Could South Carolina child-support enforcement funds be used to pay a county vehicle-storage bill?

Short answer The 1997 letter quoted a statute restricting child-support funds to related enforcement activities and pointed to a decision treating those funds as supplemental. It declined to determine whether the particular vehicle-storage payment violated the statute because the contract terms and facts were unknown.
State
South Carolina
Opinion
1997-february-3-1997-1
Issued
February 3, 1997
Issued by
Robert D. Cook, Assistant Deputy Attorney General of South Carolina
Requested by
The Honorable Glenn G. Reese, Senator, District No. 11

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This page answers the general question as of 1997. Ask about yours and see what current South Carolina law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official South Carolina Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed South Carolina attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
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Plain-English summary

A senator asked in 1997 whether money in a sheriff's child-support enforcement account could be used to pay a $19,000 abandoned-vehicle storage bill after county council had refused to pay it. The assistant deputy attorney general did not decide whether that particular transfer was lawful. He lacked the operative contract and other facts, and said the AG's office could not investigate them in an opinion.

The letter quoted S.C.Code Ann. Sec. 43-5-235. As quoted, it directed the payments into a separate account for the entity providing child-support services and confined their use to activities related to establishing, collecting, and enforcing child-support obligations. It also quoted a circuit court decision describing those funds as additional to, rather than a replacement for, the entity's ordinary operating budget. The author pointed the inquirer to the statute and suggested consulting the county treasurer or the state agency involved in the contract.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the AG conclude that the sheriff's vehicle-storage bill was an unlawful charge to the child-support account?
A: No. The author declined to decide the specific transaction because he did not know the governing contract or the surrounding facts.

Q: What use of the special account did the statute permit as quoted in the letter?
A: The quoted language limited it to activities related to establishing, collecting, and enforcing child-support obligations by the entity for which the account was established.

Q: Could the incentive funds simply replace the sheriff's operating budget?
A: The quoted statute barred using payments under that section to replace operating funds. The court decision the letter cited also described the money as supplemental to the county or entity's existing budget obligation.

Q: What did the author suggest for resolving the disputed payment?
A: Because the case turned on missing facts and contract terms, he suggested consulting the county treasurer or the state agency that may have been party to the contract.

Background and statutory framework

The request described an existing county wrecker contract, a storage bill, county council's refusal to pay, and a reported transfer from the sheriff's child-support account. The letter did not verify those assertions. Its legal discussion quoted the account restrictions of S.C.Code Ann. Sec. 43-5-235 and a circuit court's interpretation of another sheriff's child-support agreement. The author expressly stopped short of applying them to the disputed payment.

Citations and references

  • Statute discussed: S.C.Code Ann. Sec. 43-5-235 (child-support enforcement agreements and restricted account).

Official title

Questioning if money from can be moved from the DSS fund to pay storage of vehicles that should not have been stored for a long period of time.

Requester

The Honorable Glenn G. Reese, Senator, District No. 11

Source

Original opinion text

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The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
AITORNEY GENERAL

February 3, 1997

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The Honorable Glenn G. Reese
Senator, District 11
117 Sun Valley Drive
Inman, South Carolina 29349
Dear Senator Reese:
A constituent of yours has raised a question. According to your constituent's letter, a local wrecker service sent a bill to the Sheriff's Office for $19,000 for the storage of abandoned vehicles. Apparently, the wrecker company had an existing contract with the county for such services. It is further indicated in your constituent's letter that County Council refused to pay this bill and that the money for the bill was taken from the Sheriff's DSS account for the enforcement of child support orders. Your constituent states that such funds are provided to the Sheriff's DSS account by the Department of Health and Human Resources pursuant to a contract. Your constituent's question is summarized as follows:
[w]e need to know if this money can be moved from the DSS fund to pay storage of vehicles that should not have been stored for this long period of time.

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S.C.Code Ann. Sec. 43-5-235 provides as follows:
[t]o the extent permitted by federal law, the department may enter into annual agreements with county governments, clerks of court, sheriffs, and other law enforcement entities having jurisdiction in that county to reimburse and to pay federal financial participation and incentives pursuant to the terms of the agreement to the appropriate contracting entity for a

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POST0ff!CE Box 115.J.9

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TELEPHO:-:E:

803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

Senator Reese
Page 2
February 3, 1997
portion of the cost of developing and implementing a child support collection and paternity determination program for:

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(I) securing support for persons receiving state public assistance and reimbursement of medical assistance from the legally responsible spouse or parent of assistance recipients; (2) establishing paternity of children born out of wedlock who are receiving aid to families with dependent children and to secure support for them; (3) all children who have sought assistance in securing support whether or not they are eligible for aid to families with dependent children and regardless of the economic circumstances. To the extent permitted by federal law, a fiscal incentive and federal financial participation must be paid to the department and provided to the entity providing the service for the collection and enforcement of child support obligations. These monies must be paid to the appropriate county treasurer or county finance office on a monthly basis and deposited into a separate account for the entity providing the service for the exclusive use by this entity for all activities related to the establishment, collection, and enforcement of child support obligations for the fiscal year in which the payments are earned and may be drawn on and used only by the entity providing the service for which the account was established. Monies paid to the contracting entity pursuant to this section may not be used to replace operating funds of the budget of the entity providing the service. Funds in the special account not encumbered for child support activities revert to the general fund of the county at the end of the fiscal year in which they were earned. Each local entity shall enter into a support enforcement agreement with the department as a condition of receiving the fiscal incentive and federal financial participation. To the extent that fiscal incentives are paid to the department and are not owed under the agreement to the contracting entity, these fiscal incentives must be reinvested in the department's Child Support Enforcement Program to increase collections of support at the state and county levels in a manner consistent with the federal laws and regulations governing incentive payments.

Senator Reese
Page 3
February 3, 1997
A Circuit Court decision, McCrea v. Williamsburg County Council, 94-CP-45-173 (October 18, 1994), stated that "[t]he intent of [the] legislature was to allow the department to enter into an annual agreement with county governments. Clerks of Court, sheriffs. or other law enforcement entities having jurisdiction in the county for the purpose of carrying out the legislation and the contract." (emphasis in original). This decision construed the particular contract in question between the Sheriff of Williamsburg and DSS as follows:
[t]he clear intent of that portion of the contract is to prevent these monies from being used to diminish the amount of the operating budget which is the obligation of the county or the entity itself, and to provide these funds as additional or supplemental funds for the purposes set out in the statute and contract. The DSS contract does not place any obligation on Williamsburg County, and the contract is solely between Sheriff McCrea and DSS, as contemplated in Section 43-5-235 of our Code of Laws.

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Of course, this Office possesses no authority to investigate factual matters and issues of fact cannot be determined in an Opinion of this Office. Op.Atty. Gen., December 12, 1983. I am certainly not aware of the facts in this particular instance, such as the language of the particular contract which may have been operative or the circumstances surrounding this situation. I can only point your constituent to the relevant law(§ 43-5235) and would suggest that the County Treasurer or the state agency who may have been a party to the contract (perhaps DSS) be consulted for further information., With kind regards, I am Very truly yours,

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Assistant Deputy Attorney General
RDC/ph

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