Did South Carolina police have to notify a school principal after taking an out-of-state child into custody in 1995?

Plain-English summary

In February 1995, Myrtle Beach's police chief asked how a newly amended South Carolina juvenile custody statute applied to children from other states and during school breaks. The AG concluded that the school-principal notification duty covered qualifying out-of-state children and remained in effect when school was not in session. The statute specified the information to convey—the nature of the offense—but no required delivery method or fixed deadline. The opinion suggested means that actually apprised the principal, reasonable timing under the circumstances, and documenting notification attempts. These were interpretations of the 1995 statute, not a statement of current school-notice law.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Law enforcement officers

The opinion said the 1995 requirement applied when an officer took a child into custody for an offense that would be an adult misdemeanor or felony, subject to the stated traffic and wildlife exception. It did not distinguish in-state from out-of-state children or suspend the duty during school holidays. The writer said the statute contained no criminal penalty of its own for noncompliance but identified possible other consequences and suggested recording notification efforts.

School principals

The statutory text discussed in the letter allowed the principal to use the information for monitoring and supervision and otherwise required confidentiality. For an out-of-state principal, the writer left handling of the information under that state's law; she did not research the laws of every other state.

Common questions

Did the notification rule cover a visiting child enrolled in another state? The opinion said yes: the 1995 text referred to “a child” without a residency exception.

Did officers have to notify a principal during summer vacation? Yes under the opinion's reading. The statute contained no school-session limit, although finding the principal could take longer during a break.

Was a telephone call required?
No single form was prescribed. The writer thought a call might suffice if it actually reached the principal, while written communication might be needed after unsuccessful calls.

Was there a fixed notification deadline?
No. The opinion anticipated a reasonably timely notice requirement depending on the circumstances.

Background and statutory framework

The letter traced three 1994–95 enactments containing the amendment and treated the most recent as restoring the principal-notice provision. It then addressed five questions about geographic reach, school breaks, notice form, timing, and resources. The writer emphasized the plain wording of § 20-7-600(1) and declined to decide the precise notice method for every factual setting.

Citations and references

• § 20-7-600(1): 1995 principal-notification duty analyzed in the letter.
• Jolly v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp.: cited on conflicting enactments.
• Wheeler v. Corley: cited on the context-dependent nature of notice.
• Bankers Trust of South Carolina v. Bruce, Worthington v. Belcher, Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. City of Spartanburg, and Mitchell v. Mitchell: cited for statutory construction.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/february-28-1995-1/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/1995feb28killman.pdf

Original opinion text

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February 28, 1995

Samuel H. Killman, Chief of Police
City of Myrtle Beach Police Department
1101 Oak Street
Myrtle Beach, South Carolina 29577
Dear Chief Killman:
By your letter of January 24, 1995, you raised several questions concerning the 1994 amendment to S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-600, which now requires that a law enforcement officer taking a child into custody for specified offenses must notify the principal of the child's school as to the nature of the offense. Each of your questions will be addressed separately, as follows. It is observed that new § 20-7-600(1) was contained in at least three enactments of the General Assembly in 1994. The first was Act No. 475 (S.1199, R-544), which was signed by the Governor on July 14, 1994 and became effective at that time. The second was in the Schoolhouse Safety Alliance Act (H.4414, R-588), which was vetoed by Governor Campbell on January 11, 1995, most probably effectively repealing the earlier act. Cf., Jolly v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 207 S.C. 1, 35 S.E.2d 42 (1945) (latest expression of legislative will prevails, in the event of a conflict). Then, the provision was also a part of the Omnibus Crime Act (H.4323, R-585), which became law, without the approval of the Governor, immediately after midnight on January 12, 1995, by operation of Art. IV, § 21 of the South Carolina Constitution. The amendment to § 20-7-600 was contained in§ 69, which took effect at that time, though other parts of the Omnibus Crime Act have different effective dates. The most recent act would effectively repeal the intermediate act and reinstate the first act. Cf., Jolly.

