Could Horry County voters petition for a referendum to repeal a hospitality-fee ordinance?

Plain-English summary

In 1997, an assistant attorney general concluded that Horry County voters could not use the petition procedure described in S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-1220 to force a repeal referendum on a hospitality-fee ordinance. That procedure applied to ordinances authorizing specified county debt backed by the county's full faith and credit. The letter understood the hospitality-fee ordinance to authorize no such debt. It also said the separate petition procedure in § 4-9-1210 for proposing ordinances could not serve as a repeal route.

The opinion answered a question about a petition signed by fifteen percent of county voters. It did not decide whether the hospitality fee was otherwise lawful or address every possible way the ordinance might later be changed.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could a petition signed by fifteen percent of Horry County voters repeal the hospitality fee?
A: The author said the 15-percent repeal procedure in § 4-9-1220 did not apply because the ordinance did not authorize the covered kind of county debt.

Q: What ordinances did that repeal-petition law cover?
A: As the letter quoted it, the procedure covered certain ordinances authorizing bonds, notes, or other debt requiring a pledge of the county's full faith and credit, with stated exceptions.

Q: Could the ordinance-proposal petition statute be used instead?
A: The author said no. Relying on earlier AG opinions, he distinguished proposing an ordinance under § 4-9-1210 from petitioning to repeal an existing one.

Q: Did the letter decide that the hospitality fee itself was invalid?
A: No. It addressed only whether the identified petition statutes supplied a route to a repeal referendum.

Background and statutory framework

Horry County had passed an ordinance imposing a hospitality fee on receipts from certain lodging and paid admissions to amusement places. A senator asked whether a petition with signatures from fifteen percent of qualified electors could require a referendum to repeal it. The author read the specific debt-ordinance language of § 4-9-1220 and found it inapplicable on the facts described. He rejected the proposed-ordinance petition route as well.

This was an informal opinion signed by an assistant attorney general. The letter said it had not been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General or published as a formal opinion.

Citations and references

• Statutes discussed: S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-1220 (certain debt-ordinance repeal petitions); § 4-9-1210 (ordinance proposals).

Official title

Asking whether a petition signed by fifteen percent of the qualified electors of Horry County could call for a referendum to repeal Ordinance Number 105-96.

Requester

The Honorable Dick Elliot, Senator, District No. 28

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/february-4-1997/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/97feb4elliott.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

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February 4, 1997

The Honorable Dick Elliott
Senator, District No. 28
P.O. Box 3200
North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina 29582
Re:

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Informal Opinion

Dear Senator Elliott:
This Office has received your opinion request dated February 3, 1997. It is my understanding that your question concerns Ordinance Number l 05-96. This Ordinance, which was recently passed by the Horry County Council, imposes a hospitality fee on the gross proceeds derived from the rental or charges on certain hotels, motels, and other sleeping accommodations and the paid admissions to places of amusement. You ask whether a petition signed by fifteen percent of the qualified electors of Horry County could call for a referendum to repeal the ordinance. Since your are inquiring about repealing an ordinance, S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-1220 (1986) requires consideration. Pursuant to§ 4-9-1220, electors may petition for the repeal of certain Ordinances: Within sixty days after the enactment by the council of any ordinance authorizing the issuance of bonds, notes or other evidence of debt the repayment of which requires a pledge of the full faith and credit of the county, or requires the approval of the issuance of bonds by a public service district within the county a petition signed by qualified

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PosT OFFICE Box I I 549

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COLUMBIA, S.C. 292 I l-1549

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TELEPHONE:

803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

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Senator Elliott
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February 4, 1997

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electors of the county equal in number to at least fifteen percent of the qualified electors of the county, or if such ordinance relates to a bond issue for a public service district, fifteen percent of the qualified electors of the district may be filed with the clerk of the county council requesting that any such ordinance be repealed; provided, however, that this section shall not apply to bond issues approved by referendum or to notes issued in anticipation of taxes. (emphasis in original). By opinions dated August 14, 1995 and August 27, 1982, this Office has advised that Section 4-9-1220 limits the repeal of ordinances by referenda to those authorizing the issuance of bonds, notes, and other debts requiring the pledge of the full faith and credit of the county. This should be distinguished from an ordinance proposed by petition and required by a referendum to be adopted by a county council. 1 It is my understanding that Ordinance Number 105-96 does not authorize the issuance of bonds, notes, and other debts requiring the pledge of the full faith and credit of the county. Therefore, since the use of §4-9-1220 is limited to the repeal of ordinances related to the types of indebtedness which require the full faith and credit of the county to be pledged for repayment, it is not applicable to this Ordinance. In addition, based on the prior opinions of this Office, I would advise that since a specific mechanism is in place for the repeal of ordinances, § 4-9-1210 could not be used for the repeal of Ordinance number 105-96.

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It is observed that S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-1220 has not been amended by the General Assembly since the opinion of August 27, 1982 was rendered by this Office. It is well recognized that the absence of any legislative amendment following the issuance of an opinion of the Attorney General strongly suggests that the views expressed therein were consistent with legislative intent. Scheff v. Township of Maple Shade, 149 N.J. Super. 448, 374 A.2d 43 (1977). Indeed, the General Assembly has on occasion acted swiftly in amending statutes following the issuance of an opinion by this Office; but such amendment has not been forthcoming in this instance.

Senator Elliott
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February 4, 1997
This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated assistant attorney general and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion.

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With kindest regards, I remain
Very truly yours,

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Paul M. Koch
Assistant Attorney General