Did owning property in a South Carolina school district excuse a nonresident child from tuition in 2005?

Plain-English summary

A family asked whether children who owned property in a school district where they did not live could attend its schools without paying tuition. In 2005, the Attorney General read the property-ownership route to enrollment together with the separate statute on nonresident attendance payments. He did not treat property ownership as an automatic exemption from that payment.

The nonresident statute calculated the charge from the prior year's local school revenue per child and reduced it by school taxes on real property owned by the child and paid to the district. It also permitted the district to waive all or part of the payment. The opinion said these payment provisions had to be read in addition to the section under which a child's property ownership could help qualify the child to attend.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2005. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did owning property in the district automatically make attendance free?
The AG did not read the ownership provision alone. He said the separate nonresident payment rule also applied.

How did the law account for school taxes on the child's property?
The statute quoted in the opinion reduced the nonresident payment by school taxes paid to the district on real property owned by the child.

Could the school district waive the payment?
The opinion quoted a provision allowing the district to waive all or a portion of it.

Background and statutory framework

The first provision listed ways a child could qualify to attend a district's schools without charge, including ownership of real estate in the district with the specified assessed value. The second governed payment by a nonresident child otherwise qualified to enroll. The AG read the two provisions together rather than treating the ownership clause as the complete answer.

Citations and references

• §59-63-30: enrollment qualifications, including property ownership, as printed in the extracted text.
• § 59-63-45: payment calculation and waiver for nonresident attendance.

Official title

Questioning whether if property is in the name of a child in a school district in which the child does not live, is the child exempt from paying tuition costs in order to attend that district’s schools.

Requester

The Honorable Lonnie Hosey, Member, House of Representatives

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/december-8-2005/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/05dec8hosey.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
HENRY M CMASTER
ATTORNEY GE.'\ERAL

December 8, 2005

The Honorable Lonnie Hosey
Member, House of Representatives
P. 0. Box 423
Barnwell, South Carolina 298 12
Dear Representative Hosey:
In a letter to this office you forwarded an opinion request from Mrs. Sandra Hudson who has questioned whether if property is in the name of a child in a school district in which the child does not live, is the child exempt from paying tuition costs in order to attend that district's schools. Particular reforence was made to S.C. Code Ann. §59-63-30 which states: Children within the ages prescribed by § 59-63-20 shall be entitled to attend the public schools of any school district, without charge, only if qualified under the following provisions of this section: (a) Such child resides with its parent or legal guardian; (b) The parent or legal guardian, with whom the child resides, is a resident of such school district; or (c) The child owns real estate in the district having an assessed value of three hundred do1lars or more; and (d) The child has maintained a satisfactory scholastic record in accordance with scholastic standards of achievement prescribed by the trustees pursuant to § 59-19-90; and ( e) The child has not been guilty of infraction of the rules of conduct promulgated by the trustees of such school district pursuant to§ 59-19-90. It is my understanding that Mrs. Hudson's children meet the requirement of Section 59-63-30 that each child owns real estate in the district having a value of three hundred dollars or more. ln addition to Section 59-63-30, S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-45 states that (A) Notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter, a nonresident child otherwise meeting the enrollment requirements of this chapter may attend a school in a school

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The Honorable Lonnie Hosey
Page2
December 8, 2005

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district which he is otherwise qualified to attend if the person responsible for educating the child pays an amount equal to the prior year's local revenue per child raised by the millage levied for school district operations and debt service reduced by school taxes on real property owned by the child paid to the school district in which he is enrolled. The district may waive all or a portion of the payment required by this section. (B) Students attending a school pursuant to this section must be counted in enrollment for purposes of determining state aid to the district. (C) If the payment to the school district is not made within a reasonable time as determined by the district, the child must be removed from the school after notice is given. (D) Any nonresident student enrolled in the schools of a district no later than September 9, 1996, shall not be required to meet the conditions of subsection (A) of this section as long as the student is continuously enrolled in the district and as long as the student meets the qualifications provided by law for attending the schools of the district. Section 59-63-30 is a provision in the same chapter as Section 59-63-45. When interpreting the meaning of a statute, certain basic principles must be observed. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). Typically, legislative intent is determined by applying the words used by the General Assembly in their usual and ordinary significance. Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 256 S.C. 577, 183 S.E.2d 451 (1971). Resort to subtle or forced construction for the purpose oflimiting or expanding the operation of a statute should not be undertaken. Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14 (1984). Courts must apply the clear and unambiguous terms of a statute according to their literal meaning. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991 ). Statutes should be given a reasonable and practical construction which is consistent with the policy and purpose expressed therein. Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 247 S.C. 132, 146 S.E.2d 166 (1966). As set forth by Section 59-63-45, a nonresident child may attend a school in a school district which he is otherwise qualified to attend if the parent " ... pays an amount equal to the prior year's local revenue per child raised by the millage levied for school district operations and debt service reduced by school taxes on real property owned by the child paid to the school district in which he is enrolled." Such requirement must be read in addition to the provisions of Section 59-63-30.

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The Honorable Lonnie Hosey
Page 3
December 8, 2005

With kind regards, I am,
Sincerely,

dJ~ « fli.J4_____

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Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General

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REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Assistant Deputy Attorney General
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Mrs. Susan Hudson
Post Office Box 115
Fairfax, South Carolina 29827