Whom did a South Carolina animal shelter have to notify when a dog’s microchip named both the shelter and an adopter?

Plain-English summary

A senator asked who should receive notice when a dog's microchip identified an animal shelter as the first owner and an adopter as a secondary owner. The AG said the shelter and the adopter should both be notified when the information identified both. It rejected an interpretation that would stop at the first microchip entry and omit the known adopter.

The AG also pointed to a misdemeanor provision for killing a dog whose owner could be identified through a collar or other positive identification. The opinion did not decide ownership of a particular dog or resolve a particular prosecution.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2004. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Was the first name on a dog’s microchip the only person entitled to notice?
A: No. In the situation presented, the AG said both the listed shelter and the adopted owner identified by the available information should be notified.

Q: What did the opinion say a shelter had to do with a newly received dog or cat?
A: The quoted statute required an immediate, thorough scan for a tattoo, microchip, or similar identification and a good-faith effort to contact the identified owner if found.

Q: Did the opinion identify a criminal consequence for killing an identifiable dog?
A: Yes. It quoted Section 47-3-530, which made killing a dog with an owner identifiable through positive identification a misdemeanor.

Background and statutory framework

Section 47-3-55 required shelters to scan dogs and cats and make a good-faith contact effort when identification was found. Section 47-3-540 governed notice before animal control officers destroyed a positively identified dog. Section 47-3-530 supplied the misdemeanor rule discussed in response to the senator's penalty question. The AG read these provisions together to avoid excluding a known adopter from notice.

Citations

• Section 47-3-55
• Section 47-3-540
• Section 47-3-530

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/february-24-2004-3/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/04feb24mcconnell.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
HENRY McMAsTER
ATIDRN£Y GENER.AL

February 24, 2004

The Honorable Glenn F. McConnell
President Pro Tempore
The Senate
P. 0. Box 142
Columbia, South Carolina 29202

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Dear Senator McConnell:
In a letter to this office you referenced provisions of the State law dealing with animals implanted with a microchip. S.C. Code Ann. Section 47-3-55 (Supp. 2003) states in part that: (A) If an animal shelter accepts or comes into possession of a dog or cat, the shelter immediately and thoroughly must scan the dog or cat for a tattoo, any implanted microchip, or similar device, which provides evidence of ownership and, upon finding it, immediately must make a good faith effort to contact the identified owner as required by Section 47-3-540. 1

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S.C. Code Ann. Section 47-3-540 (1987) provides that
Animal control officers must not destroy any positively identifiable dog until they have notified the owner at his last known address by registered mail that they have the dog in their possession. The owner must notify the animal control officer within two weeks that he will pick up his dog. If the owner does not pick up his dog within two weeks of notification to the animal control officer, the dog may be destroyed .... S.C. Code Ann. Section 47-3-530 (1987) provides that

'Subsection (B) of Section 47-3-55 provides that

If an animal shelter or its officers, directors, or staff have made a good faith effort to comply with the provisions of subsection (A), they must be held hannless, as well as the manufacturer, against any action at Jaw or otherwise, civil or criminal, for failure to detect a microchip or similar device and undertake the action specified in subsection (A).

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~ <'.;. p~ 8UU..OING • POST OFFICE Box 11549 • COWMBIA, S.C. 2921 1-1549 • TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970 '-/L '\"-? ...... ,,,/

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• FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

The Honorable Glenn F. McConnell
Page2
February 24, 2004

Any person killing any dog when the owner may be identified by means of a collar bearing sufficient information or some other form of positive identification is guilty of a misdemeanor ....

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You have asked who is the owner entitled to notification under the referenced statutes. You indicated that you have been informed that in some instances, an animal shelter is listed as the "oWner'' on the microchip, with the adopted owner as secondary owner. You have asked whether the.information contained on the microchip is controlling as regards the ownership of the animal. You also asked whether Section 47-3-530 provides any penalty for a person or entity that does not notify the owner of an animal prior to its destruction. In construing the referenced statutes with regard to the questions posed by you, several principles of statutory construction are relevant. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that legislative intent must be ascertained and given effect. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). Legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered from the language used. State ex rel. McLeod v. Montgomery, 244 S.C. 308, 136 S.E.2d 778 (1964). Statutes as a whole must receive a reasonable, practical and fair interpretation consistent with the purpose, design, and policy of the lawmakers. Caughman v. Columbia Y.M.C.A., 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E.2d 788 (1948). The words of a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to forced or subtle construction which would work to expand or limit the operation of the statute. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991): The plain meaning of statutes cannot be contravened. State v. Leopard, 349 S.C. 467, 563 S.E.2d. 342 (2002). Courts must apply the clear and unambiguous terms of a statute according to their literal meaning. Blackmon, supra. You first asked who is the owner entitled to notification pursuant to the referenced statutes. Additionally, you asked is the owner of an animal the one listed on the microchip or is the animal shelter that comes into possession of an animal entitled to an independent determination of ownership as to who to notify or whether to notify. In my opinion, where a dog is brought into an animal shelter and a scan is made with the results that the animal shelter is listed as the "owner" and information is presented identifying the adopted owner, based upon such identification, both the shelter and the adopted owner should be notified. It would appear absurd to construe Section 47-3-55 as limiting notification to the "first"owner, not notifying the adopted owner if information is obtained as to the adopted owner's status. As stated in Section47-3-55, where an animal shelter obtains a dog, the dog must be scanned fo~ ;i tattoo for evidence of ownership and ''upon finding it, ... (the shelter) ... must immediately make a good faith effort to contact the identified owner." The adopted owner, where information is obtained as to that party, along with the shelter identified in the scan, would be the proper parties for notification. As noted, Section 47-3-540 provides that animal control officers may not destroy a positively identified dog until the owner has been notified.

The Honorable Glenn F. McConnell
Page 3
February 24, 2004

As to your question as to whether Section 47-3-530 provides any penalty for an individual or entity that does not notify the owner of an animal prior to its destruction, as set forth, Section 473-530 provides that any person killing a dog when the owner can be identified by some means of positive identification is guilty of a misdemeanor. With kind regards, I am, Very truly yours,

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Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

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Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General