Could a precious-metals dealer get a South Carolina permit for a flea-market booth leased for a year in 1995?

Plain-English summary

In February 1995, Lexington County's sheriff asked whether a precious-metals dealer could qualify for a permit by leasing space at a flea market long enough to satisfy the law's permanence requirement. A Deputy Attorney General said no. The statute required a permanent place of business and separately barred dealers from operating at flea markets and other temporary locations. In her reading, the one-year-lease presumption applied only to a fixed, permanent premises; it did not transform an expressly excluded flea-market location into one.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Dealers and permit administrators

The opinion read the specific flea-market exclusion together with the general definition of a permanent place of business. The length of a lease at a temporary site did not overcome the specific prohibition. It did not determine the status of a different fixed premises.

Common questions

Would a one-year flea-market lease satisfy the permanence requirement? No. The writer said the statutory presumption applied to a fixed permanent business site, while flea markets were expressly classified as temporary locations.

Could the dealer obtain a permit for a flea-market operation anyway? The 1995 opinion said a permit would not issue for operation from that temporary location, regardless of lease length.

Background and statutory framework

The letter interpreted § 40-54-10's definition of permanent business premises alongside § 40-54-20's specific exclusion of flea markets. It relied on the rule that a provision addressing a specific situation controls over more general wording. Its conclusion concerned the 1995 permitting scheme.

Citations and references

• § 40-54-10: definition and lease presumption.
• § 40-54-20: permit condition and flea-market exclusion.
• Gambrell v. Travelers Insurance and McMillen Feed Mills, Inc. v. Mayer: cited on legislative intent.
• Duke Power Co. v. S.C. Public Service Comm'n., Langley v. Pierce, and Ramsey v. County of McCormick: cited on giving effect to a specific statutory provision.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/february-6-1995/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/1995feb6metts.pdf

Original opinion text

T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK
ATTORNEY GENERAL

REMBERT C. DENNIS BUil.DiNO
POST OFHCB BOX 11549
COLUMBIA, S.C. 29211·1549
TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970
FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

February 6, 1995

The Honorable James R. Metts, Ed.D.
Sheriff, Lexington County
P. 0. Box 639
Lexington, South Carolina 29071
Re:

Informal Opinion

Dear Sheriff Metts:
Thank you for your letter requesting an opinion as to whether a dealer in precious metals who engages in business at a flea market could ever meet the requirements of permanency and be issued a permit pursuant to the South Carolina Code of Laws § 40-5420 (Supp. 1993). According to § 40-54-20, a dealer can obtain a permit to engage in the business of buying and selling precious metals only if he operates from a "permanent place of business." A permanent place of business is defined in § 40-54-10 as a fixed premises either owned by the dealer or leased by him. One year's lease is a presumption of permanency. Further, § 40-54-20 provides that no dealer shall operate upon public property nor from a vehicle, flea market, hotel room or similar temporary location. (Emphasis added.) Under the well established canons of statutory construction, "the legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, which must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the [s]tatutes." Gambrell v. Travelers Insurance

The Honorable James R. Metts, Ed.D.
Page 2
February 6, 1995
Co., 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d 814, 816 (1983); McMillen Feed Mills, Inc. v. Mayer, 265 S.C. 500, 220 S.E.2d 221 (1975). It is evident from the words used therein, taken in their ordinary and popular significance, that the legislature specifically intended to exclude leases at temporary locations from the presumption of permanency since a temporary location is not a permanent place of business. Section 40-54-20 specifically addresses that a flea market, like a vehicle or hotel room, is a temporary location. "Laws giving specific treatment to a given situation take precedence over general laws on the subject .... " Duke Power Co. v. S.C. Public Service Comm'n., 284 S.C. 81, 326 S.E.2d 395, 399 (1985); Langley v. Pierce, 438 S.E.2d 242 (S.C. 1993); see also, Ramsey v. County of McCormick, 412 S.E.2d 408 (S.C. 1991) ("Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another with a portion of the same subject in a more specific and definite way, the special statute will be given effect.") Based on these authorities, it is our informal opinion that the legislature made clear that regardless of the length of time a dealer leases from a temporary location, a permit will not be issued. Moreover, the presumption of permanency arises only when
. a dealer leases from a permanent place of business - a fixed premises, not when he leases from a temporary location. Again, thank you for your letter. I trust you will find the above information to be helpful. If I can be of assistance to you in the future, or if a formal opinion is required, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely,

/.,,b- /Jdl~
Zeb C. Williams, III
Deputy Attorney General

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