Could a South Carolina circuit public defender accrue state employee annual leave?

Plain-English summary

In 2011, the South Carolina Attorney General concluded that circuit public defenders could not accrue annual leave under state employee leave policies. The statute called them full-time state employees, but also required that they receive the same compensation and benefits as circuit solicitors. The AG said solicitors, as elected officials, did not accrue annual leave. It treated the benefits comparison as a limit on the public defenders' otherwise available state employee benefits.

The requester also asked whether unused annual leave could be paid when a public defender left office. Because the AG answered the accrual question negatively, it expressly did not address that separate terminal-leave question.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2011. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Did full-time state employee status give a circuit public defender annual leave? A: The AG said no. It read the specific provision equating defender benefits with solicitor benefits as controlling.

Why did solicitor benefits matter?
A: The opinion said circuit solicitors were elected officials and did not accrue annual leave. The statute required defenders to have the same benefits as solicitors.

Did the opinion decide payment for unused leave on departure? A: No. Having concluded defenders could not accrue annual leave, the AG said it did not need to address terminal leave.

Background and statutory framework

The Comptroller General's office sought an answer on accrual and payout. The AG applied the specific compensation-and-benefits sentence in § 17-3-510 (B) and its prior opinions on leave for elected officials. It said circuit public defenders were not covered by state employee leave policies and read the statute as limiting benefits that circuit solicitors did not receive. It did not decide the terminal-leave question.

Citations and references

The opinion quotes § 17-3-510 (B) and notes §1-7-325 on circuit solicitors.

Official title

Addressing whether or not circuit public defenders are entitled to accrue annual leave policies for state employees. Specifically, whether or not they are also entitled to receive payment for accumulated, unused annual leave (“terminal leave”) upon leaving the position.

Requester

James M. Holly, Chief of Staff of Comptroller General

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/december-22-2011/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/holly-j-m-os-9372-12-22-11-can-circuit-public-defenders-accrue-annual-leave.pdf

Original opinion text

ALAN WILSON

A TIORNEY GENERAL

December 22, 2011

James M. Holly, Chief of Staff
South Carolina Office of Comptroller General
1200 Senate Street
305 Wade Hampton Building
Columbia, SC 2920 l
Dear Mr. Holly:
We received your letter requesting an opinion of this office addressing whether or not circuit public defenders are entitled to accrue annual leave under leave policies for state employees. If circuit public defenders are entitled to annual leave, you ask whether or not they are also entitled to receive payment for accumulated, unused annual leave (''terminal leave") upon leaving the position. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-3-510 provides that in each judicial circuit of this state, a Circuit Public Defender Selection Panel must nominate a person to serve as the circuit public defender in the judicial circuit. Specifically relevant to your question, § 17-3-510 (B) states: " ... [t]he circuit public defender for each judicial circuit must be a full-time employee of the State and must be compensated and have the same benefits as the circuit solicitor." [Emphasis added] . In reading § 17-3-510 (B), a number of fundamental principles of statutory construction must be considered. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to determine the intent of the Legislature. Bass v. Isochem, 365 S.C. 454, 617 S.E.2d 369, 377 (Ct. App. 2005). All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute. McClanahan v. Richland County Council, 350 S.C. 433, 567 S.E.2d 240, 242 (2002); State v. Morgan, 352 S.C. 359, 574 S.E.2d 203, 206 (Ct. App. 2002). "Once the legislature has made [a] choice, there is no room for the courts to impose a different judgment based upon their own notions of public policy." S.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mumford, 299 S.C. 14, 382 S.E.2d 11, 14 (Ct. App. 1989). The Legislature's intent should be ascertained primarily from the plain language of the statute. State v. Landis, 362 S.C. 97, 606 S.E.2d 503, 505 (Ct. App. 2004). The language must be read in a sense which harmonizes with its subject matter and accords with its general purpose. Hitachi Data Sys. Corn. v. Leatherman, 309 S.C. 174, 420 S.E.2d 843, 846 ( 1992). What the Legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). When a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning. Miller v. Aiken, 364 S.C.

REMBERT

c. DENNIS BUILDING • POST OFFICE Box 11549 • COLUMBIA, SC 29211-1549 • TELEPHONE 803-734-3970 • FACSIMILE 803-253-6283

Mr. Holly
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December 22, 2011
303, 613 S.E.2d 364, 366 (2005); Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Bennettsville, 314 S.C. 137, 442 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1994). If a statute's language is unambiguous and clear, there is no need to employ the rules of statutory construction and a court has no right to look for or impose another meaning. Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 355 S.C. 361, 585 S.E.2d 292, 298 (2003); Paschal v. State Election Comm'n, 317 S.C. 434, 454 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1995); see also Timmons v. Tricentennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 175 S.E.2d 805, 817 (1970) ["Where the language of the statute is clear and explicit, the court cannot rewrite the statute and inject matters into it which are not in the legislature's language"]. In addition, it is well recognized that "[a] statute should not be construed by concentrating on any isolated phrase." Instead, "[i]n construing statutory language, the statute must be read as a whole and sections which are a part of the same general statutory law must be construed together and each one given effect." South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Jasper County, 368 S.C. 388, 398, 629 S.E.2d 624, 629 (2006). All provisions of a statute must be given full force and effect, if consistent. Bradford v. Byrnes, 221 S.C. 255, 70 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1952). Finally, it is well-settled that a specific statutory provision prevails over a more general one. Wooten v. S.C. Department of Transportation, 333 S.C. 464, 511 S.E.2d 355, 357 (1999). Turning now to your question, we note this office has previously concluded that elected officials were not entitled to accrue and be paid for either annual leave or sick leave. See Ops. S.C. Atty. Gen., March 31, 1987 [no payment for annual leave for elected, outgoing county supervisor]; January 10, 1983
[no sick or annual leave, or terminal leave pay, for elected officials, constitutional officers]; June 11, 1979
[no payment for unused "annual leave" for a county treasurer]; October 5, 1976 [no sick leave for officers elected on a statewide basis]; see also Op. S.C. Atty. Gen., October 2, 1978 [no sick or annual leave for a family court judge]. This remains the opinion of this office. Circuit solicitors are full-time employees of the state, see §1-7-325, but they may not accrue annual leave, because they are elected officials. Although circuit public defenders are deemed full-time state employees under § 17-3-510 (B), and are thus entitled to certain benefits accorded to state employees, we note that the Legislature specifically provided that circuit public defenders "must be compensated and have the same benefits as the circuit solicitor." A fortiori, circuit public defenders are not covered under leave policies established for state employees and may not accrue annual leave. 1 We deem the language of §17-3-510 (B) to be a limitation of the benefits otherwise afforded to circuit public defenders as state employees. Our interpretation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute and its general purpose. Had the Legislature intended for circuit public defenders to accrue annual leave or to be entitled to other benefits to which circuit solicitors are not, it would not have expressly limited the compensation and benefits of circuit public defenders to those of circuit solicitors. Any other interpretation of this specific provision would render the statute meaningless. There is "a presumption that the legislature intended to accomplish something with a statute rather than to engage in a futile exercise." Berkebile v. Outen, 311 S.C. 50, 426 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1993).

Because we answered your first question in the negative, we need not address whether circuit public defenders are entitled to terminal leave. 1

Mr. Holly
Page3
December 22, 2011
If you have any further questions, please advise.
Very truly yours,

~

N. Mark Rapoport
Senior Assistant Attorney General
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

~P · G/b-

iObert D. Cook
Deputy Attorney General

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