Did Anderson County’s school board election and district tax rates violate constitutional rules?

Plain-English summary

An Anderson County legislator asked about the county board of education’s composition and school-tax powers. In January 2002, the AG enclosed an earlier office opinion saying countywide election of board members who lived in different, unequally populated school districts appeared valid on its face. On a question about taxing without consent under Article X, § 5, he said the concern appeared addressed by that election opinion if it was only about the election method, but invited clarification if it was something else.

For differing school-district millage rates under Article X, § 6, the AG gave a conditional answer: rates imposed only within each district for that district’s own purposes did not appear to violate uniformity. If the question instead involved varying rates for one countywide levy, he needed more information. The letter did not decide that different factual scenario.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2002. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

School board members

The AG relied on prior office advice about the facial validity of countywide elections with district-residency requirements. He did not conduct a new factual vote-dilution analysis in this short letter.

Tax officials and districts

The letter distinguished district-specific levies from a single countywide levy with varying rates and limited its favorable answer to the former situation.

Common questions

Did the AG say the board’s election method was facially valid? A: He cited an enclosed 1988 opinion reaching that conclusion despite differences in district population.

Were differing school-district tax rates automatically unconstitutional? A: The letter said district-specific rates for district-specific purposes did not appear unconstitutional on the facts described.

Did he decide a countywide levy with different rates?
A: No. He requested additional information for that possibility.

Background and statutory framework

The letter addressed equal protection’s one-person-one-vote requirement and Article X, §§ 5 and 6 of the South Carolina Constitution. It discussed the county board’s election method and legislation under which school districts recommended millage and the board set it. The constitutional tax answer turned on the geographical scope and purpose of the levy.

Citations and references

• Article X, § 5: consent-to-taxation provision quoted by the AG.
• Article X, § 6: property-tax uniformity provision quoted by the AG.

Official title

Regarding the constitutionality of the Anderson County Board of Education as established by Act. No. 510, 1982 SC Acts 3420.

Requester

The Honorable Ronald P. Townsend, Chairman, Anderson County Legislative Delegation

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/january-29-2002/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/02jan29townsend.pdf

Original opinion text

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The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLI E CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

January 29, 2002

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The Honorable Ronald P. Townsend
Chairman, Anderson County Legislative Delegation
Room 429, Blatt Building
Columbia, SC
By Delivery
Dear Representative Townsend:
You have requested an informal opinion regarding the constitutionality of the Anderson County Board of Education as established by Act. No 510, 1982 SC Acts 3420. You have posed three questions each of which is set forth and discussed below.

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" . . . [I]s the composition of the Anderson County Board of Education in violation of 1. the ' one person one vote' requirement of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution?"

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In response to this question, I am enclosing a copy of the an August 1, 1988 opinion of this Office which concluded that the countywide election of members of the County board who must live in various school districts of Anderson County appears to be valid on its face even though those districts vary as to population. "[I]s the Anderson County Board of Education' s levying of taxes in violation of art. 2. X §5 of the South Carolina Constitution?" Article X§ 5 prohibits taxation "without the consent of the people or their representatives lawfully assembled." If your concern is with the method of the election of the Board in relation to this provision, the matter appears to be settled by the above referenced 1988 Opinion although that Opinion did not specifically address art . X §5 . If you have a different question about this provision, please let us know .

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REMBERT

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P OST OFFICE Box

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TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

The Honorable Ronald P. Townsend
January 29, 2002
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"[I]s the Anderson County board of Education's levying of separate millage rates on the property of the different school districts in violation of ... "art X § 6?

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Article X § 6 states that "[p ]roperty tax levies shall be uniform in respect to person and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing such taxes .... " Pursuant to Act No. 269, 1989 SC Acts 1655, as amended by Act No. 581, 1994 S.C. Acts 6025, the different school districts in Anderson County recommend to the Board the amount of tax millage needed to defray the cost of the budgets the districts prepare, and the Board then determines the millage. If the millage rates to which you are referring are imposed only within the districts for the purposes of those districts then they would not appear to violate art. X § 6 under the provisions of the Anderson legislation which is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality (Robinson v. Richland County Council, 293 S.C. 27 358 S.E. 2d 392 (1987)). Furthermore, our State's Education Finance Act includes local funding based upon the taxpaying ability of each district. See also S.C. Code Ann. §§59-20-40(e) (1990)(Education Finance Act requirements); 59-21-1030 (Supp. 2000)(minimum local financial effort requirements). If the millage rates are instead variations in rates for a single countywide levy, please let me know as I will need additional information. See Ops. Atty. Gen. (October 30, 1984)(Copy attached). For your further information, I am enclosing a copy ofa prior opinion related to the allocation of the revenue from a countywide millage which appears to address a different question. Ops. Atty. Gen. (August 16, 2000). I believe that you already have a copy of this Opinion.

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This letter is an informal opinion. It has been written by the designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the opinion of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally reviewed by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. If you have further questions, please let me know.