Thus, § 20-7-600(1) now provides:
When a child is taken into custody by a law enforcement officer for an offense which would be a misdemeanor or

Chief Killman
Page 2
February 28, 1995

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felony if committed by an adult, not including traffic or wildlife violations over which courts other than the family court have concurrent jurisdiction as provided for in Section 20-7-410, the law enforcement officer also shall notify the principal of the school in which the child is enrolled of the nature of the offense. This information may be used by the principal for monitoring and supervisory purposes but otherwise must be kept confidential by the principal in the same manner required by Section 20-7-780. Rules of Statutory Construction In construing any statute, the primary objective of both the courts and this Office is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent if it is at all possible to do so. Bankers Trust of South Carolina v. Bruce, 275 S.C. 35, 267 S.E.2d 424 (1980). Words used in the statute are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings. Worthington v. Belcher, 274 S.C. 366, 264 S.E.2d 148 (1980). In the absence of ambiguity, words must not be added to or taken away from a statute. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. City of Spartanburg, 185 S.C. 313, 194 S.E. 139 (1938). Where the terms of a statute are clear, a court (and this Office) must apply them according to their literal meaning. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 266 S.C. 196, 222 S.E.2d 499 (1976). Question 1 Is the statutory notification requirement applicable to out-ofstate juvenile offenders, and if so, are we in conflict with juvenile privacy statutes in other states? The statutory requirements apply when "a child" is taken into custody by a law enforcement officer for a specified offense. The plain language of the statute makes no distinction between in-state and out-of-state residents. To interpret the statute as requiring out-of-state children to be handled differently would require insertion of language into the statute to that effect; such insertion would be a matter for the legislature to address. In addition, Section 20-7-600(1) itself does not contain a criminal penalty for failure to follow its requirements. Failure to comply with the statute could constitute nonfeasance or neglect of duty. Considering the public policy behind the enactment of§ 20-7-600(1), to enhance school safety, the issue of liability for failure to comply with§ 20-7-600(1) could also arise. Assessment of these risk factors suggests that the statute be followed even for out-of-state children. Accordingly, until such time as § 20-7-600(1) should be amended,

Chief Killman
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February 28, 1995
the statute would be applicable to out-of-state juvenile offenders, as well as in-state juvenile offenders. As to the possibility of conflict with laws of other states, I first observe that the alleged offense for which the child is taken into custody occurred in this state; the child would be taken into custody in this state; any adjudication as to the alleged offense would occur in this state; and that the statute imposes an obligation of notification on the law enforcement officials of this state. The only apparent impact out-of-state would be the requirement of confidentiality imposed upon the principal receiving the information. Moreover, the juvenile confidentiality statutes of this state (such as§§ 20-7-780 and 20-71360, 20-7-3300, and perhaps others) relate to court records, Department of Juvenile Justice records, and the like of this state. By enacting § 20-7-600(1), the legislature created an exception that removed confidentiality with respect to juveniles who are taken into custody for alleged offenses set forth in§ 20-7-600(1). While it is beyond the scope of this opinion to research the laws of the other forty-nine states, unquestionably, the laws of one state do not apply or operate outside the territorial limits of that state. 16 Am.Jur.2d Conflicts of Laws §§ 7, 10. Section 20-7-600(1) imposes an affirmative duty on the law enforcement officers of this state to transmit the information; it is then up to the principal in the receiving state to act upon the information according to the law of that state, our state statute notwithstanding. From these perspectives, therefore, I do not perceive a conflict with laws from other states. I

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Question 2
Is this statutory notification requirement applicable when school is not in session (i.e., holidays, summer break, etc.)?

