to afford the Recreation Commission the ability to create many types of recreation related facilities. Accordingly, while not specifically provided for in the District’s enabling legislation, we believe that the Recreation Commission may establish facilities providing wellness, fitness, and

Mr. O’Rourke
Page 3
January 29, 2007
senior services, so long as those facilities are aimed at providing recreational opportunities to the public. Very truly yours, Henry McMaster Attorney General

By:

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

______
Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General

Cydney M. Milling
Assistant Attorney General

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