Did the South Carolina AG consider kidnapping a crime of moral turpitude in 1995?

Plain-English summary

In February 1995, counsel for South Carolina's foster-care review division asked whether kidnapping counted as a crime of moral turpitude. The AG said yes. He used the state's general definition of moral turpitude and cited decisions from California, Nebraska, and Indiana treating kidnapping as falling within that category. The opinion acknowledged that neither the AG office nor a South Carolina court had previously resolved the precise kidnapping question in the sources it found.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Officials applying moral-turpitude provisions

The letter supplied a classification of kidnapping for the question asked. It did not itself decide whether a particular person's charge or conviction triggered suspension, removal, or another consequence under a separate law.

Common questions

Did the AG classify kidnapping as a crime of moral turpitude? Yes. That was the letter's express conclusion in 1995.

Was the answer based on a South Carolina kidnapping case? No. The writer said he had located no South Carolina decision on the specific question and relied on decisions from other jurisdictions.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion quoted the definition of moral turpitude from State v. Horton and compared it with out-of-state cases addressing kidnapping. It was a short classification opinion, separate from the question of what consequences any particular statute attached to that classification.

Citations and references

• State v. Horton: South Carolina definition of moral turpitude.
• People v. Zataray, State v. Tatreau, and Webster v. State: out-of-state kidnapping decisions cited in support.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/february-9-1995/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/1995feb9harbeson.pdf

Original opinion text

CHAltlES MOIONY CoNdON
ATTORNEY

CiENERAl

The State of South Carolina
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY QENERAl
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February 9, 1995

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Timothy D. Harbeson, Esquire
General Counsel
Division of Foster Care Review
Office of the Governor
2221 Devine Street, Suite 500
Columbia, South Carolina 29205-2471
Dear Mr. Harbeson:
You have sought the opinion of this Office as to whether the offense of kidnapping would constitute a crime of moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is traditionally defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man .... Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of whether it is punishable by law as a crime .... An act in which fraud is an ingredient involves moral turpitude. State v. Horton, 271 S.C. 413, 414, 248 S.E.2d 263 (1978). This Office has apparently never considered previously whether kidnapping would constitute a crime of moral turpitude, nor have we located judicial decisions within this State deciding the issue. Cases from other jurisdictions have determined kidnapping to be a crime of moral turpitude, however.

Mr. Harbeson
Page 2
February 9, 1995

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In People v. Zataray, 173 Cal.App.3d 390, 219 Cal.Rptr. 33 (1985), kidnapping was said to involve bad character and the readiness to do evil. The defendant's prior conviction for simple kidnapping was deemed to be a crime of moral turpitude for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's testimony. Similarly, in State v. Tatreau, 176 Neb. 381, 126 N.W.2d 157 (1964), kidnapping is described to be "a crime which involves great moral turpitude. The potential of harm to the victim as well as to the relatives is so great that the severest of penalties is warranted." 176 Neb. at 392, 126 N.W.2d at 163. That moral turpitude is involved in kidnapping was also stated in Webster v. State, 513 N.E.2d 173 (Ind. 1987). We believe the courts of this State would follow the reasoning of these courts if faced with the issue. It is therefore the opinion of this Office that the offense of kidnapping would be considered a crime of moral turpitude. With kindest regards, I am

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