Did South Carolina’s 1996 false-information statute cover a driver who gave police a false name during an investigation of the driver?

Plain-English summary

A Walterboro officer asked about drivers who gave a fictitious or another person's name during a traffic stop. The local concern was framed as whether the false-information statute applied only to written documents. In 1996, the AG pointed to a different limit in the statute: it addressed false information concerning an alleged crime committed by another person. Relying on an earlier AG opinion, he said it did not appear to apply when the person misrepresented their own identity in an investigation of their own conduct.

The letter did not say oral lies were generally lawful or that no other charge could fit a particular case. It expressly preserved the local prosecutor's discretion over applicable charges and said a legislative amendment would be needed to extend this statute to the situation described.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1996. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did the AG distinguish spoken from written false statements?

No. The reason he gave for the statute's apparent inapplicability was its focus on an alleged offense by another person, rather than the medium of the statement.

Did giving a false name during one's own traffic stop fit this provision?

The AG said this false-information provision did not appear to cover misrepresenting one's identity while police investigated that same individual's conduct.

Did the opinion rule out every possible charge?

No. It left the choice of any applicable criminal charge and prosecution decision to the local prosecutor.

Background and legal framework

The opinion quoted Sec. 16-17-725 and applied an earlier AG letter interpreting its reference to a crime by another. It was an informal view of the signing assistant deputy attorney general; the earlier letter was enclosed but only its relevant passage appears in the PDF text below.

Citations

• Sec. 16-17-725.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/february-26-1996-2/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/96feb26ginn.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
AITORNEY GENERAL

February 26, 1996

Ptl. Jerry Ginn
Walterboro Police Department
Post Office Box 709
Walterboro, South Carolina 29488
Re: Informal Opinion
Dear Ptl. Ginn:
You have asked for advice on the following situation:
[t]his is in reference to 16-17-725, false information to a police officer. I am interested in your opinion, due to the fact that our judge dismisses cases on the basis that this statute is for written documents and that a person can tell a law enforcement officer anything they want to about themselves. The situation usually evolves from a traffic stop where the driver of the vehicle gives the officer someone else's name or a ficticious name. The officer then makes an arrest or issues a citation to later find that the person in question gave the wrong name and was not who he said he was. S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 16-17-725 provides in pertinent part as follows:
[i]t is unlawful for any person to knowingly make a false complaint, or after notice of a criminal investigation to give false information to any law enforcement officer concerning the alleged commission of any crime by another ... .

RDIBERT

c DF\J:\IS BL'ILDI';(;

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POST OFFICE Box 11549

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COLU);!BIA, S.C. 29211-1549

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TELEPHONE:

803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

Ptl. Ginn
Page 2
February 26, 1996
I am enclosing a copy of an opinion of this Office, dated August 24, 1992 which is dispositive of your question. There, the question was addressed as to whether the statute is applicable to the situation where a person "misrepresents one's identity to a law enforcement officer if the investigation involves one's own actions." The opinion stated:
... Section 16-17-725 appears to be inapplicable to a situation where an individual misrepresents his own identity to a law enforcement officer if the investigation involves the same individual. As stated above, pursuant to such provision the prohibited actions appear to deal only with the alleged commission of an offense "by another." This advice should not be construed as applying to any particular set of facts or circumstances. Also, any decision with regard to what criminal charges may be applicable or the decision of whether or not to proceed with a particular charge is within the discretion of the local prosecutor.

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Thus, the General Assembly would have to amend the statute to address the situation which you are referencing. . This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I am Very truly yours,

-~

Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General
RDC/an
Enclosure