Did Newberry County’s voter-adopted Revenue Ordinance prevent a proposed industrial fee-in-lieu-of-taxes arrangement?

Plain-English summary

Newberry County's attorney asked whether a voter-adopted Revenue Ordinance affected a proposed fee-in-lieu-of-taxes arrangement for a possible industrial project. In 1996, the AG agreed, on the information supplied, with the county attorney's reading: the ordinance was intended to limit new and increased county taxes and the growth of county government, rather than industrial or economic growth.

The opinion was deliberately narrow. It deferred interpretation of local ordinances to local authorities, acknowledged that their knowledge of the drafters' intent could change the analysis, and did not independently validate the proposed arrangement. The county attorney's own opinion and the ordinance were mentioned as materials sent to the AG but were not reproduced in the official PDF below.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1996. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did the AG view the Revenue Ordinance as a ban on industrial growth?

No. On the record presented, the AG agreed that its target was growth in county government and taxes, not the county's economic growth.

Did the letter approve the particular fee-in-lieu-of-taxes agreement?

It did not review or approve the terms of a final agreement. Its conclusion addressed the county attorney's interpretation of the ordinance on limited information.

Who did the AG say should interpret the county ordinance?

The opinion deferred to local authorities, who could consider the ordinance's drafting history and intent directly.

Background and legal framework

The letter concerned Ordinance 163, called the Revenue Ordinance, adopted through Newberry County's initiative and referendum process. It was an informal view of the signing senior assistant attorney general and expressly relied on the facts and local interpretation submitted with the request.

Citations

• Newberry County Ordinance 163, identified in the opinion.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/february-29-1996/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/96feb29stuart.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

February 29, I 996

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Hardwick Stuart, Jr., Esquire
Newberry County Attorney
Post Office Box 394
Columbia, South Carolina 29202-0394
RE: Informal Opinion
Dear Mr. Stuart:
By your letter of February 20, 1996, to Attorney General Condon, you sought an opinion as to a proposed fee-in-lieu-of-taxes arrangement with an industrial prospect which may locate in Newberry County, in light of "The Revenue Ordinance" as adopted pursuant to the initiative and referendum process in Newberry County. You had forwarded to this Office a copy of the opinion which you, as Newberry County Attorney, provided to Newberry County Council as well as a copy of the ordinance in question. Of course, this Office is not statutorily authorized to either participate in the drafting of such an ordinance or petition or attend meetings of county councils or the like at which such petition or ordinance would be discussed, and accordingly we consistently defer to local authorities to interpret ordinances which were adopted at the local level, for any additional insight or enlightenment as to the drafters' intent. However, based solely on the information presented for our consideration and in the absence of additional information as to intent to the contrary, I would concur with your opinion that Newberry County did not intend to apply Ordinance 163, "The Revenue Ordinance," to industrial growth, but instead intended it to limit new taxes and increased taxes. In particular, I concur with the conclusion and observation on page three of your opinion: This conclusion is further supported by the stated purpose and the exception in the Revenue Ordinance. As for the Revenue Ordinance itself,

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Hardwick Stuart, Jr., Esquire
Page 2
February 29, 1996
the stated purpose is to "limit the growth of county government," which is different from the economic growth of the county.

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This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Senior Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kindest regards, I am Sincerely,

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Patricia D. Petway
Senior Assistant Attorney General

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