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The plain language of § 20-7-600(1) does not place a time restriction on its applicability. The requirement exists even when school is not in session. Question 3 What is the approved form of notification (i.e., personal notification, copy of crime report or incident report, phone call, etc.)? The statute requires that the principal be apprised as to "the nature of the offense." The "nature" of a thing is its essence, character, kind, sort, or species. People v. Harden, 78 Ill.App.2d 431, 222 N.E.2d 693 (1966); State v. Murphy, 23 Nev. 390, 48 P. 628 (1897); Jones v. McDade, 200 Ala. 230, 75 So. 98 (1917). The statute is silent as to what

Chief Killman
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February 28, 1995
form the required notification must take, though clearly the law enforcement officer must advise the principal as to the essence, sort, species, or character of the offense for which the child was taken into custody. In South Carolina, adequate notice is recognized as a question of fact, dependent upon the circumstances of a particular case. In Wheeler v. Corley, 106 S.C. 319, 91 S.E. 307 (1917), the court stated as to notice that one case does not much help the decision of another case. "Notice" is generally a subtle thing, evidenced as often by what was not done as what was done. ... It is elusive, and rests in silence as well as in speech.... Id., 106 S.C. at 322. The general law as to notice is summarized succinctly in 58 Am.Jur.2d Notice § 28:

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It is a general rule that where a statute requires notice to be given, but does not specify the type of notice, actual personal notice is required, and the notice must be personally served on the person to be notified. It has also been stated, however, that if a statute or rule requires that notice be given, but fails to specify a particular form, that which will constitute sufficient notice will be liberally construed. In such a case, the notice, to be sufficient, must be reasonably certain to apprise those affected. ... It is dependent on the particular circumstances existing in an individual case as to whether a notice required by statute in a specific case is to be regarded as timely or sufficient.

Because § 20-7-600(1) is so new, we have no judicial guidance as to what would constitute sufficient notice, or what form of notification would be "approved." Clearly the principal must somehow be personally notified of the nature of the offense for which the child was taken into custody, by whatever means will apprise the principal. Possibly a telephone call to the principal would be sufficient; if telephone attempts prove to be unsuccessful, written communication would perhaps provide adequate notice. Whatever means may be selected, it is quite possible that the same method of notification will not be effective in each case; this may be particularly true during holiday periods when principals are not always at their assigned schools. In the absence of legislative or judicial

Chief Killman
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February 28, 1995
guidance, I would suggest taking whatever steps may be necessary to achieve the required notice. Question 4 Is there a time requirement for notification? i

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The statute provides no guidance as to this question. I believe the courts would imply a requirement that notification be provided in a reasonably timely fashion. What is reasonable would depend on the circumstances of each case. For example, during summer vacation, many principals may be working at their assigned schools, and notification may be achieved easily and quickly. In other schools, it may not be possible to notify the principal until vacation or holiday periods are over; notification would therefore take longer to accomplish. Question 5 How much time and what resources will we be expected to expend to make this notification (when applied to out-ofcounty and out-of-state notification if required)? Again, the statute is silent as to this issue. I believe that law enforcement officers will be expected to expend whatever time and resources may be necessary to achieve the required notification. As observed earlier, while § 20-7-600(1) contains no criminal penalties should a law enforcement officer fail to comply with the requirements thereof, there are other potential civil and/or criminal ramifications for failure to comply with the statute. We are mindful of the potential burden this requirement will place on the law enforcement personnel in localities where young people gather for vacations or holidays, but we are also mindful of the important school safety measures which this statute can enhance by its being followed. Out of an abundance of caution it is suggested that efforts made to comply with this statute be documented on a case-by-case basis. The various attempts made to reach a principal, some indication of how notice was effected, and the like (i.e., retaining a returned receipt if notice was mailed, telephone logs or copies of telephone bills if notification was made by telephone) would be helpful if a law enforcement officer should ever have to verify that § 20-7-600(1) was complied with, for whatever reason. I trust that the foregoing has satisfactorily responded to your inquiries. If additional assistance should be needed, please advise.

Chief Killman
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February 28, 1995
With kindest regards, I am

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