Did a 1996 ruling change when South Carolina House candidates had to live in their districts?

Plain-English summary

The South Carolina Election Commission asked whether a 1996 trial-court order invalidating Section 2-1-40 overruled a 1982 Charleston County election case. The 1998 AG letter explained that the 1982 case had upheld the special law but had not decided its constitutionality. The 1996 case directly contested that question and struck the law down.

The AG agreed that the 1996 ruling displaced the earlier case on the narrow issue of whether a House candidate had to reside in the district before offering as a candidate. He said the office had consistently read the candidate qualification as applying at the general election, including residence in the area, and identified the state constitution as the primary basis. The letter identified itself as an informal opinion of the signing Deputy Attorney General.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the AG say a House candidate had to live in the district before offering for election? A: No. He agreed that the 1996 order displaced the earlier ruling insofar as it imposed that pre-offering requirement.

Q: When did the opinion say a candidate had to meet the residency qualification? A: It said a candidate had to be qualified, including district residence, by the time of the general election.

Q: Did the 1982 case decide whether the residence statute was constitutional? A: The AG said it did not address that issue, while the 1996 case directly did.

Background and statutory framework

The letter compared the issues resolved in the two Charleston County cases and the office’s earlier readings of candidate qualifications. Its conclusion about the effect of the 1996 order was limited to residence before offering for election.

Citations and references

Statute discussed: Section 2-1-40. Constitutional provision: South Carolina Constitution, Article III, §7.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/february-19-1998/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/98feb19hendrix.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CH A RLES M OLON Y C ON D ON
ATIO RNEY G ENERAL

February 19' 1998

Mr. James F. Hendrix
Executive Director
South Carolina Election Commission
P. O. Box 5987
Columbia, SC
29250
Dear Jim:
You have forwarded to me a copy of an Order of Judge Larry Patterson issued on September 30, 1996, Beane v. Charleston County Election Commission and Charleston County Republican Party. In this case Judge Patterson finds the provisions of Section 2-1-40 of the Code to be unconstitutional and overrules the 1982 case of The Charleston County Democratic Party v. The Charleston County Republican Party and The Charleston County Election Commission. You have inquired if the 1996 case overrules the 1982 case . Section 2-1-40 of the Code created a special law which required candidates for the House to be residents of the district in which they planned to offer prior to offering for election. This law was upheld in 1982 by the Honorable John Hamilton Smith in the above-cited case. However, as the 1996 case sets out, the issue of the constitutionality of this statute was not addressed in the 1982 case. It has been the consistent opinion of this Office that a candidate must be qualified as of the time of the general election. 1 1959-60 Att'y Gen. Ops . 159; 1964 Att'y Gen. Ops. 257; 1968 Att'y Gen. Ops. 101, 177. This is also and primarily a constitutional requirement. South Carolina Constitution, Article III, §7 . The 1996 case had a different pla i ntiff but identical defe n dants and in the 19 9 6 case the cons ti tutionali ty of the statute was directly contested and was struck as unconstitutional. Insofar as the 1996 opinion addresses whether candidates for the House must reside in the district prior to offering as a candidate, we would agree that the 1996 case overrules the prior case.

1

This would i nclude residing in the area.

RE.\1BERT c. D ENNIS B UILDING

•

POST OFFICE B ox 11 549

•

Cou .:MBI A,

s.c. 292 11 - 1549

•

T ELEPHONE:

803-734-3970

•

FAC SIMI LE: 803-253-628 3

Mr. James F. Hendrix
February 19, 1998
Page 2

This letter is an informal opinion and represents only the opinion of the undersigned attorney. It has not, however, been personally reviewed by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of formal opinions. Sin~ely

yours,

~~~~~
Treva G. Ashworth
Deputy Attorney General

TGA:bvc

I

.