Did a South Carolina county have to supply a dispatcher when a city was short staffed?

Plain-English summary

A Bishopville police captain asked whether the county had to provide a dispatcher when the city's dispatch unit was short staffed, given that the city dispatched for city and county law enforcement and fire units. The Deputy AG said this situation should be resolved by contract between city and county. He drew on earlier office opinions describing the authority of counties and municipalities to arrange services jointly.

The quoted authority allowed a county to furnish functions inside a municipality by contract, subject to state law and restrictions where the municipality already provided or budgeted for the service. The letter did not state that a staffing shortage itself imposed a duty on the county to assign an employee.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Was the county required to send a dispatcher whenever the city lacked one? A: The author did not identify such an automatic requirement. He said the situation was one for a city-county contract.

Q: Could a county provide services inside city limits? A: The letter quoted statutory authority permitting contracted county services there, subject to the stated legal limits and municipal permission where applicable.

Q: Could a city and county share the cost of law enforcement services? A: The letter quoted an earlier opinion identifying authority for agreements on joint administration and cost sharing, with specific limits on where payments could be made.

Background and statutory framework

The letter relied heavily on earlier Attorney General opinions interpreting Section 4-9-40 and related authority for intergovernmental services and contracts. Its answer concerned the proposed dispatch staffing arrangement, rather than a completed contract whose terms it could interpret.

Citations and references

Statutes discussed: Section 4-9-40; Sec. 6-1-20.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/february-11-1997/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/97feb11mills.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

February 11, 1997

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Captain James F. Mills
Operations Officer
Bishopville Police Department
P. 0. Box 388
Bishopville, South Carolina 29010
Re: Informal Opinion
Dear Captain Mills:
You have asked for guidance concerning a county's "furnishing assistance to a city, if the city is short of personnel." Specifically, you state that "[a]n example would be in dispatch services where the city presently dispatches for both county and city law enforcement units and the county and city fire departments. If the city was short in the dispatch unit, would the county be required to furnish the city a dispatcher? Such services are typically provided by contract. In Op.Atty.Gen. Op.No. 92-67 (November 6, 1992), we referenced the various provisions of law in this regard. Quoting from an earlier opinion dated April 11, 1985, we stated:
... while a county and county officials are not as a general matter obligated to perform services within the corporate limits of a city, the General Assembly has provided by statute for municipal residents to contract for county services in certain situations. Section 4-9-40 of the Home Rule Act authorizes a county to "perform any of its functions, furnish any of its services within the corporate limits of any municipality, situated within the county, by contract with any

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POST OFFICE Box 11549

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TELEPHONE:

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FACSl\11LE: 803-253-6283

Captain Mills
Page 2
February 11, 1997
individual, corporation or municipal governing body, subject always to the general law and the Constitution of this State regarding such matters." ... Such services cannot be provided, however where the service "is being provided by the municipality or has been budgeted or funds have been applied for" unless permission is given by the municipal governing body. See also, Sec. 23-27-10 et seq. and Sec. 4-9-30(5) [authorizes county to create special districts for police protection] ....

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In the 1992 Opinion, we also recognized an opinion dated May 17, 1978 where we stated:
[t]here are currently no state statutes which would prevent ... (a sheriffs department) ... from offering contract law enforcement services to municipalities ... (within that same county) ... Both counties and incorporated municipalities have the ability to contract, a power given them by Sections 4-9-30(3) and 5-7-60 of the Code ... The ability of political subdivisions to enter into an agreement for the joint administration, responsibility and sharing of the costs of services with other political subdivisions is granted by Article VIII, Section 13 of the South Carolina Constitution and Sec. 6-1-20, Code .... The opinion concluded that such statutes enable an incorporated municipality to contract with a county to provide law enforcement services to the municipality.... The opinion further stated
[t]here are currently no state statutes
which would preclude a municipality from
making an appropriation in its budget for payment of law enforcement services to the county general fund with later disbursement to the sheriffs department ... (However) ... (e)nabling legislation would be necessary in order for the municipality to pay the same funds directly into the Sheriffs Department County budget account. Therefore, your situation would be one to be resolved by contract between the city and county pursuant to the foregoing authorities.

Captain Mills
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February 11, 1997
This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I am Very truly yours,

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Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General
RDC/ph