Did Lexington School District Four’s fiscal autonomy remove the county-board consent requirement for selling school property?

Plain-English summary

A senator asked whether Lexington County School District Four's authority to set its school tax levy freed it from a statutory requirement to obtain consent before selling or leasing school property. In 1996, the AG said the consent provision of § 59-19-250 still appeared to apply. The special act giving districts tax-levy authority addressed taxes, not other district powers or property transfers.

The requester also supplied a court order concerning a proposed conveyance of a school to a civic organization. The AG observed that the order did not expressly address county education board consent and said he did not know whether that issue had otherwise been raised in the case. He acknowledged a court might read the order differently, so his conclusion was expressed as an apparent application of the consent rule rather than a determination of the litigation's effect.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1996. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did fiscal autonomy automatically remove the consent requirement?

The AG said no. A law allowing the district to determine its tax levy did not appear to change the separate school-property consent provision.

Had the cited court order decided the consent issue?

The AG said the order did not expressly address it and that he did not know whether it had been raised elsewhere in the litigation.

Which body did the statute identify for consent?

The provision discussed county board of education consent, or consent of the county governing body where no county education board existed.

Background and legal framework

The cited school property statute addressed trustee sales and leases of district property and required prior consent. The opinion distinguished that rule from Act No. 280's tax-levy provision and considered the limited significance of an attached court order. It was an informal view of the signing deputy attorney general.

Citations

• § 59-19-250.
• Goodwin v. Lexington County School District No. Four.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/february-26-1996-4/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/96feb26wilson.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

February 26, 1996

The Honorable Joe Wilson
Senator, Lexington County
211 Gressette Building
Columbia, South Carolina 29202
Re:

Informal Opinion

Dear Senator Wilson:
You have requested the advice of this Off ice as to whether the consent provisions of § 59-19-250 (1976) do not apply to Lexington County School District Four because the District is "fiscally autonomous". The statute provides, in part, as follows: The school trustees of the several districts may sell or lease school property, real or personal, in their school district whenever they deem it expedient to do so and apply the proceeds of any such sale or lease to the school fund of the district. The consent of the county board of education or; in those counties which do not have a county board of education, the governing body of the county, shall be first obtained by the trustees desiring to make any such sale or lease .... (emphasis added)

I

An informal opinion letter from me to you dated October 30, 1995 concluded that this statute appears to apply to this district. Act No. 280, 1979 S.C. Acts 975 provides that the " ... the school tax levy shall be determined by the various school district boards of trustees " It does not set forth powers of the Districts over other matters. Because Act 280 is confined to tax levies, it does not indicate that it would limit the operation of the consent provisions of §59-19-250. 1 1

The " ... primary function in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature .... " Where the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation, and we must apply them according to their literal

RD!BERT c. DE\J\JIS BL'ILDlf'G

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PosT OFFICE Box 11549

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COIXMBIA, S.C. 29211-1549

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TELEPHO\JE:

803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

The Honorable Joe Wilson
February 26, 1996
Page 2
The Order that you have attached of the Honorable Walter J. Bristow, Jr., concerning the property that is in dispute concludes generally that the "manner in which the Board made this decision
[to convey the school to a civic organization] does not violate State law" (Goodwin v. Lexington County School District No. Four (95-CP-32-0214, March 22, 1995); however, the Order does not refer to Act 280 nor does it expressly address the question of whether the District had to obtain the consent of the County Board of Education (County Board) under §59 -19 -250. :a The original complaint and Motion to Dismiss in that case also do not appear to address the consent issue. I do not know whether the issue of the approval of the County Board was otherwise raised in that litigation.

I

In conclusion, the consent provisions of§ 59-19-250 appear to apply to the Lexington School District Four. Although a possibility exists that a Court could conclude that no such consent needs to be obtained under Judge Bristow•s Order, the Qrder does not appear to have addressed the consent provision. This letter is an informal opinion. It has been written by the designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the opinion of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally reviewed by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. I hope that this information is of assistance to you. truly,

ith, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
JESjr.

meaning.
South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation v. Dickinson, 288 s.c. 134, 341 S.E. 2d 134 (1986). The Order addresses other parts of § 59-19-250.